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Abstract 
In 2008, Cyclone Nargis devastated the low-lying Ayeyarwady Delta and more 
than 150,000 people died during the storm. It was the worst natural disaster in 
Myanmar’s history and globally it was one of the deadliest cyclones of all time. This 
thesis assesses the implications of Cyclone Nargis for the human security of delta 
communities in the past and the future. 
 
Using Cyclone Nargis as the focus event, the research investigates multiple 
dimensions of pre-existing vulnerability, strengths and weaknesses in the early 
warning and emergency response systems, and the dynamics of post-impact 
recovery. It argues that the roots of vulnerability and resilience were situated in the 
history of the national political regime in place at the time of the cyclone. The 
research is based on community narratives collected in 45 villages from three 
different marginal zones of the Ayeyarwady Delta. 
 
This study argues that disaster risk reduction and the promotion of human security in 
the Delta requires the expansion of community-based processes focusing on building 
community resilience and the better utilization of locally relevant physical assets for 
improved safety. These lessons from Cyclone Nargis should be incorporated into the 
national DRR framework. More broadly, beyond Myanmar this place-based study of 
rural communities should inform the connected issues of development, governance 
and disaster risk reduction. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The main objective of this dissertation is to analyze Cyclone Nargis in its three phases: 
pre-impact vulnerability, impact (storm emergency) and the post-impact recovery. 
Events along this horizontal timeline are investigated within the vulnerability, 
resilience and human security dimensions of the rural communities in the Ayeyarwady 
Delta of Myanmar. This empirical study, based on Cyclone Nargis’s exposure to the 
45 villages of the Delta, explores the community's experience of struggle, survival, 
and revival along with the community’s vertical linkages to national governance, and 
different political regimes.  
I started this research with the simple question ‘Why was Cyclone Nargis so deadly?’ 
Then the question expanded to ‘Which assets’ and ‘What processes’ helped individual 
survival and that of the community? Recognition of the importance of assets for 
people’s wellbeing is common in various livelihood studies (Ellis 2000; DFID 1999). 
In a village, assets appear as natural- and physical-disaster resilient features within the 
community. Nunan (2015) described the role of assets as not just being used but which 
‘give people capability to be and to act. Assets can be a source of power’ (p.112). A 
‘process’ refers to an action or a series of actions of a community to attain and maintain 
these safety assets and capabilities. In this study, community-based resilience 
knowledge that focuses on assets and process was drawn from three heavily impacted 
areas of the Ayeyarwady Delta. 
Cyclone Nargis not only ushered in dynamic civil society as a resilience aspect but 
also exhibited the tragic vulnerability of the people. More than 150,000 people were 
lost in the storm. In this introductory chapter, I will explain why the vulnerability, 
resilience and recovery aspects of Cyclone Nargis in remote villages were prioritized 
as crucial areas to examine. These explanations will be in the problem statement, 
followed by the significance of the research, research objectives, and research 
questions. Then, I will provide a brief background to Cyclone Nargis and a profile of 
the Ayeyarwady Delta. 
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1.1 Statement of the problem 
In comparison with cases of other mega-disasters, many aspects of Cyclone Nargis 
have not yet been explored due to restricted access to the Delta under the military 
regime that ruled the country from 1988 to 2010 before it handed over power to the 
semi-civilian government of President Thein Sein after the 2010 election. Currently, 
in a less-restrictive time of political transition, led by the National League for 
Democracy party which won a majority of seats in the parliament in 2015, Cyclone 
Nargis has become a nearly decade-old story and started to fade from collective 
memory. The purpose of this study is to revisit one of the deadliest disasters in history 
to locate community resilience and human security implications.      
When U Thein Sein, the President of Myanmar from 2011 to 2015, left office, he 
claimed that a series of spontaneous reforms had contributed to the political stability 
and economic progress of the country (Chongkittavorn 2017). In the five years of his 
administration, he named some positive indicators of reform – such as the spread of 
communication technology, higher political freedom, ease of restrictions on the 
censorship, economic performance and lowering national poverty, as ‘remarkable 
achievements’. While this progress is encouraging compared to the dismal state of 
affairs under the previous military regime (1988˗2010), deep-rooted vulnerability and 
development challenges still exist.  
From 2006 to 2016, Myanmar experienced two major earthquakes, three severe 
cyclones, floods and other smaller scale hazards (OCHA 2016). According to the UN 
risk model, Myanmar is ranked number one as the ‘most at risk country’ among other 
Asian and Pacific counterparts (OCHA 2016). In 2016, Myanmar ranked second out 
of 187 countries in the Global Climate Risk Index and nine out of 191 countries in the 
Index of Risk Management (INFORM 2017). Myanmar also has a high likelihood of 
medium-to-large-scale natural disasters occurring nearly every two years (Peer 2013). 
While several structural adjustments have been underway in disaster risk reduction 
policies (DRRWG 2013) in parallel with the ongoing political transition of the country, 
the vulnerability level for natural hazards is still high and critical areas of disaster risk 
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reduction, preparedness and adaptation still need to be significantly enhanced. In this 
regard, Cyclone Nargis could offer many lessons.   
The historical memory of Cyclone Nargis itself is fading as time passes on. Yet, 
questions such as, ‘What contributed to the disaster apart from the biophysical aspect 
of cyclone hazard?’ and ‘What do we need to do to prepare for future hazard 
scenarios?’ still need detailed explanation. Blaikie et al. (2004) stated that disasters are 
‘a complex mix of natural hazards and human action’ (p.5). In the context of Cyclone 
Nargis, human actions in terms of national political regimes and policy impacts to 
communities’ vulnerability still need to be examined in detail, and still need to go 
beyond casual reference to linkages as much as possible.  
Impacts and implications of the military regime’s policies on several aspects of 
Myanmar, such as health, education and the economy, were already under scrutiny in 
various studies. But the impacts of policy on the specific geography of the Delta and 
the people living there in the context of Cyclone Nargis still need to be explored 
further. This study attempts to do that by revisiting Cyclone Nargis in multiple 
dimensions and situations of vulnerability, resiliency and recovery in national political 
context.  
The lack of human security was a critical issue affecting the people of Myanmar for 
decades and was most visibly revealed in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis’s landfall 
when the government tried to block aid to the Delta. The core meaning of human 
security is stated in the UNDP 1994 report as ‘protection from sudden and hurtful 
disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, jobs or in communities’ 
(UNDP 1994, p.23). The current political transition raises hope of progressing towards 
a more secure and prosperous Myanmar. Myanmar, in this particular time of change, 
needs to configure the implications of frequent disasters to poverty, human 
development, and human security. Observation of community processes and assets for 
resilience under different political regimes, past and present, can inform policy 
formulation for human security. As Blaikie (2004) notes, disasters inhibit societal 
progress in many ways (Blaikie et al. 2003). 
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Two gaps were noted here as regards Cyclone Nargis. The first gap is difficulty in 
getting community narratives, especially from the people who lived there, experienced 
the storm, and have been enduring the post-impact phase. Until the recent political 
changes their voices were not fully heard, and community aspects before and after 
Cyclone Nargis have not been fully incorporated into disaster risk reduction 
knowledge. Especially for early warning systems, community aspects are crucial for 
the effectiveness of the system. Cyclone Nargis identified issues and areas that could 
undermine early warning processes and did not effectively help to save people lives.  
The second gap comes from the challenge of connecting and studying different 
marginal areas of the Delta due to geographical barriers of complex waterways. As 
Bankoff (2003) noted, no disaster has the same impact on everyone. In this context, 
marginality and aid inequality happened after Cyclone Nargis with continuing impacts 
on the recovery process. The differences among social structures and the different 
geographical entities in the regions affected by Cyclone Nargis need to be analyzed 
for effective humanitarian and developmental work in Myanmar and beyond.  
 
Figure 1 Dimensions of Cyclone Nargis focused on in this study 
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Thus, this study assumes that the dynamics of community in the context of Cyclone 
Nargis will shed light on various factors that could build or undermine human security 
and resilience. As shown in Figure 1, this research will explore Cyclone Nargis from 
pre-impact vulnerability, early warning system, cyclone emergency and recovery 
aspects while impacts and influences of national political regimes will be analyzed 
along with community experience.   
The disaster revealed vulnerability as well as the resilience of the community. 
Community resilience exists in various ways even under difficult situations. In the 
Delta, as in most parts of Myanmar, village community is the smallest administrative 
unit; there are 63,860 villages in the whole country. It is these small-unit communities 
that have to grapple with the consequences of disasters and development that often 
originate beyond their domain. Community resilience is often exhibited in the form of 
collective community efforts in these villages. Cyclone Nargis offers a deeper 
understanding of what contributes to local communities’ resilience in struggle, 
survival and recovery from disaster. Few of these aspects have been explored so far 
and they can provide strategy to enhance resilience and long-term human security.  
1.2 Research objectives 
The general aims of this study are: 
(1) To capture multidimensional disaster vulnerability and resilience in the pre-
impact phase in communities of the Delta in the context of Cyclone Nargis.  
(2) To identify crucial aspects of early warning, evacuation and coping capacity in 
the storm emergency or impact phase of Cyclone Nargis from the perspective 
of community as well as the government and other institutions.  
(3) To assess the capital, capabilities and resilience process of communities and to 
explore human security linkages to socio-political and environmental change 
factors. 
(4) To understand the factors that contribute to recovery, resilience and disaster 
preparedness in the post-impact phase, which is characterized by changes in 
civil society and the national-level policy framework.   
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1.3 Research questions 
The research questions to provide guidance to the whole process of examining the 
three regions of the Delta are as follows: 
(1) What are the conditions that caused vulnerability in the Delta community 
before Cyclone Nargis and how have these conditions been changing over time 
under different political regimes in Myanmar?  
(2) What contributed to the differential impacts of the early warning and 
evacuation processes of the different communities against the backdrop of the 
actions or inactions of the government and institutions to ensure human 
security? 
(3) How do the village communities assess their recovery processes and outcomes 
in the three research zones and how do their assessments identify issues in the 
resiliency and human security of community?  
1.4 Scope of the research 
This study traces back to the dynamics of resilience along the horizontal timeline of 
the pre-impact, impact (storm emergency), and post-impact phases in the community’s 
experience in the three selected research zones. Using primary sources from the village 
narrative as the basic research component, additional content from expert interviews, 
and secondary sources such as media content and official documents were 
incorporated into this research.  
Besides the justification that village selection was made based on geographical 
positions at the margin of the Delta, the three different zones for the research were 
constructed based on the time scale of the landfall of the cyclone at each place. Zone 
I was the very first area where the cyclone made landfall and the storm path passed 
directly through it. Then the cyclone track passed near the Zone II area. It then 
continued to the upper Northeastern part of the Delta and affected Zone III. All three 
zones were highly impacted areas and suffered from the storm surge with high loss of 
life and property. The field studies in the three different zones permitted me to compare 
similar or differing experiences in each phase of the cyclone time line. 
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There are several limitations regarding the scope of the study. Firstly, exploration of 
pre-existing vulnerability needs the research to trace back to historical accounts and 
policy literature whenever impacts on the Delta are implied. Vulnerability indexes or 
quantified indicators of the Delta before Cyclone Nargis are very rare. This limitation 
partly comes from the difficulties of collecting data under a military government for 
decades. Yet, some socio-political analysis is available to identify causal links to 
vulnerability.  
Another limitation of this research comes from the limited focus on individual and 
household levels because the data were collected mostly in focus group discussions 
representing the village level. As the community’s initiatives and experiences are at 
the center of this inquiry, the field study intended to provide village-level information 
rather than for household and individuals. Although this approach allows collective 
narratives to emerge and instant verification of accuracy in a village community 
setting, household-level dynamics and measurements could not be provided in this 
research.  
Finally, as stated in the analysis on the recovery phase, disaster risk reduction aspects 
can only be covered in the recovery phase with a focus on community’s processes and 
safety assets regarding disaster preparedness. This limitation comes from overlapping 
boundaries between relief, reconstruction, short-term and long-term recovery. As 
human security focus in the context of disaster is central theme in this research, a 
narrower scope of the study was formulated to look at the whole recovery process with 
a focus on disaster risk reduction. In this regard, the dynamics of changes within the 
community are explored to locate possible opportunities, and missed opportunities to 
build community resilience and reduce vulnerability.  
 1.5 Significance of the research 
Regardless of remarkable economic growth in recent decades, inequality is still rising 
and too stubborn to be alleviated in Asia. As Bankoff (2003) argued, ‘the most 
vulnerable are the poorest; that billion or so of humanity whose extreme poverty leaves 
them little choice but to continue living in marginal urban and rural areas most at risk 
from these hazards’ (Bankoff 2003, p.18). An estimated 500 million people remain 
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trapped in extreme poverty (UNESCAP 2016). In the current climate change context, 
ordinary citizens living in unevenly vulnerable areas have increasingly been suffering 
from the climate-induced disaster. Especially in Southeast Asian countries where the 
temperature is predicted to rise about 3 to 4°C over the next 80 years, economic loss 
in these countries is likely to hinder the effectiveness of poverty reduction policies and 
programs. As Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Human Security, Ms. 
Mehrnaz Mostafavi, Chief of the United Nations Human Security Unit stresses,  
When seriously thinking about all of the dimensions of DRR, measures similar to 
the human security approach naturally come to the forefront. But I believe that by 
making the human security approach more explicit in our disaster risk reduction 
efforts, we will be able to better plan and prepare for disaster prevention without 
leaving the most vulnerable people behind. (Speech at Tohoku University, Miyagi, 
Japan on 17 March 2015) 
This study which revealed a pattern of human vulnerabilities and resilience in the 
disaster-affected region of one of the poorest Asian countries explains that human 
security approach has much potential to contribute to disaster risk reduction policy-
making in impoverished part of Asia that needs a variety of coping strategy. 
Understanding emergency risk management in the authoritarian state with a very weak 
DRR institution also carries lessons about the danger of top-down decision-making 
that undermines the safety of the people. 
The existing body of literature on Cyclone Nargis is concentrated on the following 
issues:  
(1) Responsibility to protect (APCFR2P 2008; Barber 2009; Bellamy and Beeson 
2010; Haacke 2009; Junk 2016; Kovach 2013; Özerdem 2010) 
(2) Political impacts of Cyclone Nargis on future democratization (Cheesman et   
al. 2010; International Crisis Group 2008) 
(3)  Human rights violations at the time of Cyclone Nargis and politics of aid 
(Belanger and Horsey 2008; Grey 2009; Human Rights Watch 2010; Lwin 
2015; Martin and Margesson 2008; Sari 2012; Seekins 2009a; Seekins 2009b; 
Selth 2008; Stover and Vinck 2008; Than 2009) 
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(4) Disaster diplomacy and the role of ASEAN from an international relations 
perspective (Amador 2009; Haacke 2008; Kapucu 2011; Lateef 2009; Roberts 
2014) 
(5) Role of civil society (Center for Conflict and Peace Studies 2009; Kramer 
2011) 
(6) Public health (Htut 2015; Guha-Sapir and Vogt 2008; Kim et al.2010; Shwe et 
al. 2013) 
(7) Environment and forestry (Aung et al. 2013; Driel and Nauta 2014; Fritz et al. 
2009; Theilen-Willige and Pararas-Carayannis 2009; Leake 2013; Lin et al. 
2009; Pattanaik 2009; Saito et al. 2010; The Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery 2013; UNEP 2009) 
(8) Science of Cyclone Nargis (Casey 2008)  
(9) Impacts and social vulnerability (South et al. 2011) 
(10)Recovery experience (James and Paton 2015; Wai 2015; Win et al. 2011).  
While many studies have focused on particular issues related to Cyclone Nargis within 
a given timeframe, this study moves along the timeline of Cyclone Nargis and attempts 
to consider little-known areas of early warning and analysis on the community struggle 
at storm emergency. This knowledge is expected to enhance disaster risk reduction 
work in Myanmar. Short-term and long-term recovery phases were also analyzed from 
the perspective of the community’s safety and human security to understand resilience 
and vulnerability of the present-day Delta.  
This research tries to add new knowledge on Cyclone Nargis, the Delta region and 
disaster risk reduction of Myanmar in two ways: (1) The study brings marginality 
aspects and explores the village communities situated at the edge of the Delta to 
discover how the issues of vulnerability and resiliency are constituted, and (2) the 
study attempts to link a micro narrative of the local communities and a macro narrative 
of national regimes and institutions. Together with other studies on Myanmar, this 
research is expected to serve in advancing community resilience and human security. 
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1.6 Background to Cyclone Nargis 
On 2 May 2008, the day started as normal for many of the residents of the Delta even 
while they kept hearing news of a storm over the Bay of Bengal. As it was around the 
onset of the monsoon, the farmers started to work in the fields for the rice-growing 
season and the fishing folks were winding down at the end of the summer fishing 
season. Internal migrant workers on the salt production farms also worked in the field 
to complete their annual seasonal jobs. 
A mother left her three children at home and followed her husband who had already 
gone to the paddy field to live there temporarily for a time-bound harvest. The farm 
hut was far from the village and other farmers from the village were also reaping the 
yield of summer paddy in the field. They were believed dead as survivor friends saw 
them struggle before drowning by drifting along the storm wave. Their three surviving 
children found themselves orphans on the very next morning of 3 May 2008.   
In a Karen village called Sar Chat from Ngapudaw, a group of church-based volunteers 
and university students who were regarded as the brightest and most trusted in their 
village set out with a boat to go to another Christian village to join a social gathering. 
Apart for one student, the whole boat perished in the cyclone. The storm surge 
deprived the village of its potential leaders. All the hope and energy of almost two 
dozen families also disappeared.   
In less than 24 hours after the initial landfall in the Delta, more than 150,000 people 
died and 2.4 million out of 4.7 million survivors living in townships were severely 
affected (Mathieson 2009). While several thousand lives abruptly ended overnight, 
millions of survivors were in distress, struggling to live and rebuild their shattered 
lives. Since 1990, Cyclone Nargis was the second deadliest storm in the world after 
Cyclone Gorky in Bangladesh in 1991 (Doocy et al. 2013). 
Cyclone Nargis started out as a low-pressure system that formed in the Bay of Bengal 
on 27 April. The India Meteorological Department declared that the low-pressure 
system had strengthened to a tropical depression and later upgraded it to cyclone status, 
which is equivalent to a Category 1 hurricane, on 28 April 2008. On that day, the 
           
          
 
24 
 
cyclone remained stationary over the warm Bay of Bengal with a higher intensity due 
to high pressure ridges to the northwest and southwest.  
On the morning of 29 April, there was wind of 100 mph (161 km/h) which is the 
equivalent of a Category 2 hurricane. Later on that day, it later weakened and began 
to move in the northeast direction. It was also downgraded to a tropical storm (NASA 
2008). On 1 May, it began to intensify rapidly and tracked back to the east while 
returning to cyclone status. By 2 May, it reached peak intensity with winds of 135 mph 
(217 km/h), which is the equivalent of a Category 4 hurricane. With the same or greater 
intensity, Cyclone Nargis made landfall in the Southwest of Myanmar on 2 May 2008. 
When the storm moved inland, it remained strong especially when it passed along the 
coast of the Ayeyarwady Delta. This is a normal pattern that can be exhibited by a 
cyclone as it moves over land. When it reached Yangon in the late night of 2 May and 
the early morning of 3 May, the wind speed was still 80 mph (129 km/h, Category 1). 
After moving inland in a northeast direction, the system dissipated on 3 May 2008 
(Hurricane Science 2008). 
After the cyclone’s landfall, the following issues appeared in media headlines around 
the globe:  
• Deadly impacts of the cyclone  
• Questioning if the government failed to warn its people 
• The military government’s blockage of aid from foreign countries and initial 
restrictions upon the movement of civil society inside the country 
• Proposition of the forced delivery of aid according to the principle of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ and positioning of US and French naval ships along 
the Myanmar coast but, later the proposal was withdrawn 
• Flurry of disaster diplomacy involving the United Nations, United States of 
America, the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)  
• High profile visit of the UN Secretary General to urge the military regime to 
open a normalized aid channel 
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• Remarkable efforts of civil society inside Myanmar to help the disaster 
survivors in the Delta 
• Agreement with ASEAN to form a coordination body for humanitarian aid and 
recovery of the Delta.  
1.7 Background to the Ayeyarwady Delta 
The Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy) River is Myanmar’s largest river (about 2,170 km long) 
and the country’s most important commercial waterway, with a drainage area of about 
411,000 km2 (Kravtsova et al. 2009). The Ayeyarwady River starts in Kachin State, at 
the confluence of the Mali Hka and N’Mai Hka Rivers, and bisects the country from 
the north to the south. The Delta branches into several mouths forming an extensive 
alluvial plain and empties into the Andaman Sea. Kravtsova et al. (2009, p.247) discuss 
that the Ayeyarwady Delta was formed some 6,000 years ago, and has prograded since 
then. The head of the Ayeyarwady Delta is located 40 km downstream of the town of 
Myan Aung and 30 km upstream of the town of Hinthada. Being rich with alluvial 
plains and marine deposits, the Delta extends to cover an area of 31,000 km (Brichieri-
Colombi 1983) that is as wide as 204 km from west to the east on a straight line and 
as long as 290 km from north to the south (Simmance 2013). Hedley et al. (2010) cited 
Aung (2003) that the tidal influence extended up to 300 km inland with penetration of 
saline water around 100 km upstream.  
Administratively, most of the Delta falls into the Ayeyarwady Region (until 2011 
‘Regions’ were called ‘Divisions’; that is why the old name was ‘Ayarwaddy 
Division’). The Ayeyarwady Region alone is composed of 26 townships and the 
capital, formerly known as Bassein, is now called Pathein (Seekins 2006). In the whole 
Ayeyarwady Delta, the rivers and creeks are interwoven and most of the villages, 
towns, farmland and forests are flat except for some low hills (Volker 1964). The 
river’s sedimentation together with seasonal flooding is important for rice growing and 
it has made the Delta one of the world’s major rice production areas (Than 2001).  
Due to its fertile soil for agriculture, the population density of 85 people capita per 
square kilometer in 1964 was more than three times higher than the country average 
at that time (Volker 1964). In comparison with the 3.5 million population size of the 
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whole Delta in 1964 (Volker 1964, p.4), the population nowadays is two times higher 
(Department of Population 2015). Today, the Region alone has 6.17 million people 
according to the 2014 census. The Ayeyarwady Delta, combining the Ayeyarwady 
Region and the Yangon Region, remained the most populated area in the census. With 
both regions combined, over 16 per cent of Myanmar’s population lives in the Delta. 
In terms of gender ratio, the female population is higher than the male population in 
the Delta. Although the Ayeyarwady Region is densely populated, over 86 per cent of 
the people live in rural areas. In the Ayeyarwady Region, rural population is correlated 
with agriculture and fishing as the whole region has very little industrial-based 
manufacturing. The rural population in the Ayeyarwady Region is even higher than 
the national average rate, equivalent to 70 per cent (Department of Population 2015). 
A list of the villages participated in this research are shown in Appendix 1.  
1.8 Chapter overview 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter justifies why Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008 needs revisiting for the 
purpose of inquiring into human security and resilience. In comparison with other 
mega-disasters, the number of past studies on Cyclone Nargis is still limited, partly 
due to limited access to Myanmar under the long military rule. This chapter explains 
the objectives of the study and reasons for the framing of the problems in the context 
of the past- and present-day Delta in relation to vulnerablity and resiliency. This 
chapter also provides a brief outline of Cyclone Nargis, the Ayeyarwady Delta and its 
socio-economic background for easy reference when research progresses in the next 
chapters.  
Chapter 2 Literature review 
This chapter situates Cyclone Nargis research in human security concepts. It makes 
the case that state security under the previous military regime weakened the human 
security of citizens as illustrated during Cyclone Nargis and in its aftermath. This 
chapter analyzes the current state of knowledge of human security, linking the 
concepts of vulnerability and resilience in the context of disaster. The chapter also 
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assembles existing literature on Cyclone Nargis to update and locate existing gaps so 
far in fields related to disaster research and other disciplines that emphasize the impact 
of the storm on communities in the Ayeyarwady Delta.  
Chapter 3 Research methodology 
This chapter explains the choice of theory, method and design, and data analysis tools 
linked with outcomes in the findings. Primarily, it justifies the use of a qualitative 
approach for disaster research using a case study method. It outlines the organization 
of field trips while reasoning for the selection of research sites to retrieve community 
narratives from villages at the different edges of the Delta. This chapter also explains 
how the C Model of Quarantelli (1987) and process tracing were applied to data 
collection and, in the next step, data organization and data analysis. The use of 
secondary data such as media, academic literature, government reports, and other types 
of documents is also explained in the data triangulation process to validate the results 
of the field research. Geographical profiles of the three research zones (spread out in 
four townships) are provided in this chapter.  
Chapter 4 Road to vulnerability 
This chapter examines Myanmar in general and the Delta society in particular under 
different political regimes in order to explain existing vulnerability before Cyclone 
Nargis made landfall. Relying mostly on historical accounts in combination with 
historical community experience, this chapter makes the case for national policy 
impacts on the vulnerability of communities, weakening people’s capital. It 
emphasizes the roots of the pre-existing vulnerability that weakened the human 
security of people when a hazard, in the form of Cyclone Nargis reached land. An 
increase of vulnerability in the Delta throughout the ages is also analyzed with an 
emphasis on the environmental decline attributed to weak natural resource governance 
in the 20 years before Cyclone Nargis.  
Chapter 5 Revisiting the early warning system 
Early warning is a major component of a community’s disaster resilience. This chapter 
revisits debate over whether the Myanmar government took sufficient action to warn 
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the public about the approaching Cyclone Nargis. As can be seen from the huge loss 
of life (more than 150,000), the early warning system was obviously not functioning 
to save lives. This chapter examines how these shortcomings ended in disaster and 
how the community responded to the early warning system. The function of the early 
warning system is analyzed in its vertical order of information flows from the national 
institutional level, which involved institutions and political stakeholders, to the 
community level. After Cyclone Nargis the early warning system has been updated. 
This chapter gives an emphasis to the need for human capital and community 
initiatives at the receiving end of warnings so as to make the system successful.  
Chapter 6 Community resilience and vulnerability in storm emergency 
At Cyclone Nargis’s landfall, the chaotic response of the former military regime 
resulted in a global outcry. The news about the initial blockage of aid and the debate 
over relief efforts on the international stage were in media headlines all over the world. 
The struggle and survival of local people during the storm were mostly drowned out 
in the urgent need for relief and reconstruction. Nevertheless, this chapter argues there 
is much to learn from the community’s struggle during the impact phase (emergency 
during cyclone landfall). Based on the community narratives, this chapter identifies 
two aspects of the community crucial in emergency situations: assets for safety, mostly 
in the form of physical structures that are used as refuges to resist wind and storm 
surge, and processes for safety, mostly in the form of a community’s sequences of 
actions to evacuate and support each other during the storm. Emergency response is 
discussed as a social process that supports crucial elements for safety while a shortage 
of stronger structures put limits on chances of survival.  
Chapter 7 Dynamics of recovery 
This chapter presents the results so far from the recovery process (long-term recovery 
which is assumed to still be ongoing). As the attention from the national government, 
and humanitarian and development organizations, mostly shifted to other areas and 
issues of Myanmar, the current state of the Delta is explained in the context of safety 
and sustainability, which directly correspond to disaster resilience. Recovery processes 
and an outcomes framework are utilized to assess the changes in a village community 
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while a comparison of the recovery outcomes in the three research zones outlines the 
factors that make a difference. The community’s social networks for resource 
mobilization and engagement with the outside in the form of linking and bridging 
social capital were among determinants for reconstruction and recovery. The findings 
in this chapter show that local participation and ownership are the main attributes for 
building long-term resilience.   
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
Based on the results shown in the previous chapters that discuss the pre-impact, the 
impact and the post-impact phases of Cyclone Nargis, this final chapter synthesizes 
the findings from the aforementioned chapters and underlines the lessons that 
Myanmar needs to incorporate for disaster risk reduction in the Delta and Myanmar. 
This chapter also stresses that a community-based approach in early warning, disaster 
preparedness, and recovery is essential. However, the resistance of deep-rooted 
vulnerability can only be curbed when bottom-up initiatives of the people can bridge 
with the national disaster risk management policy framework that is committed to 
providing resources and knowledge. Enabling an environment for community 
members to enhance community processes and assets for resilience and human 
security is also highlighted in the conclusion.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
2. Introduction 
In a disaster, impacts can be mitigated when the human factors are carefully 
considered. Although hazards caused by ‘nature’ are often inevitable, ‘the impact of 
natural disaster can be significantly mitigated by the right kind of human anticipation 
and policy, and significantly exacerbated by the wrong kind of human action’ (Bacon 
2014, p.36). Than (2007, p.177) recalls Myanmar’s government position on security 
around the time of Cyclone Nargis as Myanmar’s ‘overwhelmingly state-centered 
national security perspective’. While national sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
national unity were the top agenda of the state, human security had been jeopardized 
in many ways (Than 2007). As Blaikie et al. (2004) noted, ‘Disasters are a complex 
mix of natural hazards and human action’ and the disaster event triggered by the 
‘natural’ mechanisms, ‘has often been complicated by human action – both by efforts 
to palliate the effects of disaster and by the social causation of vulnerability’ (Blaikie 
et al. 2004, p.5).  
The drivers of disaster vulnerability and resilience in the pre-impact phase, impact 
phase and post-impact phase of Cyclone Nargis in this study are examined in light of 
human security theory. Also, marginality is highlighted; as Suhrke (1999) noted ‘if the 
essence of human security is reduced vulnerability, policies to this end could be 
aggregated into a ‘human security regime’ (p.273). Cyclone Nargis is set as one of the 
examples of the former regime’s failure to incorporate a human security component in 
disaster risk management (Than 2009; Seekins 2009). In this study, people-centered 
and protective values of a human security approach (UN 2009) are applied to further 
investigate ways to reduce disaster vulnerability and increase resilience to disaster 
among the Deltaic communities. Conceptual links between human security and 
resilience, and the recovery process after Cyclone Nargis are explored in this chapter.  
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2.1 Human security 
Human security is a concept that has been much contested since it was championed in 
the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP 1994). At the end of the Cold War, the 
human security perspective emerged as a new way of looking at security by which 
people’s lives are placed at the center (Acharya 2007; Matthew et al. 2009; Sen 2014). 
The human security approach has broadened ‘the scope of security analysis and policy 
from territorial security to the security of people’ (Gómez and Gasper 2013, p.2). In 
the context of the human security discussion, approaches to and understanding the 
security of the people have reoriented from being free from physical violence to the 
incorporation of other imminent threats that people are facing (Bacon and Hobson 
2014b). Liotta and Owen (2006) argued,  
In ethical terms, human security is both a ‘system’ and a systemic practice that 
promotes and sustains stability, security, and progressive integration of 
individuals within their relationships to their states, societies, and regions. In 
abstract but understandable terms, human security allows individuals the 
pursuit of life, liberty, and both happiness and justice. (p.40) 
The relationship between the state and the people was redefined by the introduction of 
the human security approach. Human security as a concept has been successful in 
challenging the predominant view of treating a military security structure as meeting 
national security priorities. Sen (2014), argues twenty-first censutry presents ‘both the 
challenges to security and its protectors’ in a much higher level of complexity (Sen 
2014, p.27). Reflecting the realities, Sen concludes that ‘The state remains the 
fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfill its security obligations – 
and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people’ (Sen 2014, p.27).  
When human security was introduced by the Human Development Report of the UN, 
it clarified that human security cannot be equated with human development (UNDP 
1994). In terms of definition, human development is defined as ‘a process of widening 
the range of people’s choice’ while the people who live with human security ‘can 
exercise these choices safely and freely’ and ‘they can be relatively confident that the 
opportunities they have today are not totally lost tomorrow’ (UNDP 1994, p.23). In 
this report, the UNDP designates human security into seven categories: ‘economic 
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security (freedom from poverty), food security (access to food) , health security (access 
to health care and protection from disease), environmental security (protection from 
such dangers as environmental depletion and pollution), personal security (physical 
safety from things such as torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, 
suicide and traffic accidents), community security (survival of traditional cultures and 
ethnic groups as well as the physical security of these groups), and political security 
(enjoyment of civil and political rights, and freedom from oppression)’(UNDP 1994, 
pp. 23˗33).  
Thakur (1997) elaborated a broader meaning of human security as follows:  
Human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. 
Anything which degrades their quality of life – demographic pressures, 
diminished access to or stock of resources, and so on – is a security threat. 
Conversely, anything which can upgrade their quality of life – economic 
growth, improved access to resources, social and political empowerment, and 
so on – is an enhancement of human security. (Thakur 1997, p.53) 
In more than two decades, human security has expanded its space in terms of concept 
and policy applications. UNESCO called it a ‘paradigm in the making’ (UNESCO 
2008, p.3). Helen James also stresses the space of civil society in the making of human 
security, saying: ‘The human security discourse creates a special space in civil society-
state relations in which state performance can be monitored and assessed’ (James 
2006, p.10).  
2.2. Human security debates 
In the context of global climate change, the human security problems coming from 
disasters are obvious downside risks, indicating that the safety and normal routine of 
daily life in many countries are disturbed by disaster than armed conflicts (Bacon and 
Hobson 2014b; Purvis and Busby 2004). In the definition of the Canadian government, 
human security means ‘freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or 
lives’ (UNESCO 2008, p.xx). While the UNDP and Japanese references to human 
security emphasize security from fear and want, the Canadian focus is on life-
threatening threats and situations that constitute fear (Konrad 2006). The Canadian 
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approach is viewed as a narrower interpretation of human security, preventing physical 
violence and protecting civil rights only (Hobson 2014; Ewan 2007). The rule of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is primarily a tool that is developed out of the narrow 
version of human security according to the Outcome Document of the 2005 United 
Nations World Summit and the Secretary-General’s 2009 Report (A/63/677) (UNGA 
2009).  
In the R2P principle, the UN recognized that the state carries the primary responsibility 
for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing. If a state is obviously failing to protect its population, the 
international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect the 
population, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UNSC 2015). 
Hubbard et al. (2011) argue that the human security approach in R2P can be 
misunderstood by some countries as justification for intervention. Moreover, R2P can 
only handle cases of human security in the form of threats of violence. As ‘R2P still 
requires state-based and supranational response’, it contrasts with a more holistic 
human security approach that brings engagement with multiple stakeholders including 
individual citizens, NGOs and all levels of government (p.338).  
The Canadian approach and the Norwegian approach, which also favors protection of 
civil rights as an action of human security (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007), and the UN 
Trust Fund for Human Security expand the principle of human security in policy 
making that aims ‘to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance 
human freedoms and human fulfilment’ (UNTFHS 2009, p.5). It is noted that the 
limiting of human security to a narrower definition such as freedom from war or 
conflict is possible, yet does not reflect the yearning of people for security not only 
from the perspective of freedom from fear but also freedom from want (Acharya 2001).  
However, there has been criticism for taking extensive fields of people-related issues, 
which Buzan calls ‘normal politics’ into the security agenda (Buzan 2004; Krause 
1998; Mack 2004; MacFarlane and Khong 2006). Buzan (2004) rejects the idea of 
securitizing social and political issues as human security claiming that ‘The idea also 
risks mixing up the quite different agendas of international security, on the one hand, 
and social security and civil liberties’ (p.370). Critics also pointed to the vagueness of 
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the concept and its applicability to the policy realm (Ewan 2007; James 2014). An 
influential work by MacFarlane and Khong (2006) also criticizes the purpose of the 
human security concept for its applicability: 
Analysts who have examined the effectiveness of this instrumental use of the 
notion are doubtful whether it has been successful in persuading states to divert 
significant resources from military security to items associated with human 
security. (p.236) 
When MacFarlane and Khong (2006) stressed the possible pitfalls of the human 
security concept, they pointed out that the concept extends to almost every threat that 
can undermine the wellbeing of the individual citizen, and it is likely that stakeholders 
will pick up the wrong priority among many other items calling for attention. 
Prioritizing the right issue at the right time is not easy, especially when all the threats 
may also mutually interact and create a series of complex outcomes when their causes 
and effects ‘lump’ together (MacFarlane and Khong 2006, p.241). They also argue that 
military measures will be installed everywhere if too many issues are put into a security 
platform (MacFarlane and Khong 2006). 
The UN ruled out the potential of problem-solving for every human security issue with 
arms by clarifying the meaning of the human security approach in October 2012. 
Articles (c) and (d) of Resolution (66/290) of the General Assembly of the UN 
described the meaning of human security as:  
(c) Human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development 
and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights 
(d) The notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect 
and its implementation 
(e) Human security does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive 
measures. Human security does not replace State security. (UNGA 2012, p.2) 
The critics of MacFarlane and Khong (2006) have also been counterchallenged by 
several proponents of human security (Owen 2014; Gasper 2010). Owen (2014) 
counterclaims that these two authors’ proposal is to defend the place of old-fashioned 
(state) security studies: 
           
          
 
35 
 
They aim to reserve the term ‘protection’ only for the protection of life against 
violent attack, as if protection of health, and protection of anything else against 
anything else, is not ‘protection’. Security claims are claims of existential 
threat, meant to justify priority response. Attempts to limit such prioritization 
to one type of threat, such as threats of physical damage from physical violence, 
and/or one type of referent/target such as the state, are arbitrary. (Owen 2014, 
p.34) 
After two decades of debate on conceptualizations of human security, a few authors 
have attempted to clarify the human security concept for applicability purposes by 
putting more emphasis on its protection-based policy orientation (James 2014; Owen 
2014). Owen (2014) distinguished human security from ‘neighboring concepts’ such 
as human development and human rights. He also proposed that a broad definition that 
is used by the UN is the best so far for conceptual integrity but a new definition is also 
needed for policy relevance.  His new definition of human security is ‘the protection 
of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, 
economic, food, health, personal and political threats’ (Owen 2014, p.63). James 
(2014) defined human security in the context of disaster risk reduction policy, 
emphasizing˗ ‘the sustainable protection and provision of the material conditions for 
meeting the embodied needs of people, and the protection of the variable existential 
conditions for maintaining a dignified life’ (p.87). 
Thomas (2000) agrees with this comprehensive approach in the pursuit of human 
security. The material needs of people such as food, shelter, education and healthcare 
must to be fulfilled but the non-material aspects of human security are not negligible. 
She insists, 
The qualitative aspect of human security is about the achievement of human 
dignity which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one’s life and 
unhindered participation in the life of the community. Emancipation from 
oppressive power structures, be they global, national or local in origin and 
scope, is necessary for human security. (Thomas 2000, p.6) 
Human security in this broader scope has a three-dimensional agenda as it 
encompasses security, development, and rights that are essential points in protecting 
individual human life and dignity (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007; UNTFHS 2009).  
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2.3 Human security in disaster risk management 
In Amartya Sen’s view, the challenge of development can be overcome only when 
deep poverty is eliminated and people can resist sudden and severe hardship (Sen 
1999). Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007) caution about development, saying 
‘development itself holds the seed of the raison d'être of human security’ (p.99). These 
authors also add that ‘sudden downturns can erase development gains’ (p.115). 
Moreover, if governments fail to give timely responses to human security issues, 
hazards can also lead to political disaster: ‘failure to deal with hazards that have a 
direct impact on the safety, security, and wellbeing of millions of people could 
endanger the legitimacy of their regimes, triggering political unrest’ (Gerstl and 
Helmke 2012, p.136).  
Disasters with potential to halt human development were discussed in the 1994 UNDP 
human development report as an integral part of environmental insecurity. Since 
disaster frequency has not abated in the last few decades but rather increased, the use 
of a human security approach in disaster risk reduction is now more widely discussed 
(Futamura et al. 2011). O’Brien and Barnett (2013) note that ‘the prospects for human 
security are deeply affected by local and global processes of environmental change’ 
(p.4).  
The Japanese government has been promoting disaster risk reduction with a human 
security approach as an essential part of its foreign policy. The Japan International 
Cooperation Agency has promoted the human security approach in disaster risk 
reduction for its added value:  
• The human security approach can emphasize the necessity of investing 
not only in hard infrastructure such as sea walls, earthquake resilient 
buildings, floodways, and early-warning systems, but also in soft 
infrastructure that make social systems more responsive and resilient. 
Planning and preparation for a disaster should include the 
understanding of the complexity of a society, such as ethnic 
composition and local history 
• The people-centered aspect of human security could shed light on the 
needs of the most vulnerable in disaster affected areas. The elderly, 
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women and people with disabilities often suffer disproportionately in 
major natural disasters. In providing goods and facilities to disaster-
affected areas, it is important to take into consideration gender and the 
needs of the most vulnerable. Otherwise, this well-intended 
humanitarian aid runs the risk of being of little use to these groups or 
even negatively affecting human dignity. Vulnerable individuals who 
are likely to be the most adversely affected by disasters should be 
given the opportunity to actively participate in the planning and 
preparation against disasters 
• The human security approach can also encourage DRR activities to 
consider the importance of survivors’ human security (Tanaka 2015). 
In the context of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, human rights abuse and the failure of 
development were accounted as factors in increasing vulnerability and insecurity. 
When a powerful natural hazard in the form of Cyclone Nargis reached land, these 
vulnerabilities and insecurities resulted in human tragedy and disaster while the state-
centric security agenda failed to protect people. Also, cyclone damage brought human 
insecurity to millions of people and the livelihood assets of people or relative wealth 
accumulation of families diminished, further linking human security issues and the 
disaster.  
2.4 The human security in the context of Myanmar 
At the regional level, ASEAN has made frequent reference to a people-oriented 
ASEAN and adopted it as a direction of association (Gerard 2014). Nevertheless, many 
countries in the region have been known to compromise human security for the sake 
of state security priorities (Nishikawa 2010). Acharya (2001) challenges the concept 
of ‘comprehensive security’ (p.443) that is often mentioned in the ASEAN context that 
focuses on economic development and social stability while the dignity of humans as 
individuals is largely discounted (UNESCO 2008). Most of the Southeast Asian 
governments claimed that human security is not something to be rejected. 
Nevertheless, there are some areas of tension between national security approach and 
state security in Southeast Asian countries (Acharya 2007). In 2005, Surin Pitsuwan, 
a former Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs and member of the Commission on Human 
Security told Acharya (2007) in a personal communication that: 
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Where is human security in Southeast Asia: not very far? If there is any region 
that is suspicious of external involvement or jealous of the concept of 
sovereignty, it is Southeast Asia. The concept of sovereignty is still very sacred 
here. ASEAN is yet to adopt human security. (p.21) 
In a long history of military dominance in Myanmar, regime security in the guise of 
state security is the main agenda of the military and ruling generals (Steinberg 2010). 
When Surin Pitsuwan called on the ASEAN community in 2000 to put human security 
at the center of policy-making in both development and international relations of 
member states, Myanmar was widely criticized for lacking concern for the security of 
ordinary people (Zaw 2000). At the time, at the ASEAN level meeting, Surin said, 
‘One cannot have support for human security and effectively pursue people-centered 
development if one is unable to ensure that people are protected from abuse, suffering, 
and deprivation.’ Myanmar in 2000 was far from the concept of people-centered 
development that lies at the foundation of human security (Zaw 2000).  
In the context of Myanmar before Cyclone Nargis, Ni (2007) called on the 
international community to reposition its engagement strategy and to move the 
Myanmar policy debate in a direction that could address both national and human 
security issues. Reflecting the paradox of the military government’s worries about state 
security and people lacking human security, Ni asserted that,  
Burma is a national security state and its rulers are most acutely concerned about 
issues of security, personal, institutional and regime as a whole. Until and unless 
the threat, perceived or real, has been addressed effectively, the chances of 
addressing the broader – and pressing – issues of human security that affect highly 
negatively 50 million ordinary citizens of all ethnic, religious and class 
backgrounds are pretty slim. (Ni 2007, p.211) 
In the Myanmar-focused studies of Helen James (James 2005; James 2006), a more 
comprehensive picture of Myanmar was shown when the world’s focus was mainly on 
the political tension between military and opposition groups. James (2006) delved into 
the delicate issue of competing priorities in engagement with Myanmar in terms of 
development and politics, and suggested that,  
The question of which comes first – political reform or economic development 
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–in order to enhance human security, is an ‘egg and chicken’ question. 
Burma/Myanmar has been waiting over 50 years to have a future and the 
societal problems are now so entrenched that it is immoral from one 
perspective, and impracticable from another, to put the future of over 50 million 
people on hold pending resolution of the political impasse. Freedom from want 
and freedom from fear are two aspects of the same issue; both must be satisfied 
if human security is to be enhanced. (James 2006, p.7)  
Both Zarni (2005) and James (2006) attempted to shed light on the military 
government’s focus on state-centric security policies, and at the same time they 
challenged the dominant view of the international community that emphasized less the 
people aspect and its associated freedom from want. In the context of rethinking the 
engagement policies of the west as regards Myanmar, the authors’ call for human 
security contributed to bringing attention to the vulnerability of people caught between 
an oppressive government and the disengagement of the international community.  
2.5 Human security issues in the study of Cyclone Nargis 
At the time of Cyclone Nargis, Myanmar’s military government was criticized for 
showing little concern over the surviving people in a humanitarian crisis (Than 2010; 
Thuzar 2015; Seekins 2008). Seekins (2008) argues that ‘The junta has generally 
displayed little interest in the human security of the population, no matter where they 
live or what ethnic group they belong to’. Steinberg (2010) believes Cyclone Nargis 
expanded the existing ‘crisis of human security’ in Myanmar, which already suffered 
from poverty and growing disparity (p.11). Than (2010) asserts that the regime was 
the cause of chronic human security problems when he analyzed the socio-economic 
status of Myanmar before Cyclone Nargis. He also reminds us that the immediate 
situation after Cyclone Nargis was a ‘chronic emergency’ (p.140). Thuzar (2015) 
argues that ‘the importance of human security in several of its dimensions was driven 
home to the military regime when the 2008 Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar’s delta 
area – the country’s rice-bowl’ (p.6). Again, Sari (2012) questioned, ‘Did the 
government adopt the human security approach in the immediate response to the 
Cyclone Nargis or prioritize helping the disaster victims?’ Sari considers that for 
Myanmar’s military regime, human security concerns are slight and ‘half-hearted’ 
(p.118).  
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As indicated in these descriptions, the human security dimensions in Cyclone Nargis 
were mainly concentrated on the Myanmar government’s handling of the disaster after 
Cyclone Nargis’s landfall, when they put more efforts into blocking internal and 
external assistance for the disaster than into finding ways to help survivors in the 
devastated Ayeyarwady Delta.   
2.5.1 Human security and R2P 
Cyclone Nargis triggered debate around whether R2P should be applied to Myanmar 
in the context of a disaster (APCR2P 2008; Junk 2016; Weiss 2010). When the 
Myanmar government’s response to the humanitarian crisis caused by Cyclone Nargis 
was delayed, the French foreign minister proposed to invoke R2P to force 
humanitarian assistance for survivors of the storm. However, France minister’s 
proposal was rejected on the ground that the junta’s restriction against relief supplies 
did not ‘constitute a prima facie breach of one of the four crimes that the Responsibility 
to Protect applies to: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing’ (APCR2P 2008, p.3). The Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect refused the use of R2P in the Myanmar case, contending that more life-saving 
actions could be achieved through other possible collaborative means with Myanmar 
and ASEAN governments rather than the misapplication of R2P. Özerdem (2010) 
instead proposed humanitarian diplomacy at the macro and micro levels as an 
alternative strategy (p.693).  
The argument for R2P in Cyclone Nargis also came from Caballero-Anthony and Chng 
(2008). The authors argued that a strict interpretation of the R2P principle should be 
avoided in the case of an emergency, where the primarily responsible stakeholder, the 
state neglects taking action. They propose a more realistic R2P approach called, ‘R2P-
Plus’. In their definition, R2P-Plus is ‘an approach that is responsive to different types 
of humanitarian crises, allowing for humanitarian assistance without resorting to 
military action’ (p.138).  
Selth (2008) also reminded us that international community must be realistic and the 
rhetoric of forced entry into a country on humanitarian grounds also needs caution in 
the context of Myanmar’s military fear of invasion throughout its long history. Selth 
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reasons that only then could an effective strategy to help people and a country in crisis 
be formulated without negative consequences.  
Nevertheless, Junk (2016) and Badescu and Weiss (2010) believed that the R2P debate 
has reached a new level of conceptual milestone for the norm development of R2P in 
the international arena, due to Cyclone Nargis.  
2.5.2 Community security 
Among the limited number of Cyclone Nargis studies, the personal security aspect of 
struggle and survival was small compared to the disaster diplomacy and political 
aspects. The empirical account of South et al. (2011) conveyed vivid pictures of 
devastated communities which were struggling at the time of the emergency. South et 
al. (2011) described the situation of local communities and their response strategies 
during Cyclone Nargis, and for several months afterward. Unlike many other studies 
that focus on the state’s actions and inaction after Cyclone Nargis, their study reached 
out to the people and retrieved the voice of ‘local agency’ (South et al. 2011, p.113). 
It also discusses the multidimensional vulnerability that came out from the impact of 
Cyclone Nargis and the role of the local community in the disaster response. The focus 
on local voices is described as: 
There is not one local (grassroots) voice, but rather a variety of interests and 
identities, types of resource, and opportunities for and constraints on action and 
expression, at the community or village level. It is necessary to unpack these 
positions, in order to appreciate the complexity and richness of local agency and 
‘voice’ (p.11). 
Similarly to South et al. (2011), this study also tries to unpack the positions of 
communities, but the time scale of the study covers pre-impact, impact and post-impact 
phases of Cyclone Nargis with an intention to extend further by exploring diverse 
experiences and initiatives. In this way, the dynamics of local resilience, and sources 
of vulnerability, can be revealed in the perspective of community security and broader 
human security.  
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2.5.3 Recovery, social capital and human security 
A few studies have examined short-term recovery and the social processes of 
communities. These studies have demonstrated that social capital has helped the short-
term recovery phase of communities in various ways. Through social networks, 
affected communities acquired resources and capital to rebuild their lives. Moreover, 
bonding social capital has helped people recover from the traumatic experience of 
Cyclone Nargis in many ways (Ayers 2014; James and Paton 2015).  
Ayers (2014) investigates the state of social capital in six places including villages and 
the ward from Pyapon town. Ayers (2014) tries to examine the impact of local faith 
communities on social capital and their role in the production of resilience to disasters 
and recommends that development and humanitarian practitioners should integrate 
social capital appraisal into disaster recovery planning and implementation. A similar 
finding is also presented in a study by Calkin and Win (2013). Assistance from NGOs, 
development organizations, and the government has contributed to the recovery of 
affected people to some extent. However, this research reminds us of the negative 
impacts of aid operations to the social capital of communities. They said, ‘We have 
further determined that the impacts of a natural disaster tend to strengthen social 
capital; while assistance and aid, if poorly administered, can undermine it’ (p.91). 
James and Paton (2015) note that social capital exists in different levels at different 
locations in Cyclone Nargis-affected areas. They indicate potential implications of 
inadequate social capital in failures to take precautionary measures, as shown in the 
case study of Bogale township where the locals are not strongly linked to another 
township (Labutta) in their region, which was devastated a few hours earlier. They 
assert that weak social links with other townships made them less prepared when the 
storm was moving toward them.   
2.5.4 Freedom and human security 
As Bacon and Hobson (2014a) argues, no disaster is completely natural. They state 
that ‘human behavior and social structures shape the way they unfold’ (p.4). A 
significant feature of Cyclone Nargis was the restriction imposed on the people by the 
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military rulers of Myanmar. At that time, freedom from fear and freedom from want 
were limited for the people. Although not an academic study, a popular book by Emma 
Larkin (2010) documents eyewitnesses’ accounts of survivors and their struggle. She 
conveys the story of Cyclone Nargis to a global audience and highlights the ineptitude 
of the military government in the title of her book, No Bad News for the King, directly 
referring to the military elite’s lack of concern for the people and the authoritarian 
structure that restricted bad news from reaching higher-up authorities.  
In another assessment of the reasons behind the government’s problematic response, 
Belanger and Horsey (2008) offer some views in the article ‘Negotiating humanitarian 
access to cyclone-affected areas of Myanmar: a review’. These authors argued that 
four factors are impediments to a smooth relief operation in the emergency phase: (1) 
The ‘self-reliance’ doctrine of the Myanmar government produced isolationist 
tendencies in Cyclone Nargis, (2) the Myanmar government had limited familiarity 
with international disaster response and feared an influx of international aid workers, 
(3) The prevailing domestic political context was very sensitive because Cyclone 
Nargis struck one week before the voting day of a national referendum, and (4) The 
suspicions of senior military leaders about the motives of donors.  
2.5.5 ASEAN's facilitation, the Tripartite Core Group and human 
security 
Leake (2013) attempts to link natural resource management and risk reduction by 
highlighting general conditions of environmental degradation. His study’s reliance on 
the data from various reports of the Tripartite Core Group (a humanitarian mechanism 
which was composed of representatives of the UN, ASEAN and the Myanmar 
government to facilitate the delivery of aid to the cyclone-affected area) leads to more 
discussion regarding the function of humanitarian aid mechanisms, and assessments 
over aid effectiveness. Leake’s discussions are mainly based on assessment reports 
that were published between 2008 and 2011 according to the three-year plan of post-
Nargis recovery and preparedness, and the study provides the progress of the 
rehabilitation process in chronological order.  
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The Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) was historically important as it was the 
first collaboration in many years between the UN, ASEAN, NGOs, and the Myanmar 
government. It contained data from two rapid assessments called the Village Tract 
Assessment (VTA), which identified vulnerabilities and capacities in the worst-hit 
areas, and the Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLa), which estimated the economic 
impact of the storm to infrastructure (TCG 2008a). At that time, the government was 
still restricting local media from reporting about the cyclone-affected Delta. But they 
did not reject the contents of reports prepared by TCG. Nevertheless, they asserted 
their power as revealed in a leaked cable from the US embassy dated 29th July 2008: 
UN U/SGY (Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and UN 
Emergency Relief Coordinator) for Humanitarian Relief John Holmes told 
diplomats during a July 23 meeting that the GOB (Government of Burma) did not 
challenge the VTA and DaLa teams’ findings and allowed them to be published 
with little editing. Resident Emergency Coordinator Dan Baker admitted later that 
in exchange for accepting the teams’ analysis with little revision, the GOB 
requested that the UN/ASEAN teams not edit the chapter on the government’s 
cyclone relief efforts (Wikileaks 2008a). 
This restricted environment around the time of Cyclone Nargis and the difficulty in 
accessing information in the context of political maneuvers, prompted me to revisit the 
experience with Cyclone Nargis for a fuller understanding of human security 
implications in this study1.  
                                                 
1 From the middle of May 2008 to end of 2009, I was fully involved as senior program officer in the 
humanitarian aid projects that focus on education and livelihood recovery of people form 
Kungyangone, Labutta, and Ngapudaw townships. Another voluntary initiative was supporting 81 
orphans from the rural villages of Kungyangone areas which could continue until 2012 thanks to the 
help of international and local friends. As putting orphans in the government orphanage created a 
more vulnerable position for children at that time, we observed that living with extended families was 
a better option. To reduce child-raising burden of extended family who was also survivors of the 
cyclone, monthly support was provided 8000 Kyat (8USD) per month. Although the amount was 
modest, it enabled these children to continue schooling. These first-hand experiences made me aware 
of the existing vulnerabilities and brought me motivation to find the ways of reducing risk and 
enhancing resiliency. 
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2.5.6 Cyclone Nargis as a catalyst for furthering human security 
Disaster as a catalyst for social and political change is noted in several studies 
(Birkmann et al. 2010; Birkland 2006; Wisner et al. 2012). Bankoff (2012) argues why 
the disaster should be considered as ‘agent of change’: 
Considering disaster as an historical process allows its impact to be evaluated as 
more than only a destructive event, at best a bane to be prepared for as well as 
possible and, at worst, one to be simply endured. While not trying to minimize the 
destructive consequences of disasters in terms of human suffering, they are also 
simply agents of change in their broadest perspective. (p.38) 
Pelling and Dill (2006, p.10) elaborated that the political and social change is likely to 
happen when people are not secured.  
The socio-political and cultural dynamics set into motion at the time of 
catastrophic ‘natural’ disasters create the conditions for potential political change 
– often at the hands of a discontented civil society. A state’s incapacity to respond 
adequately to a disaster can create a temporary power vacuum, and potentially a 
watershed moment in historical trajectories. (p.10)  
After Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, social and political transition also occurred and 
some studies tried to verify Cyclone Nargis’s role in ongoing changes in Myanmar. 
Than (2009) posed the question ‘Should Nargis be considered more than a Storm?’ 
According to Than, ‘the ‘imperfect storm’ of 2008 physically destroyed much-needed 
human and material assets of Myanmar but failed to loosen the junta’s grip over 
Burma’s polity or reorient political change in a direction favored by the opposition’ 
(p.216). Nevertheless, major changes in the post-Cyclone Nargis period provided more 
space for civil society in both services and advocacy to influence changes, and more 
open and expanded engagements with the international community. International 
organizations with a focus on conflict resolution also laid down engagement options 
after Cyclone Nargis, and suggested that it was time to normalize aid relations because 
of growing human insecurity. For instance, the International Crisis Group urged the 
international players to consider the human security perspective as below:  
Growing impoverishment and deteriorating social service structures have 
pushed millions of households to the edge of survival, leaving them acutely 
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vulnerable to economic shocks or natural disasters. If not addressed, the 
increasing levels of household insecurity will lead to further human suffering, 
and could eventually escalate into a major humanitarian crisis. (p.i) 
After Cyclone Nargis, media freedom has gradually expanded and local opinions and 
advocacy on human security have also appeared in the local media from time to time 
(Mizzima 2011; Seng Raw 2015; The Irrawaddy 2015, Zin 2013; Than 2009; Thuzar 
2015).  
Referring to the ASEAN experience, Acharya (2007) analyzes that democratic 
transitions in Southeast Asian regional countries created an environment that 
encouraged more acceptance of the principle of human security. In the region, Acharya 
(2007) argues, 
Some of the governments of these states have also championed the human 
security concept more openly as a way of distancing themselves from their 
authoritarian predecessors, enhancing their international legitimacy and 
attracting development assistance. (p.26)  
In 2011, Myanmar’s military chief referred to human security as the security agenda 
for a country in a public speech (RFA 2015; Aung 2014). While waging civil wars 
with ethnic armed groups, such a stance is difficult to interpret as more than a rhetorical 
reference but at least human security ideas reached the public domain after Cyclone 
Nargis. Human security rhetoric is not used by the military chief alone. Human 
security as a policy orientation is often used in the speech of the former President, U 
Thein Sein. The excerpt of a speech on 3 November 2015 is one example. Reflecting 
the reform, U Thein Sein’s claimed, ‘We must unwaveringly continue to work on 
reforms to improve the delivery of people-centered services, healthcare, education, job 
opportunities, individual freedoms, and human security’ (Sein 2015). 
In the current political transition, a deeper understanding of society’s vulnerability, 
sources of resilience and dimensions of human security are needed in the context of 
Myanmar to move towards a more practical human security agenda. Cyclone Nargis 
offers such understanding as the intersection of social vulnerability and natural hazards 
in the context of broader human insecurity. Human roles in the Cyclone Nargis disaster 
still need to be highlighted for future implications in enhancing human security. As 
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Bacon and Hobson (2014a) noted, one of the advantages of the human security 
approach for studying natural disasters is its emphasis on ‘the direct and immediate 
role people play in creating, exacerbating or reducing vulnerability and risk’ (p.3).  
2.6 Disaster vulnerability, resilience and human insecurity 
2.6.1 Vulnerability 
According to a definition in the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR), vulnerability is ‘a human condition or process resulting from physical, 
social, economic and environmental factors, that determines the likelihood and scale 
of damage from the impact of a given hazard’ (UNDP 2004, p.11). Also, capacity can 
be defined as a ‘The combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available 
within an organization, community or society to manage and reduce disaster risks and 
strengthen resilience’ (ISDR 2009).  
Anderson (1995) elaborates a classification of the sources of vulnerability. In his view, 
vulnerability can be primarily caused by three factors: (1) nature (2) cost (3) human 
(pp.43˗46). Among these three, Anderson (1995) argues that nature as a cause is the 
oldest form of analysis in vulnerability studies. People who live in areas that are prone 
to various types of natural hazard such as volcano eruptions, cyclones, earthquakes, 
and floods are vulnerable because hazards are not preventable in these areas and they 
are vulnerable because they happen to be there. Preston et al. (2011) also describe the 
vulnerability caused by nature as biophysical determinants: ‘They are the physical, 
biological and ecological factors that influence the potential for harm. Such factors 
might include climatic conditions, natural hazards, topography, land cover, or primary 
productivity’ (Preston et al. 2011, p.183). The importance of the biophysical 
environment of a place is emphasized in the view of Hewitt (1997). He argues that ‘the 
state of any society’s physical environment and the attitude it holds towards resource 
use and management is closely related to the occurrence of hazard and disaster’ (p.59).  
Zakour and Gillespie (2013) referred to biophysical vulnerability of place as ‘hazards 
of place’ or geographical location. By citing Cutter et al. (2003) and Borden et al. 
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(2007), Zakour and Gillespie (2013) used three types of risks to specify hazards of 
places:  
(1) biophysical risk estimated as the historical frequency of disasters from the 
physical hazards in geographical locations, multiplied by the severity of those 
hazards 
(2) risk from the built environment reflected in the age, deterioration, and 
structural weakness of buildings and infrastructure 
(3) social risks manifest in the challenges related to getting and using the 
resources needed to absorb the shock of disaster and recover from it (p.103).  
In the case of Cyclone Nargis, biophysical vulnerability needs to be briefly noted here 
as the scientific aspects of tropical cyclones have established the fact that ocean surface 
temperature contributes to storm formation (NASA 2009). Although human society is 
the main focus in people-centered research in vulnerability, questions are also raised 
around whether human vulnerability can be adequately characterized without 
considering simultaneously the vulnerability of the surrounding ecosphere (Fenton et 
al. 2007; Maguire and Cartwright 2008; Turner et al. 2003). 
In the context of Cyclone Nargis, man-made environmental destruction such as 
mangrove forest depletion compounded the storm hazard in a tragic way. A UNEP 
(2009) report on the state of environment in the Delta stated that environmental 
degradation and resource depletion had been exacerbating the driving force of 
economic development that led to corruption and sustainability problems (UNEP 
2009). The environmental aspects of the Delta impacting vulnerability and resilience 
still demand more detailed study for human security implications.  
From a technological standpoint, a second key to the analysis of vulnerability is ‘cost’ 
(Anderson 1995). In this aspect, vulnerability can be reduced with the help of 
technologies, but costs do matters. Mitigation could be possible but it may be 
expensive for places where poverty prevails. In such cases, the level of vulnerability 
is determined by choices accessible to society; when and how to use technologies to 
mitigate the effect of hazards. Hewitt (1995) argues that in certain situations, a lack 
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knowledge and preparedness is to blame, but looking deeper, the unaffordability of 
costly technology might be the cause of vulnerability although it is already available.  
Similar to Anderson (1995), many contemporary social scientists, policy advocates 
and activists also consider humans to be playing a central role in manufacturing 
vulnerability and multiple variables must be considered in a definition of vulnerability 
(Birkmann 2006; Cutter and Finch 2008; Fuchs et al. 2012; Morrow 1999; Stiglitz 
2014). Nature is not the sole source of vulnerability; other variables such as economic, 
social and political indicators such as lack of freedom, deep poverty and lack of options 
for survival and poor resources also play a role. Preston et al. (2011) called these 
socioeconomic determinants of vulnerability: ‘They are the social, economic or 
cultural factors that influence the potential for harm. Such factors might include 
demography, poverty, trade, employment, gender, or governance’ (Preston et al. 2011, 
p.183). 
From a socio-economic point of view, the impact of a natural event in any given 
community does not randomly happen. The effect on any particular household, 
therefore, results from a complex set of social interactions in the community (Blaikie 
et al. 2004). Some conditions have to do with the dwelling, and still others with the 
social and economic characteristics of the people who are living there (Hewitt 1983; 
Quarantelli 1987, 1995; Bates and Peacock 1987).  
According to Cannon (1994), socio-economic systems are in fact the root causes of 
unequal access to opportunities and unequal exposures to risk. Regarding the concept 
of social vulnerability, Cannon et al. (2003) describe social vulnerability as a set of 
characteristics that includes a person’s: ‘Initial wellbeing (nutritional status, physical 
and mental health), livelihood and resilience (assets and capitals, income and 
qualifications), self-protection (capability and willingness to build a safe home, use a 
safe site), social protection (preparedness and mitigation measures), and social and 
political networks and institutions (social capital, institutional environment and the 
like)’(p.5).  
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2.6.2 Resilience 
The UN defines resilience as ‘the ability of a system, community or society exposed 
to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard 
in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of 
its essential basic structures and functions’ (ISDR 2009). As a concept, ‘resilience’ has 
strong roots in environmental studies. Holling (1973), focusing on the stability of 
ecological systems, defined resilience as a ‘measure of the persistence of systems and 
of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same 
relationships between populations or state variables’ (Holling 1973, p.14). Later 
disaster research studies adopted the concept of resilience and Timmermann (1981) is 
known as one of the earliest scholars who used resilience in disaster research. 
Timmerman (1981) tries to locate resilience in the context of vulnerability. He clarified 
the concept of resilience in the disaster context by citing Holling’s definition of 
resilience: 
If we accept …that resilience has to do with the persistence of a system 
vulnerability and resilience are by no means simple reciprocals. There are many 
‘woundings’ that do not affect the persistence of a system at all, but merely 
require either extra effort on the part of the system, or the elimination of freely 
expendable units. Resilience is just one of the vulnerable characteristics of a 
system. But – and this is critical-resilience is the one characteristic of a system 
which, when it is impaired, also impairs the persistence of the system. (p.21) 
Although resilience is generally focused on from the aspects of both ‘engineered 
system and social system’ (Cutter et al. 2008, p.600), it is widely debated that 
characteristics of resilience in social structures cannot be the same as that of ecological 
and engineering aspects because resilience as a social process involves ‘issues of 
agencies and power’ (Greijn et al. 2015, p.12). As happens in ecological systems, 
numerous identification measures for resilience devised so far try to look at the social 
phenomenon of resilience in system approaches. In the IPCC’s definition, resilience is 
stated as the ‘ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, 
accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient 
manner’ (IPCC 2012, p.3). Gall (2013) argues resilience can be studied as ‘a system’ 
or a ‘system of systems’. In terms of an assessment approach, Gall (2013) views 
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resilience as a ‘self-regulating system – or cluster of systems’ operating with a self-
correcting manner through feedback: ‘such complex adaptive systems that create 
resilience share synergies, linkages and interactions across spatial and temporal scales’ 
(Gall 2013, p.18). It was also agreed that a system approach helps one understand the 
different types of interactions between systems as well as the thresholds of different 
types of system (Constas et al. 2014). When the ‘systems approach’ is used in a rural 
setting, observing the social-ecological interactions is necessary to get a clear view of 
‘the links between human system, ecosystem, and shocks and trends’ (Constas et al. 
2014, p.23).  
Although the system approach has been proven to be highly applicable in technical 
science, Stojanovic et al. (2016) argue that systems approaches are not currently 
dominant in the social sciences because ‘defining social aspects in systemic ways has 
proven challenging’. While defining functions in the social domain’ is problematic 
(p.2), Stojanovic et al. (2016) claim ‘certain elements of society are less amenable to 
conceptualization as systems, and therefore undertheorizes social entities and 
processes’ (p.12) as system approach is rooted in studies of ‘relationships between 
interacting parts, feedbacks, boundaries, emergent properties, self-organization, and 
hierarchies’ in ‘areas of complexity science’ (Stojanovic et al. 2016, p.2).  
In order to capture the social dynamics of resilience in the three phases studied as 
regards Cyclone Nargis, this study tries to approach resilience from a ‘capacity’ 
perspective. Since the launch of resilience as a concept in disaster research, all 
definitions of disaster resilience have been associated with the capacity aspect (Greijn 
et al. 2015; Mayunga 2007; Winderl 2014). de Weijer and McCandless (2015) state 
that resilience is ‘associated with the capacity of individuals, groups and society as a 
whole to cope, adapt, and transform in the face of man-made and natural shocks’ (p.4). 
Béné et al. (2012) divided resilience capacity into three components: ‘absorptive 
capacity, adaptive capacity, and transformative capacity’ (p.21) as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 3D resilience framework (Béné et al. 2012, p.21) 
Absorptive coping capacity, at least, helps disaster-affected people ‘to resist’ and 
‘absorb its impacts without consequences’ for their ‘function, status, or state’ (Béné et 
al. 2012, p.21). A working definition of ActionAid specifies: ‘Absorptive capacity is 
the ability to prevent, prepare for or mitigate the effects of negative events, through 
coping mechanisms that focus on essential basic structures and functions’ (p.10).  
When absorptive capacity is exceeded, adaptive capacity will be required for various 
adjustments that result in incremental change in people’s lives. Béné et al. (2012) 
argue, 
These incremental adjustments and changes can take many forms (e.g. adopting 
new farming techniques, change in farming practices, diversifying livelihood 
bases, engaging in new social networks, etc). These adaptations can be 
individual or collective, and they can take place at multi-level (intra-household, 
groups of individuals/households, community, etc). (p.22) 
ActionAid (2016) offers several examples of adaptive capacity that include 
‘diversification of livelihoods, adopting flood-resistant farming techniques, training 
community elders and local authorities on resolving tensions and conflict within and 
between communities regarding access to water or land, or adapting curriculums for 
health professionals to train them in how to deal with outbreaks of epidemics’ (p.8).  
Assets are fundamental in increasing adaptive capacity (Béné et al. 2012; Vincent 
2007). However, assets alone cannot make the community capable of effective 
adaptation; Béné et al. 2012 argue as regards the determinant of adaptive capacity as 
follows: 
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Successful adaptation depends to a large extent on the capacity of individuals, 
societies or communities to coordinate decision-making, to act collectively, 
foster innovation and experimentation, and exploit new opportunities. All those 
relate to strong social fabric established during periods of stability –
highlighting the strong relation and synergy between absorptive resilience and 
adaptive resilience. (Béné et al. 2012, p.24) 
Increasing the community’s capacity to transformative level requires structural 
changes in ecological, economic and social structures that can uplift people from 
poverty traps, repeated disasters and an unsustainable environment (Béné et al. 2012). 
ActionAid claims that only by transformative capacity, can people move to ‘cultural 
change, institutional reforms and behavioral shifts’ for disaster resilience (ActionAid 
2016, p.8).  
In the Cyclone Nargis affected areas, absorptive coping capacity, adaptive capacity 
and transformative capacity at village community level are also linked to these three 
types of capacity at the national level. Since 2008, several steps for disaster risk 
reduction have been laid down for resilience and human security. Myanmar’s action 
plan for disaster risk reduction was also adopted in 2012 based on the ‘Hyogo 
framework for action 2005˗2015’. The Hyogo Framework for Action notes that 
knowing vulnerability is critical for building resilient society:  
The starting point for reducing disaster risk and for promoting a culture of 
disaster resilience lies in the knowledge of the hazards and the physical, social, 
economic and environmental vulnerabilities to disasters that most societies 
face, and of the ways in which hazards and vulnerabilities are changing in the 
short and long term, followed by action taken on the basis of that knowledge. 
(ISDR 2005, p.7)   
A culture of disaster resilience can be enhanced only if the community gains an 
opportunity to shift from absorptive capacity to adaptive and transformative capacity. 
According to Béné et al. (2012), a move from the stage of ‘persistence’ by merely 
resisting the impact of disaster to the stage of flexible adjustment always involves 
transitional costs. It is likely that the bigger the intensity of change, the higher the 
transitional cost incurred. Brown (2016) also reminds us of the importance of 
dynamics of power in social and ecological system changes. Brown (2016) argues we 
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should not ‘underestimate the extent to which transformations in socio ecological 
systems and governance actually require transformations of power and concerted 
political struggle’ (p.103). 
2.7 The state of community insecurity: examining vulnerability  
In this study of a storm hazard in the Delta community, the focus is on dynamic 
interactions between vulnerability and resilience. A major challenge in resilience and 
vulnerability research is that ‘not only are people different, but they are changing 
continuously, both as individuals and as groups. This constant change within the 
human system interacts with the physical system to make hazard, exposure, and 
vulnerability all quite dynamic’ (Mileti 1999, p.119).  
Ribot (1995) argued for vertical relations between community level and state level 
policies; this research reflects this in examining how vulnerability and resilience have 
impact on the safety aspect of village communities from the Delta. For conducting 
comparative studies in three different corners of the Ayeyarwady Delta, Ribot’s view 
on vulnerability is also integrated into the research design:  
The vulnerability is shaped by ongoing political–economic processes of 
extraction, accumulation, social differentiation, and marginalization, within a 
given set of property relations (ownership and access) shaped by relations 
among various groupings within society. These relations are mediated by state 
policies (such as land conversion, economic development, and resettlement). 
Different social groups have differing assets as well as differing patterns of 
access to productive resources. Their assets and access are critical aspects of 
their vulnerability. (Ribot 1995, p.120) 
With reference to the previous studies of Cutter et al. (2003), Perry et al. (2001), 
Putnam (2000) and Blaikie et al. (2004), Cutter (2006) identified some of the factors 
that largely influence social vulnerability. These factors include ‘lack of resources 
(including information knowledge and technology); limited access to political power 
and representation; lack of social capital, building stock and age; frail and physically 
limited individuals; and type and density of infrastructure and lifelines’ (p.117).  
           
          
 
55 
 
Moreover, it is also common to find that social vulnerability can change over space 
and time (Cutter and Finch 2008). For instance, ‘population change and population 
density’ of a community have a strong influence when ‘social vulnerability’ is 
measured on a ‘temporal scale’ (Cutter and Finch 2008, p.2304). Vogel and O'Brien 
(2004) discuss the key three features of vulnerability: it is ‘multi-dimensional and 
differential (varies across physical space and among and within social groups)’, ‘scale 
dependent regarding time, space and units of analysis such as individual, household, 
region, system’, and ‘dynamic, having the characteristics and driving forces can 
change over time’ (cited in Birkmann 2006, p.13).  
There are many ways to measure social vulnerability. Some of them focus on studying 
the underlying forces that cause vulnerability. For example, ‘the pressure and release 
model’ (PAR) and the access to resource models offer operationalization tools to 
analyze the ‘intersection of social vulnerability and hazard exposure’ (Blaikie et al. 
2004). The Pressure and Release (PAR) model assumes risk explicitly as a ‘function 
of the perturbation, stressor, or stress and the vulnerability of the exposed unit’ 
(Perdikaris 2014, p.42). PAR directs its attention to the conditions that make exposure 
unsafe, lead to vulnerability and cause the creation of these conditions. This is applied 
primarily to address social groups who have faced a disaster event. The PAR model 
emphasizes distinctions of vulnerability by different exposure units (e.g., class, 
ethnicity). However, there is also criticism that PAR does not sufficiently incorporate 
the vulnerability of biophysical subsystems and cannot fully address human and 
environmental systems due to their proximity to hazard zones (Cutter et al. 2008). It 
cannot identify adequately ‘the structure of the hazard’s causal sequence, including the 
nested scales of interactions’ (Turner et al. 2003, p.8074).  
This study on Cyclone Nargis incorporates some aspects of PAR, especially in 
identifying root causes. PAR’s strength in organizing the hierarchical structure of 
causal factors (Blaikie et al. 2004) is also noted and informed this study.   
The ‘Access Model’ also has influence in developing some analytical tools for 
examining the data coming from the qualitative method of this research. This model is 
designed to look at long-term social and environmental change in a disaster-affected 
community. While the PAR model facilitates studies to see how to trace the underlying 
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causes of vulnerability including economic and social pressures, the Access Model 
tries to examine how individuals or communities can access the resources that are 
necessary for them to secure a livelihood in pre-disaster time and their ability to adapt 
in a disaster (Blaikie et al. 2004).  
The process of achieving access to required resources, such as the process of earning 
a living, is determined by social and economic relations, including the social relations 
of production, gender, ethnicity, status and age. Blaikie et al. (2004) stressed that, ‘It 
is essential that assets and the patterns of access to them remain central to this project 
and do not become detached from the underlying political economy which shapes 
them’ (Blaikie et al. 2004, p.94).  
This model is also useful for looking at access to lifelines during an emergency period. 
Venture (2014) argues that lifelines are synonymous with civil infrastructure that is 
vital to the economy and quality of life. Lifelines can be grouped into six categories 
including (1) electric power, (2) gas and liquid fuels, (3) telecommunications, (4) 
transportation, (5) water, and (6) wastewater systems. In the case of poor countries, a 
lifeline is meant to include basic life sustaining systems and infrastructure.  
In Cyclone Nargis-affected areas, access to lifelines is a key determinant of life 
sustaining during an emergency. It has also become an indicator of social vulnerability 
in the post-Nargis period. Platt (1991) defines lifelines as systems or networks that 
provide for the circulation of people, goods, services, and information upon which 
health, safety, comfort, and economic activity depend. Again, social relations involve 
decision making about how to obtain these lifelines.  
In the case of Cyclone Nargis, the Delta’s geographic position and climatic features 
are not the only factors that contribute to its vulnerabilities. Political, social and 
economic factors have been major drivers of unsustainability and vulnerability to 
disaster. Apart from the broad categories of biophysical and socio-economic attributes 
of vulnerability, features of resilience were also evident in the struggle and survival of 
people during the storm and after community-led mobilization in relief efforts. This 
research will attempt to look for specific attributions to vulnerability in the 
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Ayeyarwady Delta by bringing safety aspects of the community to the core of the 
study.  
2.8 The state of community security: examining resilience 
Community resilience is a process linking a network of adaptive capacities 
(resources with dynamic attributes) to adaptation after a disturbance or 
adversity. (Norris et al. 2008, p. 130)  
However, the resilience of a region is likely to be disturbed when its ‘spatial pattern’ 
is prone to frequent occurrence of hazards (Cutter and Finch 2008). Because of the 
potential for temporal and spatial changes in vulnerability and resilience levels, Cutter 
and Finch (2008) state that ‘for future preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation 
planning, a one-size-fits-all approach may be ineffective in reducing social 
vulnerability or improving local resilience to the impacts of hazards’ (p.2305). Out of 
numerous ways of identifying means to enhance resilience for the future, ‘a capital 
based approach’ (Mayunga 2007) can also display how resilience may be built 
throughout emergency and recovery phases.  
In measuring resilience for human security, which dimensions to be measured is a 
challenging question for this study. As human security threats emerge out of physical, 
living and social systems (Tanaka 2015), system approach can be one way to be 
considered. In ‘a systems approach’, Holling (1973, p. 14) describes resilience as ‘a 
measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and 
disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or state 
variables’. According to UNDP, a system-wide approach to resilience needs to capture 
‘a range of activities, actors, and processes that are part of a resilience-building system’ 
(Winderl 2014, p.7). Cavallo and Ireland (2014) argue ‘disasters involve different 
independent systems, which are all dependent on each other. Therefore, a disaster can 
be considered as a system of systems (SoS).  Boardman and Sauser (2008) also claim 
that systems are an integrated network of independent systems which are 
heterogeneous.  
Although the conceptual framework of SoS sounds challenging to the linear 
approaches to disaster risk management, system approach itself is not free from critics. 
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Cavallo and Ireland (2014) insist that a system of systems approach advocates to look 
closely to the function of a complex set interdependent risks which may interact in a 
cascading manner. Although conceptually clear and understandable, its applicability 
is much in question. Olsson et al. (2015) pointed out that a systems approach for 
measuring resilience in a social setting is not as appealing as it is used in the ecosystem. 
As Olsson et al. (2015) pointed, defining a system ontology and setting the boundary 
of a system is not easily workable in the real-world assessment:  
With regard to boundaries, there is no sharp line of demarcation in reality to 
explain perceived differences between natural or social systems. Neither in nature 
nor in society are boundaries fixed unless we first decide on the phenomenon to 
be described or explained. Pragmatic considerations imply some degree of 
construction—in both social and natural contexts. (Olsson et al. 2015).  
As a contested model for measuring resilience, Gall (2013) pointed that a ‘coherent 
system approach’ has not yet materialized (p.22). Rather than viewing societal entities 
within the villages and their respective research zones as multiple systems, forms and 
process of resilience in the studied villages are examined with the capital approach in 
which several domains are somewhat similar to the sustainable livelihood framework. 
However, this study prioritizes to focus on the capacity of the village community to 
respond to an emergency disaster risk but not on domains of capitals that are usually 
analyzed in studies searching solution to development. 
The notion of resilience which also carries the meaning of adaptive capacity and shock 
absorbent ability is discussed in this study by using a capital framework for human 
security. The Community Capitals Framework (Flora, Flora and Gasteyer 2015) is 
widely applied in rural and community development studies. Flora and Flora (2008) 
argued that the characteristics of successful entrepreneurial and sustainable 
communities involved seven types of capital: ‘(1)Natural (resource, amenities and 
natural beauty), (2) cultural (the way people ‘know the world’ and how to act within 
it), (3) human (the skills and abilities of people), (4) social (the connections among 
people and organizations or the social glue to make things happen), (5) political (The 
ability to influence standards, rules, regulations and their enforcement), (6) financial 
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(The financial resources available to invest in community capacity building) and (7) 
built (The infrastructure that supports the community)’( Flora and Flora 2008, p.4).  
This categorization of community capitals is also reflected in the disaster resilience 
assessment used by the capital approach of Mayunga (2007). The capital approach 
covers a number of capitals including human capital, social capital, economic capital, 
natural capital and physical capital. With reference to both Flora, Flora and Fey (2004) 
and Mayunga (2007), this study tries to adapt the domain of capitals in a context of 
Myanmar village communities. In addition to the capitals Mayunga (2007) applied, 
political capital and cultural capital, which are inseparable from other forms of capital, 
are also considered as a foundation of social resilience in rural village society in 
Myanmar. It is assumed that these forms of capital can be accumulated in the village 
society as elements that can build up disaster-resilient assets and facilitate processes 
for disaster risk reduction.  
Woolcock and Narayan (2000) believe that social capital is primarily important in 
social contexts in which formal insurance and financial instruments are lacking. One 
of the earliest pioneers in the study of social capital is Lyda Judson Hanifan who is 
credited with coining the term social capital as ‘those tangible assets [that] count for 
most in the daily lives of people: namely goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and social 
intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit’ (Hanifan 
1916, p.130). The well-known concept of cultural capital was introduced by Bourdieu 
who highlighted ways people use cultural knowledge to locate their high status and 
authority in the ladder of social hierarchy (Bourdieu 2011). Coleman elaborated on the 
differences in function of the three types of capital namely human, physical and social 
capital (Coleman 1988, p.95). By citing Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964), he clarifies 
the core value of physical material as tools, machines and other productive equipment 
which are categorized as assets in this study. Again, referring to the definition of 
human capital in the field of the economics of education, he elaborates that ‘human 
capital is created by changes in persons that bring about skills and capabilities that 
make them able to act in new ways’ (p.100). Among all types of capital, social capital 
is the least tangible but its reproductivity function is very similar to what physical 
capital and human capital can perform (Coleman 1988).  
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Based on interpersonal relations, social capital can also be grounds for productive 
activity. In addition, political capital is also present in the process of emergency 
response although it might not have the same meaning as it usually functions in a fully 
grown democratic state. For a country under authoritarian regime, the meaning of 
‘political capital’ can be understood as ‘the capacity of the people to influence political 
decisions’ (Schugurensky 2012, p.3). In situations like Cyclone Nargis, taking 
necessary precautionary measures for disaster risk reduction was considered a political 
act in many cases. Furthermore, the dynamics of response among community members 
to influence community disaster politics had enough reasons to be seen from the 
perspective of political capital. In the case of Cyclone Nargis-affected areas, the 
concept of resilience can be applied at many levels of analysis. In this study, qualitative 
assessments of resilience are implied in the safety aspects of physical features, 
ecological systems, social infrastructure, community capacity (including economic 
strength) and the support of the state DRR system.  
2.9 Human security as a way forward in the Ayeyarwady Delta 
Three basic conditions are required to have a community where everyone can live with 
human security (Brklacich et al. 2010). They are ‘(1) the options necessary to end, 
mitigate, or adapt to threats to their human, environmental, and social rights, (2) the 
capacity and freedom to exercise these options, and (3) the opportunity to actively 
participate in attaining these options’ (Longergan 1999 cited Brklacich 2010, p.37).  
As shown in Figure 3, there is a strong relationship between human security and 
vulnerability. When vulnerability cannot be overcome,  human security cannot be 
present,  as vulnerability and human security sit at opposite ends of a continuum 
(Brklacich 2010, p.37). A natural disaster affects all seven elements of human security 
in many ways. Cyclone Nargis is a classic example of the link between human security 
and people's vulnerability in the seven areas of human insecurity.  
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Figure 3 Relationship between vulnerability and human security 
Source: Brklacich et al. (2010, p.37) 
The seven dimensions of human security in the post-impact Delta are briefly 
considered below, before continuing discussion of the multidimensions of Cyclone 
Nargis in the coming chapters.  
Economic security 
In a comparative study of livelihood assets before and after Cyclone Nargis in the final 
recovery assessment report of the TCG (TCG 2010), Periodic Review 4 discovered 
that, the amount of fishing gear went down to 58 per cent, fish processing to 77 per 
cent and boat ownership to one-third in surveyed areas compared to the time before 
Cyclone Nargis. The post-Nargis Delta economy was still severely affected by 
cyclone-related destruction even after two years. TCG (2010) stated that livelihood 
opportunities in the Delta were not restored. As usual, impacts move down to the 
poorest segments of the population.   
Food security 
In the research zones that participated in this study, people in many villages passed the 
first three days without food and water. Coconuts and some rotten rice were the only 
survival food they could find in the environment. Some villages were left empty-
handed and moved out to temporary camps in town for survival. In some remote areas, 
the government and NGO arrived only after 20 days or a month. In a massive disaster 
like Cyclone Nargis, the flood and surge caused drastic changes to crop and soil quality 
in the long run, which led to crop failure in many cases. TCG (2008a) stated that more 
than half of the households living in the most affected townships reported having lost 
all food stocks during the cyclone. Even after a month, 55 per cent of households did 
not have food for more than one day.  
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Health security  
Cyclone Nargis had a serious negative impact on the healthcare system. Immediately, 
the health security of the affected region was largely destroyed because 130 health 
facilities were totally destroyed while another 500 were damaged (TCG 2008a). 
Moreover, in some remote villages, there were people who died only after landfall 
because of zero access to medical services for their pain and injuries.  
Community security  
Cyclone Nargis displaced 800,000 people and totally destroyed around half a million 
houses. It also destroyed food stocks and rice depots (TCG 2010). These indicators are 
the impact of a disaster that can be more severe than the consequence of an armed 
battle. When people are displaced, not all community members can gather again in 
their original places. Some of the villagers disappeared for good. With physical 
violence committed by armed personnel, community security was destroyed.  
Bacon and Hobson (2014a) argue that some communities are socially more resilient 
than others. Bonding, linking and bridging social capital as denoted by Aldrich (2012) 
can support the community to be more disaster-resilient through successful 
mobilization of resources and social cohesion. According to Aldrich (2012), 
communities with a high level of social capital are more likely to recover from 
disasters for three main reasons:  
• Deep levels of social capital serve as informal insurance and promote mutual 
assistance after a disaster 
• Dense and numerous social ties help survivors solve collective action problems 
that stymie rehabilitation 
• Strong social ties strengthen the voices of survivors and decrease the 
probability of their leaving (Aldrich 2012, pp. 149–150). 
Environmental security  
Population increase, poverty, agricultural land expansion and aquatic industries are the 
main sources of environmental decline in the Ayeyarwady Delta. Environmental 
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factors are also drivers of the marginalization of people in areas more are prone to 
disaster. The likelihood of exposure to natural hazards is higher in environmentally 
vulnerable land (UNDP 1994). A disaster can add more destruction to the environment. 
During Cyclone Nargis, natural resources for livelihoods were severely impacted and 
the whole Delta lost 38,000 hectares (ha) of natural and replanted mangroves, 
submerged over 63 per cent of paddy fields, and damaged 43 per cent of freshwater 
ponds (TCG 2008a). 
Personal security  
Life after Cyclone Nargis for many survivors was extremely insecure with little 
support for continued survival. Family and social networks were lost for many people 
until they reached temporary shelter, and many people struggled to find a place for 
refuge. In the government-run temporary camps, security was still a concern in 
crowded conditions (UNICEF 2008).  People were also forced back to their ruined 
villages after some weeks (less than four weeks in many places). In this restless 
struggle after the cyclone, personal security of women, old people and children was at 
risk. According to TCG (2008a), in the middle of June 2008, only 14 per cent of the 
affected villages had temporary settlement. At that time, many of the government-run 
temporary camps and other temporary camps were already closed (TCG 2008a). 
Displacement usually occurred together with insecurity and more vulnerability for 
children, women and the elderly.  
Political security 
Long before Cyclone Nargis, political insecurity had been a dominant aspect of 
Myanmar under military rule. Political security in the form of people having a say in 
issues affecting their life was not much improved in the aftermath of disaster and even 
worse in some areas of the Delta. After Cyclone Nargis, government sources from 
state-owned newspapers were silent about the death toll for two days after the 
cyclone’s landfall. It was privately-owned weekly newspapers whose reporters were 
first to reach the Delta and who discreetly recorded the ground situation. Censorship 
did not allow certain pictures and many stories were cut about the severity of the 
cyclone impact and the suffering of the victims. For several months, censorship 
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authorities toned down stories that highlighted the traumatic experiences of the victims 
(Downman 2013; Freedom House 2009).  
2.10 Why human security approach 
Human security approach is considered as a starting point to study a crisis like a 
meteorological hazard. When human security approach is viewed from policy 
perspective, it is considered not as a policy ‘process for development’ but as ‘policy 
challenges that arise in times of crisis and threaten security in an immediate way’ 
(Suhrke 1999, p.271). From individual level perspective, someone who is making 
adjustment for long term socio-economic change is also different from another being 
hit by a sudden life-threatening disaster, Suhrke (1999) argues. By quoting Scott 
(1977) who referred to situation in rural China in 1931 as ‘there are districts in which 
the position of the rural population is that of a man standing permanently up to the 
neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown him’, Suhrke (1999) analyzes 
that human security approach has been a proper method for situation that resembles a 
person standing in the neck-deep water. Human security can save that man, ‘either by 
taking immediate preventive measures to flatten the ripple before it reaches him, or by 
throwing out a life buoy’ (p.271).  
In this study, the safety aspects of in the villages from the margin of the Delta are 
examined in the light of human security. As the situation in the Delta is found 
resembled to a man standing in neck-deep water, attempts are made to enhance local 
understanding of how the ripples can be immediately flatten from an almost drowning 
person. While this study does not sway away from discussing potentials for long term 
policy process to get the man out of the river while making the structural adjustment 
to lower the water level, its emphasis is on overcoming human insecurity if any hazard 
happens to this disaster-prone region. Moreover, human security approach is also wide 
enough to cover several dimensions of security including environmental security 
which is fully linked to Eco-DRR and other dimensions of human security closely 
associated with life-safety of the villagers from vulnerable areas.  
In response to disaster risk, Nature-based Solution (NbS) has been recommended by 
International Union for Conservation of Nature as a new trend for its presumably cost-
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effectiveness and advantage of better livelihood and sustainability (Cohen-Shacham et 
al. 2016). IUCN defines Nature-based Solutions as ‘actions to protect, sustainably 
manage, and restore natural or modified ecosystems, that address societal challenges 
effectively and adaptively, simultaneously providing human well-being and 
biodiversity benefits’ (Renaud et al. 2016). Ecosystem-based DRR is increasingly 
considered by low-income countries that cannot afford high-cost disaster risk 
reduction infrastructure. Applying the lens of Eco-DRR approach in disaster policy 
research have a lot of potential because of its applicability in addressing Myanmar’s 
challenges against environmental degradation and urgent needs of disaster risk 
reduction plans. While the adverse impact of climate change is visibly signifying the 
need of effective disaster risk management and climate adaptation, some efforts are 
also underway to understand the linkages between the environment and disaster in 
Myanmar (JIAC 2015). In the context of the most rural villages of Ayeyarwaddy Delta, 
these linkages are strongly related to the other political, socioeconomic and cultural 
factors that make the poor people living in this area trapped in fragile and marginal 
spaces without much capacity to tackle disaster risk. Despite Eco-DRR concept will 
be able to explain the story of resilience and vulnerability to disaster in research areas 
as part of the whole story, some key aspects of rural life in the context of disaster will 
be left out of the community narratives (for instance, the role of agencies and structure 
during emergency and recovery phases and politics of disaster).  
Again, sustainable livelihood approach (is also commonly used as a conceptual 
framework to study the long-term process of a disaster recovery and in some cases, to 
evaluate the effectiveness of aid in reconstruction (Cannon 2003; Carney 2003; 
Birkmann 2006). The sustainable livelihoods approach was first introduced by the 
Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development (Krantz 2001). Later 
many forms of livelihoods approaches were expanded with disaster risk reduction. One 
of the modified version is the sustainable livelihoods framework from the Department 
for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom (Good Practice Review 
2017). Chambers and Conway (1991) defines livelihoods as:  
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and 
access) and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable 
which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its 
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capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the 
next generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local 
and global levels and in the short and long term. (p.6) 
Overlapping with the Eco-DRR in some degree, Sustainable Livelihood Framework 
(SLF) helps identifying ways community members respond to shocks at household 
and community level. Possession of assets (or capital) offer a wider range of options 
for survival and speed up recovery if an event of hazard hits the community. With a 
focus on reducing vulnerability of the people in the long term, SLF offered choices for 
policy planning, prioritizing and impact monitoring. Livelihood options involve a vast 
arrays of coping strategies for recovery rather than safety risk at emergency. This study 
does apply the core value of capital embedded in the community as highlighted by the 
SLF but forms of capitals are viewed in the light of response strategy of the village 
communities in the context of a life-threatening hazard. 
To sum up, this chapter has discussed human security issues in existing studies on 
Cyclone Nargis, and has highlighted many gaps yet to be filled regarding Cyclone 
Nargis. The discussion moved to vulnerability and discussed several frameworks in 
vulnerability studies emphasizing relevance to the Ayeyarwady Delta of Myanmar. 
The crucial area of the resilience concept was outlined in relation to human security 
and vulnerability. Finally, this research’s implications for domains of human security 
were discussed with a brief profile on each domain for the post-Nargis period. 
Long-term disaster recovery is assumed to be ongoing and the human security 
dimensions of recovery are explored in later parts of this study. If disaster recovery is 
not properly managed, future disaster prevention will be compromised (Hobson et al. 
2014). Moreover, Soroos (2010) has confirmed that an anticipatory strategy is required 
toward reducing vulnerability in advance before threats come to fruition. Soroos 
(2010) argues that ‘anticipatory efforts may be directed either toward preventing or 
limiting threats to human security or to reducing the vulnerabilities of societies to these 
threats’ (p.179). Anticipatory responses for human security or reducing vulnerability 
include emergency preparedness planning, such as early warning systems, evacuation 
procedures, and assembling relief supplies that could minimize the number of 
casualties at the time of exposure to a disaster.  
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Chapter 3 
Research methodology 
3 The qualitative approach of the research 
In disaster research, qualitative research design is not a stranger (Phillips 2014). This 
study utilizes a case study approach while the arguments in each chapter are backed 
up by facts and figures that indicate measurable dimensions of community 
vulnerability and resilience. The case study method usually involves data collection 
tools for a field study and analysis methods to extract textual data which is useful for 
in-depth analysis of the socio-economic and political dimensions of the field: 
Case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the 
complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution or system 
in a ‘real-life’ context. It is research based, inclusive of different methods and 
is evidence-led. (Simons 2009, p.21) 
This research is designed as a ‘multiple-cases study’. By studying more than one case 
or one region, my purpose is to enable replication of a theoretical proposition about 
human security in linking it with disaster risk vulnerability and resilience in the 
Ayeyarwady Delta. Yin (2004) argues that:  
Focusing on a single case will force you to devote careful attention to that case. 
However, having multiple cases might help you to strengthen the findings from 
your entire study—because the multiple cases might have been chosen as: 
replications of each other, deliberate and contrasting comparisons, or 
hypothesized variations. (p.5) 
To strengthen replicability, the study uses more than one technique of data collection 
and data analysis. This multi-case study required me to travel extensively to Nargis- 
affected sites stretching from the western end of the Ayeyarwady Delta to the eastern 
side and then to the upper Delta near Yangon. Stallings (2006) noted that field research 
is a critical component of disaster research as it strikes a balance between theoretical 
and practical significance. A positive side of the qualitative approach is that the 
researcher can still be reflexive in interactions with respondents. Most of the 
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respondents who participated in this research from the different zones of the Delta 
went through post-disaster stress to a high degree; the nature of reflexivity in the 
qualitative approach allowed interactive dialogue between researcher and respondents, 
enhancing deeper understanding of the issues without compromising the local ‘voice’. 
Ungar (2003) said, ‘Giving voice to those who are otherwise silenced in the production 
of knowledge contributes to a deeper understanding of the localized discourses of 
resistance that permeate disadvantaged communities’ (p.94). Schubert (1995, cited in 
Payne 2000) pointed out that reflexivity ‘helps us identify the socially and rhetorically 
constructed boundaries that delimit our view of the social field, to transgress those 
limits, and provide a basis for creative, ethical alternatives’ (p.10).  
Moreover, for an inquiry that also relates to vulnerability and resilience of a society, 
the qualitive method is helpful to identify ‘the social and cultural factors that play a 
deciding role in determining what are good and bad outcomes, make the notion of 
contextually specific and culturally biased construct’ (Ungar 2004, p.18). Ungar 
(2003) also explains why qualitative research is well suited for the following types of 
disaster-related situation:  
(1) It can lead to the discovery of the unnamed protective processes relevant to 
the lived experience of research participants 
(2) It provides thick description of phenomenon in very specific contexts 
(3) It elicits and adds power to minority ‘voices’ which account for unique 
localized definitions of positive outcomes 
(4) It promotes tolerance for these localized constructions by avoiding 
generalization but facilitating transferability of results  
(5) It requires researchers to account for their biased standpoints (Ungar 2003, 
p.85).  
Phillips (2014), citing Goffman (1959), suggests that the qualitative approach is 
appropriate for cases of disasters that ‘represent a location in which to observe the 
human condition at a most sincere level of performance’ (p.5). Phillips argued that, 
‘social problems along with the resiliency found in social networks and social 
structures’ can be studied with the help of the holistic value of the qualitative approach. 
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By saying ‘holistic’, the qualitative approach looks for ‘meanings produced by social 
actors through social interactions’ and helps the researcher understand ‘the broader 
context rather than specific acts’ (p.4) without him or her being necessarily pre-
deterministic on the facts he or she will find.  
In other aspects, there is heated debate among researchers and disaster-related agencies 
over what should be the best way to study disaster recovery: should it be based on 
‘process’ or ‘an outcome’? (Constas et al. 2014; Nigg 1995; Winkworth 2007). The 
findings in this study suggest that the notions of ‘outcome’ and ‘process’ are not 
mutually exclusive in the cases of the disaster-prone and poverty stricken coastal areas 
of Myanmar. This study attempts to analyze the variables of the vulnerability and 
resilience that are embedded in the ‘process’ the community experiences and the assets 
they can apply in three temporal dimensions: the ‘pre-impact, impact and post-impact’ 
phases of Cyclone Nargis.  
Given the context of a changing political climate in the decade after Cyclone Nargis 
and the multidimensional changes in the national disaster risk reduction framework, a 
‘process-based approach’ is complementary to studying ‘the outcomes’ that are 
embodied in the long-term consequences of relief and reconstruction aid in the safety 
aspect of the community. Human security in each part of a disaster cycle is measured 
by using a ‘trace-back technique’, which Phillips (2014) referred as to ‘the long 
standing and deeply embedded political, economic and social problems that lead up to 
the event’ (p.127).  
This study traces back to the points of disaster, to resilience structures in pre-existing 
vulnerability. Moreover, this study is also based on the two theoretical principles 
which Ferreira et al. (2015) suggests for disaster research dealing with vulnerable 
populations: ‘utilitarianism and social justice’ (p.32). Delivering policy-oriented 
recommendations to help vulnerable people as much as possible and to contribute to 
the greater good is the goal, by adhering to the lens of social justice when dealing with 
disaster-affected people.  
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3.1 Research design for studying disaster resilience in temporal 
and spatial scale 
The design of this dissertation includes both temporal and spatial scales in studying 
exposure of Cyclone Nargis in the Delta in 2008 and the experience of recovery 
beyond 2008. A place-based approach that links the physical features of the three 
places of the Delta to the broader context of resilience is applied. Cutter (2006) argues, 
‘social and biophysical elements mutually relate and produce overall vulnerability of 
the place’ (p.88). In revisiting Cyclone Nargis, place vulnerability in Myanmar in 
terms of biophysical features is a given fact. The geographical risk is largely shaped 
by its position in ‘the most at risk’ country category. The biophysical vulnerability of 
the Ayeyarwady Delta is compounded by weak governance, a poorly functioning 
disaster risk response system and people’s lack of access to resilient infrastructure, 
including telecommunications, the media (as risk communication facilities), roads, 
bridges, boats and emergency shelters, etc.  
Pre-disaster vulnerability and resilience in the three different research zones is 
evaluated through the lens of interaction of three domains including ‘people’, ‘place’ 
and ‘governance’. The interactive dimensions of ‘people’, ‘place’ and ‘governance’ 
are also reflected in all discussions in the next chapters which cover the impact phase 
and post-impact phase. Through the lens of vulnerability and resilience, the human 
security perspective of the three selected zones is studied by noting that disaster 
exposure varies across geographical and temporal scales (Adger 2006; Cardona et al. 
2012; Cutter et al. 2003).  
People  
‘People’ refers to the community members who live in the villages of the three selected 
zones. Individual voices will also be counted as community members representing 
community issues. Throughout a disaster cycle, sometimes, people may have only 
limited capacity to act independently from the administrative authorities’ rule that is 
imposed on them. Nevertheless, it is far from taking community as a passive subject 
of the administrative structure. This study looks into the dynamics of communities in 
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all segments of the disaster cycle, namely disaster response, recovery, preparedness 
and mitigation.  
Place 
Here, both the biophysical features and man-made infrastructure are counted as part of 
‘places’. Any of the ‘places’ that enhance people’s capacity to respond to disaster risk 
are also alternatively called ‘assets’ in discussion in this dissertation. But the notion of 
‘place’ needs to consider not only the physical vulnerability of a geographic region but 
also the resilience function of the natural environment around the community.  
Governance 
Weak governance can result in an increase in the number of risk drivers that are 
connected to each other (Preventionweb 2015). Governance is defined by UNDP 
(2010): 
Governance is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority 
in the management of a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, 
processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their 
interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their 
differences. Governance encompasses, but also transcends, government. It 
encompasses all relevant groups, including the private sector and civil society 
organizations. (UNDP 2010, p.1) 
In this research, the meaning of ‘governance’ encompasses the international level to 
the village level and transcends all aspects of community lives that link to community 
disaster risk reductions.  
Vulnerability and resilience factors are embedded in the condition of the environment 
and the status of its resource as being crucial elements of a community’s resilience 
system (Constas et al. 2014). In building a disaster-resilient community, the 
perspectives of micro-level community systems should be linked to those of the macro-
system at the national level that deals with policy, social protection systems, 
infrastructure, laws and governance issues (IFRC 2014). The state of vertical 
integration between community and the national, regional and global disaster risk 
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governance regime will also be explored in order to identify enabling factors for 
communities in reducing vulnerability.  
In terms of ‘spatial’ scales, this study primarily focuses only on village-level resilience 
while considering villages’ linkages with the regional, national and global scales as 
part of the study. For instance, organizing an emergency evacuation drill in a village 
is a positive variable of the resilience capacity of the community. Although the 
village’s participation in the drill is the focus of this study, the driving forces behind 
this participation will also be considered as the involvement of the other layers. 
Therefore, the guideline of the Relief and Resettlement Department to organize the 
emergency drills in the respective villages and the mandate of the Myanmar 
government to implement the designated Action Plan for Disaster Disk Reduction to 
fulfill its obligation as a member of the Sendei Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
will be taken into account. Although this precautionary exercise is a community-based 
action, the influence of a policy framework from the township and national political 
system on the community’s decisions will also be included in the ‘safety analysis’. 
With respect to the ‘temporal’ scale, the current process of building a community’s 
resilience is considered to have a threshold in pre-Nargis years. As the emergence of 
some of the villages from the Bogale area (Zone II) was a by-product of undocumented 
agricultural expansion in the last 40 years, the way their villages emerged has 
tremendous implications for their vulnerabilities and the resilience of the community 
nowadays.  
3.2 Applying the C Model 
Kreps (2001) argues ‘disasters are non-routine events in societies that involve 
conjunctions of physical conditions with social definitions of human harm and social 
disruption’ (p.3718). Not only the disaster, but also the post-disaster period featured a 
series of non-routine events in Myanmar in which efficient disaster risk management 
mechanism was lacking at the time of Cyclone Nargis. To see the events around 
Cyclone Nargis in 2008 as numerous, non-routine events, a qualitative research 
method called the ‘C’ model is useful as a guideline. The ‘C’ Model (Quarantelli 1987) 
was developed by E. L. Quarantelli, the co-founder of the Disaster Research Center 
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based at Ohio State University, which is one of the oldest schools in the disaster 
research field which has encouraged qualitative field study for disaster research. Table 
1 shows how the four Cs are defined by the disaster research center (Phillips 2014, 
p.80): 
Table 1 Elements of the C Model 
Characteristics What are the features of the individual, organization or community? 
Conditions What pre-existing contexts produced physical and social vulnerability? What   
kinds of social, economic, environment, or political factors influenced how the 
event unfolded? How did such factors impact the outcomes? 
Consequences What are the obvious and less obvious outcomes of the event, interactions, 
process, or decisions? 
Chronology How did the event or process unfold over time? 
Source: Phillips (2014, p.80) 
The letter ‘C’ represents the four stages of the data processing of the disaster research: 
Conditions (C1), Characteristics (C2), Consequences (C3) and Chronology/Career 
(C4). The C Model is useful for unpacking and reorganizing data coming from field 
research (Phillips 2014). Not only for the data analysis here but also for the writing-up 
of each chapter of the dissertation, the C Model is applied. As Quarantelli (1987) 
explains, the four Cs work in sequence: ‘conditions or circumstances which lead to 
certain characteristics which will have consequences as a result of the career of the 
phenomenon’ (p.7).  
Preparing the discussion points or interview questions by applying C-Model 
The C Model also gives a guideline for the questionnaire used in the semi-structured 
interviews with experts, in focus group discussions and in open-ended questions with 
village leaders. Inquiries to the village leaders started by asking the village historical 
background that intended to investigate the events in the lifetime of a village including: 
(1) the emergence of the village in the Delta historical context, (2) relationship between 
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the village environment and the people across the time, (3) disaster experiences  before 
and after Nargis Cyclone, (4) socio-economic background of the village and (4) the 
present day progress and challenges against sustainable livelihood and disaster risk 
reduction. The following Table 2 is the backbone for both village leader interview and 
focus group discussion. It shows how the questions can be categorized into the 
different elements of ‘C’ to delve into information in every phase of the disaster cycle. 
Table 2 Issues explored with the 4C Model  
Conditions (C1) Condition specific to a setting that may influence disaster-related 
matters 
Questions based on the 
conditions of the pre-
Nargis hours 
• Situation of the disaster risk management systems at both 
community level and national level for Cyclone Nargis 
• The state of the risk communication system 
• Political dynamics of the country and their influence on 
disaster policy-making 
• Operation of national disaster management system linking 
with regional and global-level systems 
• Communication and transportation infrastructure in the 
community as part of the resilience system 
• Level of disaster knowledge among community members 
• Socio-economic conditions in pre-Nargis days 
Characteristics (C2) Characteristics that can clearly be ‘informed by empirical observation’. 
Questions about the 
emergency response and 
the state of survivors 
• International humanitarian system and debates on 
humanitarian intervention 
• Search and rescue  
• Chances and methods of surviving among the affected 
communities 
• Efficiency of disaster response 
• The role of social capital in emergency 
• The effectiveness of relief aid  
• Who are the most vulnerable? 
• What are the localized assets to reduce vulnerability?  
Consequences (C3) Intended and unintended outcomes, positive and negative outcomes 
Questions about the 
continuation of life • Loss and damage • Outcome of humanitarian intervention  
• Recovery experiences and social capital 
• The state of the ecosystem 
• Restoration of sustainable livelihoods 
• The impact of humanitarian aid on the community disaster 
resilience system 
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Chronology (C4) The process of recovery unfolding overtime 
Questions about disaster 
preparedness • Disaster preparedness in terms of knowledge and skill • The efficiency of community-based disaster management 
systems 
• Risk perceptions across time 
• Existing threats to the wellbeing of the community 
• Capacity to bounce back if hit by disaster 
The relationships between different dimensions (people, place, and governance) in the 
pre-Nargis setting, the emergency, and the post-Nargis setting are examined as shown 
in different ‘C’ columns of Table 2. Details of questions that is used in focus group 
discussion is attached in Appendix 2 while the question to village leaders are as shown 
in the next section of this chapter. These questions were developed within the scope of 
preset themes organized based on ‘the four Cs’ (Phillips 2014, p.80). It is plausible to 
say that the C-Model has influenced every step of this research from the beginning to 
the end of writing the manuscript. 
3.3 Major field visit and shorter observation trips 
The field study began in the first week of January 2013. Before the official field trip, 
a preliminary study was conducted in Bogale township and Kungyangone township to 
test feasibility with pilot interviews with 10 people in July 2012.  
A major field visit for the focus group discussion in each of 45 villages was organized 
in 2013. It was conducted over a period of nine months between January 2013 and 
October 2013. Although I myself was fully involved in humanitarian aid projects in 
Labutta, Bogale and Kungyangone areas throughout 2008˗2009 as a senior program 
officer of the International HIV/AIDS Alliance, it was necessary to make several new 
contacts for liaison with the community before going to the research areas. Friends, 
former colleagues from the local areas and other contacts from local organizations 
operating projects in the Delta helped to identify possible contacts from host villages. 
Friends and former colleagues were from local NGOs such as Spirit in Education 
Movement, Eco-Dev, Paung Ku, Karuna (Pathein), Metta, Network Activities Group 
(Former Nargis Action Group), Saturday Group from Kungyangone, and Alin Dan 
(Rays of Light) from Bogale township. Former fieldworkers in some international 
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NGOs, including Care and ActionAid also helped by introducing me to hosts and 
potential respondents from local villages and by giving advice about possible 
approaches to conduct focus group discussions and expert interviews in local settings.  
This post-Nargis field study period coincided with the start of the multidimensional 
reforms in Myanmar that began to have implications on the lives of ordinary citizens. 
For example, during the five years between 2011 and 2015, Myanmar promulgated or 
amended more than ten major laws for the first time in more than half a century. These 
new laws brought significant effects on the citizens and some impacts have been more 
visible in the rural areas. These are the Ward or Village Tract Administration Law 
(2012), the Telecommunications Law (2013), the National Education Law (2014), the 
Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law and the Farmland Law (2012), the 
Labour Organization Law (2011), the Anti-Corruption Law (2013), the Right to 
Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act (2011), the Contempt of Courts Law 
(2013), the Environmental Conservation Law (2012), and the Associations 
Registration Law (2014). Moreover, a law that is most relevant to the topic under study 
was approved by the Parliament in 2013 and which started to be effective in the post-
2013 period is the Natural Disaster Management Law (2013). Considering the 
significance of changes at both macro and micro levels, May and June of 2015 were 
dedicated to revisiting the areas and I conducted another round of interviews with not 
only the former members of focus group discussions but also with new ones. Some of 
the old members could not find the time to join the new round of inquiry.   
3.3.1 Purposive sampling of the villages 
Each of the cyclone affected village participated in this research was selected based on 
the following criteria: (1) it must be located near the coast where the tide daily touches 
the shore of the village (2) it must be near the mouth of the rivers of the Ayeyarwaddy 
Delta preferably closer to Kungyangone, Dedaye, Bogale and Labutta townships 
which lie on the cyclone track (3) it existed as a village community before Nargis 
Cyclone and its existence has remained the same status as ‘a village’ (without 
disintegrating or integrated into a bigger community such as a town) and (4) it must 
fall within a formal administration structure, at least being governed by sal eain gaung, 
the head of every ten households (smallest unit of official administration in the village 
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level). Some of these selected villages may differ from its original shape of the pre-
Nargis days either in terms of population size or geographic location. It also must be 
holding an individual entity without being swallowed by a bigger village in terms of 
administrative structure or not living as a small collection of houses not having any 
status at all in the post-Nargis reconstruction period. Nevertheless, migrant 
communities which are found near the selected villages with no legal village status 
were also included as part of the study when the focus group discussion raised the 
topics related to them. By extending the scope in such case, it helps the understanding 
relationship between migrant communities along the coast and their nearby villages in 
the pre- and post-Nargis days. Migrant communities are found near Zee Thaung in 
Zone I and the villages along the Toe River of Zone III. All villages taken part are 
shown with their exact location in Appendix 1. 
3.3.2 Maintaining research integrity  
At the time of the field study, the researcher went into these villages as an individual 
scholar without being affiliated with any aid organization. The individuals and 
organizations helped the researcher during field visits to find the contacts in each 
village especially with the village leaders and the leaders of small community-based 
organizations. None of the organizations which help to find the local contacts were 
involving in disaster-related issues at the time of research. Although NGOs were 
playing a vital role in the recovery phase of these selected areas, this study is designed 
to be free from voicing any NGO’s interest for sustaining their programs. Or the 
country’s democratic transition has been drawing the attention of NGOs to other 
prioritized areas. The donor’s influence in this research is zero except the fact that the 
researcher needed to use the community’s links to the former aid network that was 
active in the research areas between 2008-2010. They used to get involved in many 
activities related to the Nargis reconstruction. However, in 2013, only Paung Ku alone 
was present in Bogale and Kungyangone townships for farmers’ right awareness 
program. 
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3.4 Research method 
3.4.1 Data collection 
Semi-structured interviews for social economic background and community 
disaster resilience systems of the village 
A set of semi-structured questions was prepared to get information about the 
causalities of vulnerability and about opportunities for promoting resilience in the 
community. Through these open-ended questions, the human capital, economic 
capital, social capital, physical and cultural capital of each village was identified. The 
background data retrieved from this questionnaire helped reveal tangible aspects that 
contributed to disaster resilience at the community level such as demographic figures, 
numbers of schools and students, clinics and health workers. These questions were 
asked only of authoritative figures or official leaders of each village. Sometimes they 
were a group of young leaders who were well informed about changes happening in 
the village or formal village administrators who are elected in the Ward or Village 
Administrator Elections newly introduced in 2012.  
In short, the aggregated background data will display the strengths and weaknesses of 
the community’s capacity to respond to disaster risk and the impacts of the recovery 
process on the lives of communities. All 45 villages were included in the areas that 
had an average housing damage between 88 per cent and 98 per cent as stated by the 
Post-Nargis Joint Assessment. Now, comparing the number of facilities or assets 
available to the community members in terms of disaster preparedness may raise some 
subsequent questions: ‘Why do they not have an equal opportunity to revive?’, ‘Why 
are they not yet a resilient community?’ or ‘Why are some villages or aspects of 
people’s lives are better than others?’. The attempts were made to verify the facts 
raised in the qualitative discussion of the focus group with all quantifiable data rasied 
from the interview. In the following set of background questions, some quantifiable 
inquiries were included and the answers to these questions were helpful to verify 
accuracy and validation of the information from focus group discussion by cross-
checking.  
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Official name of the village and local name of the village 
Demography 
•    Population  
•    Number of female/male  
•    Number of children attending schools 
•    Tell me about the races living in this village? What ethnic group the villagers 
belonged to? 
•    Which is a majority race in the village? 
•    Percentage of farmers out of the village population 
•    Percentage of Fishermen out of the village population 
•    Percentage of manual/landless laborer 
 
Education  
•    How is education facility for the children from the village? Is there a school in the 
village? If not, where the children go to attend school? 
•    Do you have monastic school or religious school in the village? What kind of 
education service are these schools providing? 
•    Do you have a library? How is it operating? 
•    Do you have book rental shops? How is it popular or functional?  
 
Health 
•    How do you manage to get medical service if someone from the village is sick? Is 
there a village clinic/dispensary? If not, where do you go for treatment? 
•    Is there any health worker posted by the government to the village? 
•    How far is your village from the hospital? 
•    Describe how you access to water in the village. 
•    Describe the number of drinkable water sources (eg. lake or tube well or well) 
•    Describe how you access to non-drinkable water that is useful for cleaning and 
washing in the households 
 
The village and disaster risk  
•    How many died in Nargis Cyclone? 
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•    Could you elaborate more on loss and damages caused to the village by Nargis 
Cyclone? 
•    Do you have designated cyclone shelter in/near the village? How far 
from the village center? 
•    What are the storm-resistant buildings in this village? Explain how you can 
access to these buildings?  
•    Name the natural hazards the village encountered in the last 10 years. 
•    How does the village get involved in any disaster risk reduction activities related 
to government institutions, NGOs, and CBOs you know? 
 
Economy 
•    What are the common jobs for landless manual workers? 
•    What do the rest of the people do?  
•    What is the estimated average household income? 
 
Communication and transportation 
•    Describe the number of TV in the village. 
•    How many TV channels the village can access? 
•    Describe the number of households with Radio. 
•    Describe the number of the telephone in the village. 
•    How do you access the newspapers? 
•    What is the means of transportation you can use to go to the nearest town? Are 
there any changes in transportation in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis? 
 
Religion, culture, and DRR 
•    Do you have the monastery in the village? How many? How will you describe the 
role the monastery playing at the time of Nargis Cyclone? 
•    Do you have non-Buddhist religious buildings and organizations in this 
community? How will you describe the role the non-Buddhist religious institution at 
the time of Nargis Cyclone? 
•    What are the main religious ceremony/ festivals in the village? 
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Energy and sustainability 
•    What are the energy sources for household use? How easy for the village to 
access the energy sources available? 
•    How dependent is the village on firewood for household energy? 
•    Do you have a commonly owned forest conservation area or official community 
forest? 
 
Engagement with civil society network 
•    Please tell about the existing projects of NGOs or any other aid organizations in 
the village? How many of them are related to DRR? 
•    Do you have any form of community-based organization? What are their current 
roles in the village? 
Expert interviews 
A shorter set of semi-structured interviews was also prepared with some room for 
flexibility according to the C-Model. This set of questions was targeted at various 
experienced people from diverse backgrounds who were personally involved in the 
rehabilitation and recovery process of Nargis-affected areas. While some of them were 
involved in projects in the research areas, others played their role at macro-levels of 
management. The questions were intended to reveal the perspectives of different 
stakeholders from different layers of the Nargis recovery process with longitudinal 
changes in policy and their impacts on survivor communities. The open-ended 
questions facilitated exploring respondents’ roles in relation to Nargis response 
initiatives and documenting their assessments of the setting of Cyclone Nargis’s 
political ground and changes in its aftermath.  
Twenty-five interviews were conducted with government officials, religious leaders 
(both male and female), representatives of both international and local development 
organizations (which had experience in the research areas), individual humanitarians, 
journalists and technical experts. Participant selection was made based on snowballing 
method. Some were identified through media networks and my previous contact with 
the government officials and members of the local and international civil society 
groups who spent years for the post-Nargis emergency and recovery.Their expertise 
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carried extensive knowledge from the following areas: (1) function of local 
government at time of emergency, relief and rehabilitation period (2) the role of media 
and people’s awareness about disaster risk preparedness or reduction (3) education for 
disaster risk reduction (3) public policymaking and implementation at the village level 
(4) the role of civil society in disaster risk reduction (5) community-based disaster risk 
reduction and the role of religious institutions (6) emergency communication and (7) 
disaster recovery in the aftermath of Nargis Cyclone.  These interviews are helpful in 
verifying information for the disaster risk management policy analysis. In the 
interviews, probing questions were raised from time to time to clarify facts or to ask 
for further details. Basically, the expert interviews took between 45 minutes to one 
hour.  
Organizing focus group discussion 
With the help of leaders from the village, both female and male focus group discussion 
members are recruited by avoiding power differentials among participants as much as 
possible. That is one reason why the official leaders were not included in the focus 
group discussion to remove constraints in terms of social and political hierarchy. 
Without a presence of the leaders, each focus group discussion was carried out in a 
comfortable atmosphere. In most of the cases, children aged above 10 to 17 also 
involved in discussion while they were together with their family members or friends 
in the discussion groups.  
For setting the criteria of focus group discussion participants, all members must have 
had experience with Cyclone Nargis in the same village which meant that the 
participants had lived in the same village within the last five to seven years at the time 
of interview. In some cases, villagers who had experienced Cyclone Nargis in other 
villages while they were away from home and then returned to the community right 
after Nargis or at some point of the post-Nargis period, shared their experience in 
discussion. In such cases, I could not prevent them from taking part in group talks. 
With sensitivity to the trauma and psychological impact among survivors, I did not 
disturb the flow of conversation when they collectively recalled their own experiences. 
But the voices of the returnees must be cut from analysis as they are not relevant to the 
specific community under discussion. 
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Participants are recruited as much as possible with a rule of diversity in terms of age, 
gender, occupation, and ethnicity. The ethnically diverse group is essential to get a 
sense of community life where the village composed more than one major ethnic group 
which is Bamar (Burmese). The researcher also tried to have a diverse group of people 
with different occupations. Focus group discussion usually happened in a house of a 
villager that is strong enough to accommodate group discussion or in a monastery in 
the village. In Zone II, some villages do not have any house big enough for group 
discussion of five to ten people. In this case, the ground under a tree or a temporary 
tent of fishermen were used. During the trip, I was accompanied by one or two 
assistants who can make audio recording or video and photo documentation. While the 
cameras were equipped with the global positioning system, photos and video footage 
of the surrounding of the village and the exact place of focus group discussion at each 
village were recorded. Nevertheless, not every part of focus group discussion was 
videographed while every group had several photos. All the documentation process 
was made ethically with the permission of the leaders of the village and other 
stakeholders. These were very useful later during analysis process in understanding 
the village environment in the context of possible disaster risk. The researcher needed 
to go back and see the pictures during transcription and analysis whenever participants’ 
discussion draws any information with a reference to the village’s location.  
As soon as the participants can gather comfortably in circle seating, I started to 
introduce myself and the purpose of my field research. Knowing me as a research 
student from a university made the participants comfortable enough as I could assure 
that I was not linked to any government agency, aid organization or the media. While 
moderating skill was an important factor for stimulating discussion by raising semi-
structured questions, noting the number of attendants in focus group discussion 
according to their name, age, occupation, and ethnicity was helped by my field 
assistant. Although the questions were designed to generate the village level 
discussion, we also expected that some answers would represent both personal and 
communal experiences. To remember who said what, I also need to use a matrix of 
questions and participants as shown in the following table: 
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Table 3 Format of documentation in focus group discussions 
Village Name Member1 Member 2 Member 3 Member 4 
Question 1     
Question 2     
Question 3     
While moderation was carefully conducted not to leave out any voices among the 
members, the village’s experiences were step by step revealed based on four Cs 
framework. The village’s preparedness for a hypothetical risk of similar hazard was 
assessed through the capital focus questions. Disaster vulnerability and resilience 
related questions revealed the state of human security at the village level. The past and 
present human security conditions were also compared. 
Table 4 Participants in focus group discussion 
Participation In focus group Individual interviews Total 
Female 102 58 160 
Male 190 62 252 
Total 292 120 412 
 
Age of participants from focus group and individual interviews 
Years Number 
10-15 11 
16-25 71 
26-35 92 
36-45 64 
46-55 72 
56-65 75 
Above 65 27 
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The village narrative in focus group discussions  
The chronology of people’s experience and the sequence of events are central elements 
in the narrative analysis; these were articulated in semi-structured questions asked by 
the researcher. This was intended to explore community resilience dynamics by 
looking at environmental and societal changes in temporal and spatial scales in linking 
with disaster preparedness in the three phases of pre-Nargis, the emergency and post-
Nargis. The size of focus group discussions in each village varied from a minimum of 
five persons to a maximum of eight persons. Although the focus group discussions 
were primarily limited to eight persons, in some situations it was not possible to 
exclude additional community members from contributing in group discussions. In 
such cases, all voices were counted as community members.  
The definitions of a ‘community’ may vary from one setting to another but for the 
purposes of this research, the concept of community is based on place (location) and 
people (social groups). As an operational definition, community can be understood as:  
A group of individuals and households living in the same location and having 
the same hazard exposure, who can share the same objectives and goals in 
disaster risk reduction. The community members may have varying perception 
of disaster risk depending on social class, education, age, gender, etc., and the 
community risk assessment and disaster risk reduction planning processes helps 
to unite the community in understanding of the risks and in preparedness, 
mitigation and prevention actions. (Victoria 2002, p.271)  
Occupations of participants from 
Focus group discussion and 
individual interviews 
Number of 
participants 
Paddy grower 57 
Fisherman 79 
Other type of agriculture (Non-
paddy) 
28 
Student 82 
Government servants 15 
Shopkeepers 25 
Dependent 39 
Manual laborers 87 
Total 412 
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 In order to explore through villager’s voice in the context of various physical, 
environmental and social changes, narrative inquiry is applied for ‘discovering and 
preserving the experiences of ordinary people’, and ‘studying hidden histories and 
geographies, the place-based lives and memories of disadvantaged people, minority 
groups, and others whose views have been ignored or whose lives pass quickly, 
producing few, if any written records’ (Kwan and Ding 2008, p.448).  
As this research focuses on changes through the occurrence of hazards and the level 
of vulnerability and resilience of the community across time, as Kwan and Ding (2008) 
noted, this study also confirms that the purpose and analytical process of narrative 
inquiry from field areas offers accounts of events or series of events that are 
chronologically connected. The three-dimensional narrative inquiry ‘over time, in a 
place or series of places, and in social interaction with milieus’ (Clandinin and 
Connelly 2000, p.20) is also used as it offers a way of understanding that the 
experiences of different members of the community whose access to essential assets 
for resilience are not the same. Moreover, the chronology of narratives and the 
emphasis on sequence (Cortazzi 1993) signified by narrative inquiry was also 
complementary to the data collection process with the C-Model. 
These narratives also delivered communicative action (Habermas 1984) among 
community members especially when people of all ages participated. The focus group 
discussions provided the forums that brought people together in order to ‘share and 
evaluate knowledge, appreciate the interests, values and aspirations of different 
stakeholders, generate common understanding, highlight areas of uncertainty and 
ambiguity, and agree on actions’ (Measham and Lockie 2012, p.7). 
Secondary data 
Collecting data by using not only the community narrative but also media and expert 
narratives is one of the key features of this research. The historical records of the 
geographical data and environmental change data have been collected as much as 
possible from all available sources including government departments, international 
institutions such as the UN, periodical reports and other scientific inquiries. The post-
Nargis field-based interviews conducted by various organizations were especially 
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useful to verify facts for background checks. Location-specific data such as the history 
of the research area and what previous studies discussed as regards the region, both in 
Burmese and English, have been compiled. Although it is difficult to get material on 
the history of all three research zones, the lifting of censorship in 2012 made present-
day investigation easier. Any media highlights on the ‘local distinctiveness’ of 
research villages and their respective zones (Clifford and King 1993) are helpful in 
understanding their ‘place’ better.  
Media content analysis 
Media content analysis is also part of the study and it helps in documenting and fact 
checking the data that described the changes in resource management, geography, and 
the ecosystem that are linked with community disaster risk management in the years 
before and after Cyclone Nargis. All these materials can also be referred to as part of 
the secondary data. Such kinds of secondary data are useful to explain the context of 
the comparison and foundation of the analysis (Friedman and Wenger 1986; Barnes et 
al. 2008). The coverage of the different newspapers of the emergency phase of Cyclone 
Nargis and its recovery period was especially important in interpreting the politics of 
disaster around Cyclone Nargis. Compared with the coverage of state-owned 
newspapers about Cyclone Nargis that toned down the intensity of the destruction and 
the challenges posed to disaster resilience, the private outlets were more open but did 
not have much independence from the censor’s scissors and this reminds us of the 
value of freedom in disaster response.  
3.4.2 Data analysis 
In the next step, the data collected by the four ‘C’ model were prepared and put into 
data analysis and a writing up process for a comparison of multiple case studies. Yin 
(2004) argues case study methods are suitable when the research intends to address ‘a 
descriptive question (what happened?) or an explanatory question (how or why did 
something happen?)’ (p.2). The strength of the case study method is well-accepted as 
having the ability to examine a case in indepth within its ‘real-life’ context (Yin 2004, 
p.1). However, a single case study is often prone to criticism for its perceived failure 
to meet standards of methodological rigor, researcher objectivity and external validity 
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(Evers and Staa 2012). In this study, every village which participated in its respective 
research zone is observed within the four ‘C’ framework not only as a stand-alone case 
but also as a comparative study with other villages from the same zone. In the next 
layer of analysis, the key distinct features of the four ‘Cs’ in all three zones are 
observed with a ‘cross-case comparison’ analysis.  
This study enhances the external validity or generalizability of its findings by using 
various research elements. From the selection process of the villages to cross-case 
analysis in multiple case comparisons, it attempts to prove generalizability. Here, 
generalizability is meant only for the theoretical application of ‘human security in the 
context of disaster vulnerability and resilience’ in replicated cases rather than 
generalizability as a case that represents situations in the whole cyclone-affected area. 
Although the picture of the whole affected region cannot be characterized here, the 
findings for the three areas provide strength for the entire study and indicate that they 
are a replication of each other.  
Organizing the data 
After transcription from hand notes, video and audio files, field data was collected 
village by village. All the information coming out from the individual interviews, and 
focus group discussion were organized in one master file for each village. It is a long 
process as it involved checking the consistency of written notes and audio-visual 
records. At the end, 45 master files resulted from three respective research zones. 
Before comparing one zone to another, the internal validation was made for each 
village by counter checking the rich discussion of the focus group with the data 
collected from individual participants. When a separate master file for each village 
was developed by gathering information as much as possible. Together with field notes 
which reflected the manner, tone and highlights of the participants, a full transcription 
of each village was combined in one master sheet. All quantifiable data coming out 
from the background interviews of each village were organized in excel files as one 
master sheet that visualized comparability of the village’s vulnerability and resilience 
factors. All these data are not measured by the purely quantitative approach, they are 
complementary to the rich narratives coming out from the focus group discussion. It 
helped the researcher to verify and confirm the findings from focus group discussion.  
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Coding 
Coding is part of a process that raises raw data to a conceptual level (Juliet and Anselm 
1998). Miles and Huberman (1994) refer to the role of coding in data analysis as 
follows:  
To review a set of fieldnotes, transcribed or synthesized and to dissect them 
meaningfully while keeping the relations between the parts intact, is the stuff 
of analysis. This part of analysis involves how you differentiate and combine 
the data you have retrieved and the reflections you make about this information. 
(p. 56) 
While transcribing the data from audio and hand-written formats to a computerized 
word sheet in the Burmese language, the thematic coding process started. Before 
jumping into the coding process, a set of pre-identified themes were developed within 
the frame of the four Cs models. In a thematic coding process, as explained by Ayres 
(2008), the researcher can begin with a list of anticipated themes that are already found 
in the raw material. This process helps to reduce the data from raw material that came 
out from semi-structured interviews. Thematic coding is useful for a study in which 
the conceptual frame is explicitly reflected in the data collection. In this stage, codes 
are now directly relevant to the conceptual model of the study, the literature the 
researcher studied and professional experience (Ayres 2008).  
During the coding process, the researcher also added some more items to the existing 
list of themes when new topics appeared from reading and analyzing raw data. 
Additional list consists of short descriptions of issues that became apparent during the 
focus group discussions and village interviews. Once data from each village was 
categorized into different themes, and a tentative set of coding categories for each 
respective theme was developed, I need to lend a hand of an independent second rater. 
A code book that had phrases and words with their own definition and their own 
address (number) was also developed to makes the code fits the data rather than putting 
the data in the box of specific code. Based on the codebook, we parallelly tried to test 
the same three villages from each research zone. After reviewing our independent 
finding, we could construct an agreement for a final version of codebooks that would 
apply to the rest of the villages. In the final discussion, we still had to adjust the existing 
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codes and defined new ones. As the transcription work of all 45 villages was very rich, 
the process of data analysis one year from March 2014 to February 2015. 
Differentiation and integration of data into only respective themes was challenging in 
a comparative study. For instance, when the ‘Conditions’ segment had a thematic code 
with a label ‘medium to receive emergency warning’, multiple answers could emerge 
to a simple open-ended question such as, ‘how did the participants of a focus group 
discussion receive a cyclone warning?’ Although the purpose of this question is to find 
out the pre-existing vulnerability of the community in the days before Cyclone Nargis, 
the respondents often brought their experiences not only from the pre-impact hours but 
also from the impact hours and associated events.  
In a quantitative interview, this kind of question may go together with a tick box by 
which the respondent can choose one of the answers as an information source they 
could access to get warnings. The strength of a qualitative study is that it can provide 
more variables to one question than one can imagine. For example, if the respondent 
could only tick pre-identified types of answers in the questionnaire sheet, it was not 
possible for the researcher to know of cases such as Zee Thaung in Zone I and Ayeyar 
in Zone II as the warning came from the nearby army unit, which was an unusual factor 
in comparison with others. Here the challenge is how to handle these diverse materials 
although they fall under the same thematic code. As Ayres (2008) argues, in this stage, 
‘coding facilitates the development of themes, and the development of themes 
facilitates coding’ (p.868). 
Again, some of the paragraphs from transcribed materials cannot be decontextualized 
with labels as they are attached to more than one ‘C’. When the respondents discussed 
the ‘Conditions’, the ‘Characteristics’ became inseparable in data analysis as well as 
in writing up. For example, the absence of primary school education was related to 
pre-Nargis vulnerability of showing a lack of shelter during Cyclone Nargis as well as 
to the weak potential of a human system to provide community resilience in the post-
Nargis ‘Chronology’. That is why a topic code is also needed for issues that overarch 
the concepts, ideas, categories and phenomena.   
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Data analysis with constant comparative method 
Throughout the coding, the constant comparative method (Glaser and Strauss 1967) 
was applied to avoid missing some key points without coding.  
Constant comparison among the three research zones was used to find out similarities 
and contrasts. Comparison matrices were also built to underline concrete similarities 
and differences. As hypothesis of the pattern had been developing based on initial 
findings since the researcher started the field interviews and group discussion, these 
patterns are clearer throughout the transcription process into a word document. They 
are also tested by building multiple matrices manually by applying to the following 
units of comparisons. The relationships between patterns are noted and discussed in 
respective chapters.  
1. Comparison within a single interview or a single focus group discussion. 
2. Comparison of one village to another within the same research zone (10 villages 
under Zone I and Zone III and 25 villages from Zone II) 
3. Comparison of one village tract to another (comparison among Kone Gyi, Dee Du 
Kone and Oke Twin village tracts in Zone I; Aye Yar, Ka Don Ka Ni and Kyein 
Chaung Gyi village tracts in Zone II; Taw Kha Yan (East), Taw Kha Yan (West), 
Thone Gwa, Kanyin Gone and Toe in Zone III) 
4. Comparison of one township to another within the same research zone (Labutta 
township and Ngapudaw township in Zone I; Bogale township and Dedaye township 
in Zone III,)  
5. Comparison of several aspects of resilience and vulnerability among Zone I, II and 
III 
6. Comparison of one administrative ‘Region’ to another (Ayeyarwaddy and Yangon 
Regions) 
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7. Comparison of one moment to another (Days before Cyclone Nargis, 24 hours 
before and after Cyclone Nargis, the first week after Cyclone Nargis, Current situation 
of 2013 and 2015) 
8. Comparison of one disaster experience to another (comparison between 2004 Indian 
ocean tsunami and Cyclone Nargis) 
In short, data analysis involved findings agreement or contrast between theoretical 
propositions and the empirical evidence from these three research zones are identified 
through pattern-matching. Expected patterns always specify the value of one or more 
dependent and independent variables. In the first round of data analysis, differences or 
similarities are retrieved from multiple cases in the same zone and later comparisons 
move outside of the same zone and cross-case analysis (Khan and VanWynsberghe 
2008) is used to examine the commonalities and differences among the four ‘Cs’ of 
the three zones. Through cross-case analysis, it was possible to find explanatory factors 
that contributed to the outcome of Cyclone Nargis in the four ‘Cs’ for every region.  
3.4.3 Triangulation  
The use of triangulation as a concept in the social sciences can be traced back to 
Campbell and Fiske (1959) and was later elaborated by Denzin (1989). It is used as a 
‘strategy for validating results obtained with individual methods’ (Flick 1998, p.230). 
Triangulation refers to the use of a ‘combination of methodological practices, 
empirical materials, and perspectives’ in a scientific inquiry to produce understanding 
(Flick 2002, p.229).  
The triangulation method suggested by Denzin (1978) requires the assessment of the 
nature of the research problem and its relevance to a particular method. This involves 
checking the consistency of the results, which comes about by using different data 
collection or data analysis methods: 
The core strength of methods triangulation is its potential to expose unique 
differences or meaningful information that may have remained undiscovered 
with the use of only one approach or data collection technique in the study. 
(USAID, p. 22).  
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The extensive use of triangulation is embedded in the design of this research. First of 
all, investigation of events happening in the time line of Cyclone Nargis needs 
familiarity with the research areas and the progress of the recovery over a timespan of 
six to seven years among the local people. As the researcher was involved a self-
organized relief aid program in the emergency phase and continued in the long-term 
recovery aid of cyclone-affected children in Zone I and Zone III, some of the events 
experienced were hard to forget. My personal experiences were useful in interpreting 
the field discussion and aggregated data but the personal reflections are always 
checked by using triangulation. As the standard of qualitative research is consolidated 
only when the data can be verified among the different options, this research is 
designed to form a hybrid type of inquiry to check the validity of one approach against 
the other.  
By means of data verification, Denzin (1989) suggests that researchers must measure 
the same phenomena at different times, places and with different persons. Media 
analysis is also part of the research method; newspapers from the post-Nargis period 
were examined but the accuracy and truthfulness of one source (especially in the 
content of the state-owned media) always needed to be checked against other sources 
of information. Finally, this study also pays attention to what Flick (2009) suggests:  
Triangulation is less a strategy for validating results and procedures than an 
alternative to validation, which increases the scope, depth, and consistency in 
methodological proceedings. (Flick 2009, p.445) 
Systematic triangulation is especially needed at the beginning of desk reviews. 
Myanmar was not strong in the tradition of encouraging scientific academic research; 
most of the publicly available and updated research had been conducted by 
independent researchers rather than government departments. Due to the lack of 
baseline data and lack of a proper documentation system for decades, it was common 
to have a set of diverse figures for the same item under investigation, for example, the 
population of the Ayeyarwady Region or the deforestation rate of the Delta. This 
situation required great care to check and evaluate by acquiring data from the most 
reliable sources possible.  
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3.5 Limitations and delimitations of the research methods 
Even though the structured questions with open-ended questions are formulated in 
both focus group discussions and in in-depth interviews, the authority to control the 
flow of the discussion often fell to the most powerful respondents sitting in the groups. 
I had to remain alert to make the balance of power between the dominant speakers and 
those who shunned engaging in the dialogue. Gender equality was often an issue when 
all the villagers present at the meeting were males as men are more engaged in village 
affairs, and group meetings in the rural social setting of normal conditions are likely 
to be dominated by men. That is why, even in the preparation stage, the researcher 
asked the local facilitators who helped organize focus group discussion in the villages 
to bring the gender aspect into consideration as much as possible. Personal contacts 
were also sometimes used to identify the right local and international experts in the 
Nargis recovery process for the interviews. Keeping the question of ‘Whose voice is 
heard and amplified because of the research?’ (Dudwick et al. 2006, p.4) in mind, the 
structure of various groups and conflict of interests are also explored.  
Another challenge is the limited availability of baseline data including scientific 
studies, experts’ opinions, academic papers and news outlets that cover geographically 
marginalized areas of the Ayeyarwady Delta. Giarratano et al. (2014) say the field 
researcher should know that the services a community can access and deliver in a post-
disaster period can be changed across time and life in the community may develop a 
‘new normal’. Seeking a set of baseline data for the areas concerned is very useful to 
understand how the community adapts or is forced to adapt quickly to a new situation. 
Unfortunately, Myanmar has very little baseline data for each province due to previous 
restrictions on the press and independent research. Especially in the marginalized 
communities that are located at the tip of the Delta as sample villages, little is known. 
In many cases, comparing the past and present was almost impossible as there was not 
enough data about the village in the existing literature. Also, the absence of or limited 
access to scientific data in the public domain did have impacts on the breadth and depth 
of conveying community narratives. For example, the community’s experience on 
rising tidal water and salinity cannot be explained adequately by borrowing evidence 
from existing ‘climate change’ literature in Myanmar as context-specific studies do 
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not exist yet. In such cases, only global data from the international literature provides 
some resources to rely on.  
3.6 Ethical considerations 
All interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with the consent of the 
respondents to allow the researcher to use the data in the dissertation. The rule of 
anonymity for privacy and confidentiality was also clarified, so that people could stay 
anonymous. Some requested that I omit their names. As many villages are located in 
the forest areas of Kadon Kani Peninsula, the participants had a lot to discuss in 
relation to governance issues in the recovery process, and forestry and marine 
resources. In this area, grievances caused by corruption and chronic poverty were also 
strongly present and very often I witnessed the outcry of discontent. Report of conflicts 
and complaints about past conflict between the alleged beneficiary of the existing 
system and those who have problems with the system frequently appeared. In such 
cases, the security of structurally vulnerable people is a concern and very often some 
of the individual interviews also go without real names. 
In terms of procedure, the respondents were also informed about the purpose of the 
interview before organizing focus group discussions or interviews. The emotional 
responses that might appear during the discussion were also considered risky for 
participation and were well explained to them as regards the nature and pattern of 
questions before starting the inquiry. Audiovisual recordings and taking photos of 
human subjects were always conducted by permission of the respective persons or 
groups.  
3.7 Maintaining consistency with usages related to ‘disaster’ 
Based on a long tradition of qualitative research schools, this study also began with 
understanding, ‘What constitutes a disaster?’ Phillips (2014) observed that researchers 
should have a clear conceptualization of key terms such as hazards, risk and disasters 
as this is the core of the whole study. He also stressed that conceptual clarity will ‘help 
the researcher to move forward a scientific body of knowledge’ (p.6) and that a 
comparison of the events would be easier when the key definitions were consistent. 
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For conceptual clarification in this research, rather than reinventing a new wheel, I use 
existing definitions of terminology that are most relevant to the Myanmar context.  
In Myanmar, it is traditional for the military authorities to refer to any case of mass 
destruction due to heavy natural hazard as a ‘natural’ disaster. On most occasions, 
under the military, the message was given to the public that disasters were inevitable 
as they are caused by nature (Government of Myanmar 2011, ABC 2015b). Nature as 
a cause is the oldest form of analysis in vulnerability study (Anderson,1995).  In 
Myanmar language, it is common usage not to make any distinction between hazard 
and disaster. ‘Kat Bay u yfab ;’ has been used with reference to any exposure to the 
hazard and its consequences. Whether without taking internationally known 
distinction between ‘hazard’ and ‘disaster’, for successive Myanmar governments 
have been using ‘natural’ as an adjective to the word ‘disaster’. One may find it in 
examples such as ‘Natural Disaster Management Law’ which was enacted on 31 July 
2013 or the National Natural Disaster Management Committee (NNDMC). What the 
Myanmar government perceived the term ‘natural disaster’ is divergent from a widely 
known reference of the UN.  
When the government formulated new disaster-related policies and legal frameworks 
in the post-Nargis period such as the Standing Order on Natural Disaster Management 
in Myanmar (2009). What the Myanmar government perceives by the term ‘natural 
disaster’ is divergent from the widely-known position of the UN on disaster issues in 
the contemporary world. Bankoff (2001) contends that seeing disaster as natural makes 
the government care less about the vulnerable when they think disasters are nobody’s 
fault but due to nature. Vulnerable people are at risk not simply because they are 
‘exposed to hazards’ but also because they have been made ‘marginal’ (Bankoff 2001, 
p.25). He argues: 
What makes a hazard into a disaster depends primarily on the way a society is 
ordered. Human systems place some people more at risk than others, creating 
relationships best understood in terms of an individual’s, household’s, 
community’s or society’s vulnerability. (Bankoff 2010, p.23) 
Bankoff’a argument is also reflected in the UNDP’s position that disaster counts on 
the role of society affected. A fundamental approach of this study considers that the 
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Myanmar people’s vulnerability is derived not only from the present natural state of 
hazards but also from the construction of social, political and economic environments 
of the affected communities. From the UN point of view, disasters are often described 
as a result of the combination of exposure to a hazard, the conditions of vulnerability 
that are present, and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce or cope with the 
potential negative consequences (Scheuer 2012). For the sake of conceptual clarity, 
the UNISDR official definitions of key terms as shown in Table 5 will be used in the 
interpretation of the field results and in describing them throughout the discussion in 
this dissertation.  
Table 5 UN’s definition of disaster-related terms 
Hazard 
 
A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may 
cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of 
livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental 
damage. 
Natural hazard 
 
Natural process or phenomenon that may cause loss of life, injury or other health 
impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic 
disruption, or environmental damage.  
Disaster A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving 
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, 
which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its 
own resources. 
Disaster risk 
 
The potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and 
services, which could occur to a particular community or a society over some 
specified future time period.  
Disaster risk 
management 
The systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations, and 
operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved 
coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the 
possibility of disaster.  
Disaster risk 
reduction 
 
The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to 
analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced 
exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise 
management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for 
adverse events. 
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Emergency 
management 
The organization and management of resources and responsibilities for 
addressing all aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness, response and 
initial recovery steps. 
Early warning 
system 
 
The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful 
warning information to enable individuals, communities and organizations 
threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time 
to reduce the possibility of harm or loss. 
Mitigation The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related 
disasters. 
Prevention The outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters. 
Preparedness The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response 
and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively 
anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely, imminent or 
current hazard events or conditions. 
Recovery 
 
The restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods 
and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to 
reduce disaster risk factors. 
Resilience The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, 
absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and 
efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its 
essential basic structures and functions. 
Response The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or 
immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure 
public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected. 
Source: UNISDR (2009) 
3.8 Selection of the research sites 
This study covers 45 villages in three self-identified research zones of the Ayeyarwady 
Delta as shown in Figure 4. All are situated along the cyclone track. Depending on 
geographic position, they are situated along Cyclone Nargis’s path and their existing 
level of resilience, and the impacts, vary in each research zone. A village’s geographic 
position subject to direct exposure to the storm surge was a major determinant in 
selection of research sites. From the aerial view, the cyclone moved from the 
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southwestern end of the Delta to the northeast passing all three zones at a highly 
destructive speed.   
The elements of the community resilience system are analyzed by comparing how 
similar or different they are among these three zones. Zone I as shown on the map can 
be divided into two places: the first half of ten sample villages is in Pyinsalu sub-
township and the other half is in Pyinkhayine Island. Zone II covered 25 villages 
spread over a large part of Kadon Kani Peninsula, which is situated in a face to face 
position with Mainmahla Kyun Wildlife Sanctuary. Nearly the whole of Zone II used 
to be part of the forest reserved area, but by the end of 2015 it received the official 
status of residential area. Zone III which is located just beside the Toe River flowing 
into the Bay of Bengal also contained 10 villages. When they are categorized as 
administrative units, eight villages are part of Kungyangone townships while the other 
two, Toe village and Sar Gyin village, are governed under the township administration 
of Dedaye. 
3.8.1 Background to Zone I 
Pyinsalu sub-township 
When the Asian Tsunami hit Myanmar’s shores in December 2004, Pyinsalu was one 
of the worst damaged spots. Pyinsalu, which used to be a fishing village became a sub-
township just before the tsunami. It was ranked as a sub-township under the Labutta 
district of the Ayeyarwady Division in 2006. In the 2004 Asian Tsunami, over two 
thousand people were affected in Pyinsalu alone and 25 persons died. According to 
the official statistics, nearly 300 houses were destroyed. Four villages under the 
Pyinsalu sub-township were directly exposed to the wave (WFP 2005). Three of them 
participated in this research.  
In Cyclone Nargis, according to township official records, the death toll was over 
50,000 (Phyu 2013) although local people believed the number could be higher. After 
Nargis, a mass influx of migration occurred as people from other areas reached 
Pyinsalu. The town and its neighboring villages also gained more attention from the 
military government because of the relatively high amount of loss and damage. The 
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residents said over 95 of the existing population were new, settling in the town only in 
2008. According to the 2014 Myanmar census, the population in Pyinsalu is over 
85,000 (Department of Population 2015, p.29).  
During Nargis, only one house, one monastery and half of the hospital buildings 
remained without being ripped apart while the whole town was smashed by the wind 
and storm surge. There were only 10 telephones in the town at the time of Nargis. 
Newspapers and weekly periodicals could only reach the town when the boats arrived 
from Yangon. The two cyclone shelters were built with the support of two private 
companies, Max Myanmar and A-One under the supervision of the government. 
Before Cyclone Nargis, people from Pyinsalu could travel to the nearest district town 
Labutta only by boat. Since 2008, a new road linking Labutta, Thingangyi and Pyinsalu 
was constructed along with four road projects that were initiated as part of the 
rehabilitation in the cyclone-affected areas (NLM 2009; NLM 2014). The five selected 
villages, namely Kone Gyi, Lay Yin Kwin, Aung Hlaing, Kwin Yar and Nant Thar 
Kone, are governed by the township authorities of Pyinsalu sub-township.  
Pyinkhayine Island 
Pyinkhayine Island can be reached only by taking the boat from Pathein, the capital of 
the Province. It takes around 10 hours from Pyinkhayine to Pathein by boat. On the 
island, motor scooters are a popular means of transport to commute from one village 
to another. The research area, which covers five villages at the cape of Pyinkhayine, is 
located next to point ‘Mawtin’, formerly known as ‘Cape Negrais’, which is the 
westernmost landmark in the Ayeyarwady Region. Geographically, these villages lie 
just opposite Haing Gyi Island, which is another seaward extremity beside a spur of 
the Arakan Yoma range between the Pathein River and Thetkal Thaung River. When 
Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, the first point of landfall was the Thamee Hla Island 
which is next to Haing Gyi Island. Although the eye of the cyclone was very close to 
the selected villages, not all villages suffered from the surge to the same degree. 
Having topographically favorable positions, three villages, namely Dee Du Kone, Zee 
Thaung and Kyaukkalat, were less affected than the other two villages, which are 
geographically more vulnerable. 
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3.8.2 Background to Zone II 
Bogale Township 
Bogale is in Pyapon district, which covered 71 village tracts comprising 589 villages 
by March 2009 (MIMU 2009). As the most downstream delta town, it also serves as a 
trading center for all the village tracts from the surrounding areas. It is situated on the 
coastal bank that faces the confluence of Kyaikpi River and Gonenyindan River. These 
two rivers join together to become the Bogale River near the town which continues to 
flow to the South until it reaches to the Andaman Sea. Bogale is approximately 43 
miles from the sea.  
The villages under study are spread over the Kadon Kani Peninsula on the mouth of 
Bogale River. Before the Bogale-Kadon Kani road was opened in 2014 (Hlaing, 2014, 
p.1), local people from the whole peninsula commuted to Bogale and other upper 
towns only by boat. The inland road infrastructure around Bogale was constructed after 
2008 and now it takes only four hours to reach to Bogale from Yangon. In the past, the 
morning and night boats between Yangon and Bogale were the only means of transport 
and took approximately eight hours.  
The villages that participated in this research are part of the Kadon Kani, Kyein 
Chaung Gyi, Kyun Thar Yar and Ayeyar village tracts. All the village areas are located 
inside the Kadon Kani Reserved Forest Area or overlap the forest area. As very few 
existed outside the forest, most of the villages were not registered as official human 
settlements until late 2015. In Bogale township, it is estimated that 36,325 people died 
due to Cyclone Nargis (Aung 2013). Even in the official records, the death toll 
accounted for 12.5 per cent of the town’s population at this time. As the effect of the 
storm was not the same everywhere, some villages were hit harder than others. Over 
90 per cent of houses were destroyed and the tools for income-generating activities of 
the farmers and fishermen almost completely vanished (Aung 2013, p.7). 
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3.8.3 Background to Zone III 
Kungyangone 
Kungyangone, which was believed to be a village of Mon ethnic people in ancient 
times under the Burmese monarch, is just 48 miles away from Yangon (Maung 1978, 
p.215). When someone goes to Kungyangone via Dala Township, it is only a two-hour 
drive from Yangon. Eight of the selected villages under Kunchangone are in areas that 
are historically and geographically known as the Southern Kunchangone, and the other 
two that belonged to Dedaye are the closest to the sea, residing on a shore between 
Toe River and Yangon River. 
Kunchangone was only a village of 200 houses in 1850 and was inhabited only by 100 
people. Under the British, it was transformed to a small town by combining with 
another village called Taw Pa Lal. Since the early years of the twentieth century, 
Kungyangone was governed as a district under the Twente Division which contained 
nine other districts. The sparse population contains mostly Burman and other 
minorities including Karen and Indian migrants (Maung 1978, p.217).  
The southern parts consist of coastal villages and islands exposed to sea water after 
the mangroves were rapidly cleared in the last half of last century. Traditionally, 
people from the northern part of Kunchangone made their living from plantations and 
the southern part is inhabited by paddy farmers and fishermen who made settlements 
along the coast line.  
Dedaye 
Two villages from Dedaye are located on the mouth of the Toe River facing the sea. 
Administratively, these villages are combined with the Dedaye township, although 
they are geographically closer to Kungyangone. These three villages are on the right 
side of Toe River, which was the borderline for the two townships of Kungyangone 
and Dedaye. These villages are close to a historic place called China Bakir Flat, where 
the British government installed a light-house between 1869 and 1920 (Maung 1978, 
p.327).    
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The name Dedaye was assumed to be a Mon name and the town’s people believed that 
it was founded by ancient Mon. After Independence, Dedaye remained as a town in 
the Ayeyarwady Division, although Kungyangone became a part of Yangon Division. 
Dedaye used to be bigger than Kunchangon in size and population in the early 20th 
century. The peak of agricultural land expansion occurred during the colonial days, 
but more forest areas were cleared for agriculture under the military government that 
came into power in 1988 (Yan 2016). After nearly three decades of rapid deforestation, 
the local people have become increasingly aware of more frequent floods and strong 
weather. Nargis was a wake-up call for the people of Kunchangone and Dedaye, where 
mangroves were cut until they reached zero level. The case study villages under 
Dedaye lost part of their mangrove areas during the rule of SLORC and SPDC. It is an 
inconvenient truth for the local people who are now highly aware of the negative 
consequences of deforestation, but they did not have the collective bargaining power 
to challenge the local authorities (Yan 2016). Dedaye, which used to have 2,800 acres 
of mangrove forest in the past is now covered by 50 acres (Yan 2016). Selected villages 
in the Dedaye under study have a majority population of fishermen with a few paddy 
farmers. 
 
Figure 4 Map of research zones in the Ayeyarwady Delta 
Source: The United Nations Institute for Training and Research.   
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Chapter 4 
Historical outline and vulnerability in the Ayeyarwady 
Delta before Cyclone Nargis 
This chapter identifies vulnerability and resiliency in the Delta before Cyclone Nargis 
hit the region. It intends to locate disaster in historical context and learn the 
implications of recent history in enhancing human security in the delta. Bankoff (2004) 
points out that ‘disasters are both historical processes and sequential events’ (p.24). 
Anthony Oliver-Smith also makes a similar point, ‘the life-history of a disaster begins 
prior to the appearance of a specific event-focused agent’ (Oliver-Smith 1999, 
p.29˗30). This chapter argues that much of the vulnerability around Cyclone Nargis is 
rooted in national history and its implications for conditions of the community’s assets 
(physical, institutional) and processes (social capital, participation, trust) for resilience.  
Much of the modern history of Myanmar has been described in terms of failure of 
development as evident in the state of the economy or failure in democratization as 
evident in the long domination of the military in politics. While several accounts on 
different features of Myanmar have been discussed in various thematic studies: general 
history and politics (Holliday 2012; Steinberg 2001; Hlaing et al. 2005), development 
and economic (ADB 2012; Cheesman et al. 2013; Furnivall 1947; Than 2007; Thein 
2004), society and culture (Gyi 1983; Myint-U 2006), ethnic conflict and military 
(Gravers 2007; Lall 2009), civil society and human security (James 2005; Steinberg 
1997), environment and resource extraction (James 2006; Skidmore and Wilson 2013), 
specific accounts of the Delta were limited. Adas (2011), Schendal (1991) and, Than 
(2000) provide accounts of the Delta with the main focus on an agricultural aspects of 
the Delta communities in the colonial and post-independence period.  
In this chapter, issues related to the Delta are extrapolated from secondary data and 
reports on Myanmar. The first part of the chapter provides a background of Myanmar 
with issues affecting to the whole country including the Delta. In the second part, 
socio-economic and environmental vulnerability in the Delta before Cyclone Nargis is 
analyzed within a framework of three domains: ‘people’, ‘place’ and ‘governance’.  
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4.1 Historical outline of land and living in the Delta 
The history of Myanmar can be presented from different starting points. We can either 
start from ancient history, from colonial times under the rule of the British Empire, or 
from Independence. This study begins with a historical background of the Delta from 
the colonial period. Several historical writings on Myanmar/Burma agreed that the 
current political map of Myanmar was created by the British Empire (Lintner 1994; 
Taylor 1987). Taylor (2007) even specified that ‘Though this flies in the face of official 
nationalist historiography of the country, it is no exaggeration to say that the British 
made modern Myanmar’ (p.72).  
In pre-colonial days, the center of power was concentrated in Central Myanmar cities 
such as Ava, Amarapura or Mandalay. Lower Burma, which includes the Ayeyarwady 
Delta, was quite far from these central authorities but they were loosely represented 
locally by district governors (myowun), who ruled over the headmen of the townships 
(myothugyi) and villages. In the Delta, the land was abundant and sparsely populated 
(Myint-U 2001). The British annexed Lower Burma in 1852 and started to 'develop' 
what they saw as ‘neglected’ resources. They introduced a plan for rice cultivation 
which focused on exports and improved rural infrastructure such as embankments, 
roads, and canals (Schendel 1991).  
The whole of Burma fell under British control in the 1890s. In a study of the Burma 
Delta under the British rule, Adas (2011) stated that what the British brought in was a 
liberal economic framework and policy measures to stimulate capitalist expansion. 
After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the fertile land of the Delta and lower 
Burma were eyed by British rice exporters as new areas to exploit for international 
trade. Within half a century (1855˗1906), the cultivated area in lower Burma increased 
from over 700,000 acres to nearly six million acres (Adas 2011). In the early twentieth 
century, the Burma Delta became the rice basket of Asia. Demographic change was 
also apparent with a huge migration of Burmese from upper Burma as well as of 
Chinese and Indian migrants. Economic growth under the British in the last half of the 
19th century was hailed as an impressive achievement (Adas 2011). 
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Then came the First World War and a downturn in the economy that loomed over the 
next two decades. Local farmers were hardest hit during the economic downturn. Many 
lost their farmland due to the debt crisis and their possessions were transferred to 
Indian moneylenders. It was recorded that more than half of all agricultural land in the 
principal rice-growing districts of lower Burma was owned by non-native absentee 
landlords by 1940 (Turnell and Vicary 2008). As Furnivall noted, a poor man in the 
poor country of the past under the Burmese king was now changed to ‘a poor man in 
a comparatively rich country’ (Furnivall 1947). Schendel (1991) observed that the 
dramatic change the British hegemony brought to rural Lower Burma was the 
destruction of the self-reliant peasantry. 
The Second World War came to Burma in 1942 with the march of the Japanese army 
through Southern Burma. After three years, the Japanese retreated and the British re-
entered. After the Second World War Burma was devastated by huge economic loss. 
The war, as quoted in Schedel’s book, ‘destroyed a larger share of the nation’s physical 
wealth than was destroyed in any other country except Greece’ (Hagen 1956 cited in 
Schedel 1991). Since Burma has been plagued by a series of armed conflicts after 
Independence, Schedel (1991) contended ‘Post-war reconstruction was largely undone 
by the revolts that followed Burma’s Independence in 1948’ (Schedel 1991, p.211). 
After gaining independence in 1948, fourteen years of ‘democratic interlude’ existed 
in Burma until the military coup of 1962. The significance of this short democratic 
rule was credited for the level of economic growth which reached back to pre-war 
levels and the expansion of education and social sectors (Thein 2004), and growing 
civil society and village life (Steinberg 1981). However, these years also marked 
widespread civil war, ethnic tensions, and political infighting. A major criticism of the 
Prime Minister U Nu was his failure to prioritize the bridging of the ethnic and 
religious divide of the country (Callahan 2004). In this context of civil war, the Delta 
witnessed fighting between the Burmese military and the Karen ethnic armed groups 
for several years after Myanmar’s Independence.   
In the meantime, Burma’s military power gradually moved to a stronger position in 
the context of civil war and in battles against the invasion of Kuomintang Chinese 
armed forces who entered the Shan States in 1949˗1950 (Callahan 2001; Seekins 
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2007). Finally, in 1962, the military staged a coup and decades of entrenched military 
rule in Burma started. Under the military government of General Ne Win, which 
rebranded itself later as the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), all rice trade 
was nationalized and rice prices were manipulated for state benefit, which affected the 
lives of farmers in the Delta and elsewhere. While rice procurement was undertaken 
by the State, growers were isolated from the world market. The State’s procurement 
also served to subsidize urban consumers. Legislation in 1965 abolished all rents on 
farm lands, but tenancy in practice did not disappear. In 1969˗70, 61 per cent of lower 
Burma’s cultivators were reported as tenants (Schendel 1991). The State became the 
sole owner of the land and land tenure was used by the State to force adherence to the 
State’s economic policies. Steinberg (1981) stated that the ‘majority of the Burmese 
peasantry is once again at the mercy of its landlord, but today the landlord is the state’ 
(p.128). 
‘The Burmese Way to Socialism’ was the main state’s narrative in General Ne Win’s 
era of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). In the BSPP era, the steady socio-
economic decline of the country led to the UN’s designation of Burma as a Least 
Developed Country in 1987 (Steinberg 2010). Under the socialist regime, there was 
little interaction with the global sphere and citizens were isolated from the world in 
various ways (Steinberg 1981). Public expenditure on agriculture declined from 11.3 
per cent of capital expenditure in 1964˗65 to 4.4 percent in 1970˗71. Due to little 
budget for irrigation, only 13 per cent of agricultural areas could be used for multiple 
cropping in 1972 (Steinberg 1981). 
The BSPP’s rule ended in 1988 with a popular uprising against the government and 
subsequent military takeover on 18 September 1988. The military tried to convince the 
people that the takeover was to be understood as ‘a coup by consent’ (Steinberg, 2013). 
The stated reason of the military was to prevent what they considered chaos on the 
streets; they said they would be holding power temporarily and promised to go back 
to the barracks. They fulfilled their promise partially in 2010 after more than two 
decades in power. In all these years, much has been recorded and analyzed about the 
military regime’s human rights abuses, forced labors, corruption, and ongoing civil 
wars in several ethnic regions (Graver and Flemming eds. 2014).  
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In more than two decades of military rule since 1988, the global media had to cover 
mostly bad news, be it the 2007 bloody crackdown on monk-led protests, or long 
prison sentences for rights activists, or the neglected victory of the opposition in the 
1990 election, or the extension of house arrest of the main opposition leader Aung San 
Suu Kyi for several times, or the seemingly endless constitution-drafting process since 
1993 which finally finished in 2008.  
Holliday (2012) argued that ‘social impacts of martial law have been mainly 
devastation’ and Myanmar has pinned itself at the wrong end of various global indexes. 
Callahan (2013) concludes two major changes in the political and economic 
environment of Myanmar since 1988 to the years before Cyclone Nargis. These 
changes are described as follows: 
One is the explosion of rent-seeking opportunities that has emerged with the state 
rebuilding process from the late 1980s until today. The second was that changes 
in the world economy ushered in at the end of the Cold War—and particularly the 
expansion of neo-liberal institutions and policies—gave senior officers access to 
an unprecedented range of lucrative (and often informal) business partnerships. 
(Callahan 2007, p.42)  
 At a casual glance on the period before political transition in 2011, Myanmar was 
ranked 174th of 178 countries in the Press Freedom Index of 2010 (Reporters without 
Border 2010), 176th out of 178 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index of 2010 
(Transparency International 2010), 132nd out of 149 counties in the Global Peace Index 
2010 and 16th most fragile state out of 177 countries in the Failed States Index 2010. 
The US and other western countries responded to Myanmar with economic sanctions 
as punishment, while most regional countries including ASEAN members and China 
maintained either engagement or business as usual with Myanmar. The military’s 
dominance over most of public institutions and the economic sector became ‘sources 
of political patronages’ (Lambrecht 2010). In this context, the society grew weaker in 
what Duffield (2008) referred to as ‘chronic emergency in Myanmar’.  
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4.2 Vulnerability of the Delta and Myanmar in the three domains 
In order to locate historical aspects of vulnerability and resilience in the Delta, three 
aspects of village community are identified as shown in Figure 5. These aspects can 
be seen in ‘people’, ‘place’ and ‘governance’ domains. ‘Governance’ is a collective 
reference to local power structures under national political control and policy 
frameworks while ‘place’ refers to natural resources and environment around the 
village or in the region under study in which a village community is situated. ‘People’ 
refers to human capital aspects of health and education together with livelihood 
conditions. The strengths and weaknesses of each aspect contribute to the levels of 
vulnerability and resiliency while these three aspects interact and impact on each other. 
For example, mangrove degradation (the place domain) affects the livelihoods options 
of the people (the people domain) and corruption of the local authority in the forest 
conservation area (the governance domain) impacts upon both people and place.  
As shown in Figure 5, communities situated within these three domains are nestled 
within the nation state which in turn is influenced by changes in regional and global 
contexts. Changes in national or regional contexts also have impacts on the stated 
domains (three aspects) of the community with dual stages of resiliency and 
vulnerability. General patterns of events and issues from a distance (national or 
international level), in which local people do not have any control but nonetheless 
receive impact on their wellbeing ruled by the authoritarian government, were also 
explored using this three domains framework.  
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Figure 5 Simplified representation of three domains in village community of the 
Delta 
Livelihoods in village communities of the Delta mainly revolved around farming, 
fishing, and related activities. While the farmers had been hard pressed by the 
government’s socio-economic policies since the first military rule of 1962, fishing was 
also no longer a cheap option that could provide a safety net for local people after a 
new fishing policy was introduced to privatize common fishing ground after 1990. In 
the face of mounting livelihood insecurity, local people have relied more on natural 
resources around their communities while government policy and corruption shrank 
the resource domain in significant ways. All these situations led the Delta community 
to a vulnerable existence in terms of natural protection, weakening community asset-
bases such as housing. In the meantime, local governance under direct control of the 
military did not always favor community processes of collective action which can 
accumulate resilience.  
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4.3 People 
4.3.1 Land and livelihood of people 
Furnivall (1957) in his reflection on pre-colonial Burma said that ‘a man did not live 
in a village because he owned land there, but he owned land because he lived in the 
village’ (p.85). From the time around Cyclone Nargis till the current situation in 
Myanmar, landlessness has been a major feature in the Delta as well as in broader parts 
of Myanmar. The only national household survey ever conducted under the military 
rule, called the Integrated Household Living Condition (IHLC II) survey (2009˗10) 
showed that 24% of the population who earned income from agriculture were landless 
(UNDP 2011). Later, the World Bank revised the IHLC II survey, as it was based on 
the outdated population census of 1983. In the revised figure of the World Bank, rural 
landlessness is around 40% (two-fifths of the total population) (World Bank 2014, 
p.24). Save the Children (2009) also noted that the number of landless households in 
the Delta was estimated at 60 to 65% of the total population, which is significantly 
higher than the national landless ratio. A rapid rate of land loss around the time before 
Cyclone Nargis was recorded as follows: 
I was working for the Ministry of Forest for 35 years before I retired in 2006. 
At that time, we had about 500 landowners in Hlaingbongyi village tract listed 
in the ministry’s statistic yearbook. When I looked at the same book published 
in 2008, there were only some 300 landowners left. Many of them had to sell 
the land because they were struggling to pay debts. (Interview with a resident 
of Halingbongyi Village Tract, Labutta Township) 
Landlessness pushed the people to marginal places and to a higher level of 
vulnerability. In focus group discussions for this research, there were people who 
became landless in pre-Cyclone Nargis time. These participants stated that debt due to 
long-term decline in productivity and government procurements policy for years 
(which stopped in 2003) was a major reason. A generational dimension of debt 
incurred over time and gradual loss of land was a dominant pattern described in 
discussions when they referred to the time before Cyclone Nargis (Focus group 
discussion in Zone I and II).   
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Since the first military coup of 1962, the government’s rice procurement policy put a 
heavy burden on the farmers of the Delta and all over Myanmar. Around 1987, the 
farmers were forced to sell around 10 to 12 tin of paddy (1 tin or basket is equal to 
20.9 kg) per acre to the government at a fixed price. But in the 1990s, under the second 
military government, a new policy set the amount of rice procurement up to 30 to 40 
tins per acre which was equivalent to the average amount of total rice production per 
acre. At that time, the government’s fixed price was only 31% of the market price 
(Young et al. 1998). The procurement policy was stopped in 2003, but 70% of national 
poverty was already located in rural areas of the country (Steinberg 2001).  
When farming was under pressure under the government procurement policy and a 
gradual decline in productivity, subsistence fishing was no longer a cheap option used 
to provide a safety net for local people because of a new scheme of privatization of 
many common fishing grounds in the Delta (GFDRR 2014). Extensive marketization 
and privatization started in the early 1990s under a scheme operated by the Department 
of Fisheries. At the township level, the Department of Fisheries controlled inland 
fishery resources and introduced finishing leases and licenses by allowing those who 
could offer a competitive price to own fishing grounds (Save the Children 2009). As 
most of the licenses were sub-leased by the primary bidder to smaller fishermen with 
a higher price, small-scale fishermen who had to rely on the income from daily fishing 
consequently suffered. Quite often, even fishing grounds in small creeks fell into the 
hands of bidders and livelihood options for the rest became fewer. 
In a study of poverty and mangrove deforestation in the Delta, Htay (2016) stated that 
local people were often incapable of paying market price for fishing licenses even 
though the creeks and rivers are located beside them. Therefore, these villagers ‘hide 
and catch marine animals in the small creeks at night’ (p.82) but they do not usually 
get a good catch. Their income was shrinking while the supposed safety net rarely 
helped. Htay (2016) also describes a circle of deprivation among the Delta fishermen; 
the villagers at the margin need to borrow the money for food, then they go fishing at 
night. Due to a lower quality of fish catch, they cannot pay back the debt. Then they 
sometimes sneak into the mangrove forest to get something to make some money for 
debt repayment and daily food. Poverty forces them to make illegal extractions 
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although they know that depleted mangroves are part of the reason for declining fish 
stocks. When mangroves which serve as fish spawning grounds lose ecosystem 
services, they cannot find fish and poverty continues to grow.  
In this context of government policy negatively impacting on local livelihoods, local 
communities in the Delta faced an increase in vulnerability. When the local 
participants in this research shared their life story under the military regime prior to 
Cyclone Nargis, they usually referred to two factors in the name of vulnerability: 
powerlessness and feeling neglected. ‘Powerlessness’ in the face of oppression, 
corruption and injustice and ‘neglect’ by the government policy and administrative 
structures to crucial issues which impact on society and community.  
Powerlessness was profoundly expressed in Zone II of this research when participants 
recounted confrontational situations involving fishing license holders and ordinary 
fishermen in which local police or authorities usually protect the interest of licensees 
(discussions in Aye Yar village of Zone II). Lack of protection for local people and its 
impact on livelihoods at village level was observed not only in fishing rights and but 
also in the land rights issue stated in Chapter 7 which featured at the root of acute 
vulnerability before Cyclone Nargis and its continuation in the recovery phase. The 
following observation of Steinberg (2001) on the rule of law in Myanmar can also be 
applied at the small village level: 
Law is not the protection of rights but arbitrary set of regulations promulgated 
to support the state establishment and to prevent dissidence. Law is thus 
personal, not contractual, opening avenues for corruption…. In provincial 
areas, local military commanders have virtual dictatorial powers to enforce (or 
ignore) regulations that serve what they regard as state (or personal) interests. 
(p.41) 
In the three research zones of the Delta, landlessness and limited livelihood options 
pushed more people to the lowest category of the wealth ranking. Doan (2008), 
described local households in four categories of wealth rankings, namely Very Poor, 
Poor, Better-Off and the Middle. In this study, which encompasses 45 villages of the 
Delta area, the conditions of landless farmers and manual laborers of fishing boats 
largely resembled the conditions of the very poor category of the Save the Children’s 
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report description. The state of very poor villagers in Save the Children’s livelihoods 
rapid needs assessment prepared by Doan (2008) is described as follows: 
The households in this wealth group are characterized by their lack of major 
productive assets, i.e., they do not have paddy land and cattle; a small number 
of them do not even have land to build their own houses and have to rent from 
others. Many of these households, typically about less than half of them do not 
even have boats; if they do, their boats are often of small size and low quality. 
Their fishing nets are small and for subsistence fishing of about US$10 or less; 
they may have crab traps that they can use without having to pay fishing license 
fee. Their crab traps are very simple and usually made by themselves with 
purchase of key materials such as small fishing nets and some bamboo sticks. 
Many of them cannot afford to have livestock, particularly pigs that can serve 
as meaningful buffer during hunger season. Thus, they must borrow in the form 
of ‘advance’ either in cash or in-kind from those households who provide 
access to casual labor opportunities; their loans are usually a few to ten dollars 
and to be repaid during the high labor season.  
If they are hired by landowners for both planting and harvesting season, they 
may typically get kyat 270,000 a year from this job. Without having land, all 
their income must go in to food, essentially rice and these households are 
extremely vulnerable to food price fluctuation. The income of these landless 
from working as casual labor in farm was sufficient to buy rice for their family 
consumption for 8˗10 months only. They must seek additional income sources 
to cover their other expenses.  
Among poor households, there are extremely poor and vulnerable households 
that are often described by the locals in their own words as those in ‘worst 
condition’. In addition to their lack of major productive assets, they are 
constrained by limited number of income earners in the family, having family 
member(s) chronically ill or disabled, etc. Some of them are elderly including 
widows who live alone and their capacity to work is very limited. They usually 
have modest income and have to rely on support from their neighbors and 
extended family members who live close by. They typically live far from the 
village center and drinking water pond. These households are extremely 
vulnerable to shocks and stress happening to them as well as their neighbors 
and family members. (Doan 2008, p.27) 
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In the post-Cyclone Nargis period of this research, it was discovered that 60 to 70 per 
cent of the households in all villages of Zone II are in a similar state to the above 
description. In contrast, Zone I and Zone III villages showed a mixture of all four 
categories of the stated survey. Yet, the proporation of landless and casual laborers 
there also ranged from 35 per cent to 45 per cent among the selected villages. These 
numbers indicate the continuing struggle of the people in the post-Cyclone Nargis 
period. Nevertheless, a new development in the pre-cyclone Nargis period is a space 
for local people to engage with issues that affect their life.  
4.3.2 The health and education of the people 
One year before Cyclone Nargis, the European Commission strategy paper on 
Myanmar concluded that, ‘the country is severely off track to achieve any of the MDGs 
by 2015’. (European Commission 2007, p.9). At that time, the dismal figures of the 
Myanmar community’s struggle were as follows: 
• Average family spent 75% of income on food (Myint-U 2009). The CIA 
World Factbook estimated that the population living below the poverty line 
was 32.7 per cent by 2007 (CIA 2017) 
• In 2008, Myanmar spending on education was at 0.7% of GDP and 3.5% of 
total government expenditures and many years before 2008 did not see 
expenditure higher than this (UNICEF 2013). That can be compared to the 
estimated military budget which consistently absorbed amount highers than 
total expenditure on health care and education for the period 2004–2009 
(Turnell 2012). In the years prior to Nargis barely 60 per cent of children 
finished primary level education (Ministry of Education 2008)   
• Total health expenditure in Myanmar is the lowest among Southeast Asia 
countries between 2003 and 2011. General government health expenditure 
(GGHE) as a percentage of general government expenditure (GGE) was only 
1% in the same period (WHO 2014).  
• Per capita income in 2008 was estimated to be about US$290 (Steinberg 2013).  
As described in the above figures, a decline in the health and education standards of 
the people which linked to vulnerability was a distinct feature of people and 
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communities in different parts of Myanmar. The Delta was no exception and poverty 
in the region was 32 per cent (UNDP 2011). 
Two prominent issues of social vulnerability in the Delta communities can be 
identified as health and education. Several discussions in Zone I and II described health 
situations in the villages before Cyclone Nargis as ‘ill health is the fastest way to 
poverty’. In 2005, three years prior to Cyclone Nargis, the World Health Organization 
estimated that out of pocket payments for healthcare in Myanmar were 99 per cent and 
among the highest globally. In other words, people were on their own in terms of health 
care services (Saw et al. 2013).  
Because of the poor healthcare services available in the country in the years prior to 
Cyclone Nargis, 41 per cent of children under five years of age were stunted and 30 
per cent were underweight (World Bank 2010). The Myanmar Multiple Indicator 
Cluster Survey (UNICEF 2011) also showed similar indicators in a report published 
the year after Nargis. According to the MICS 2009˗2010, Myanmar had the third 
highest malnutrition rate in South East Asia. 
Malnutrition triggered a higher mortality rate among children. In addition to that it 
hampered children’s ability to learn as well as having cognition skills. In the current 
context of a changing environment and of extreme climatic events, basic knowledge 
about geography and functional literacy will help the children and their families to 
survive. During the fieldwork for this research, people in several villages, teenagers 
and adults alike, expressed how they could not get a mental image of the cyclone’s 
direction and geographical orientation even though they heard about it or listened to 
the storm news on the radio.  
Changes in the education sector also need to be considered as underlying roots of 
vulnerability. In colonial and in early post-colonial days, Myanmar had a well-
functioning education system and a high literacy rate (Matelski 2015). After the 1962 
military takeover, the quality of education system started to decline (Ditlevsen 2014; 
Steinberg 2001). With little budget allocated for education, physical aspects such as 
school building quality, as well as the number of teachers and implementation of 
proper curriculum declined (Ditlevsen 2014).  
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Poverty, as noted by Phong and Tinh (2010), is ‘not synonymous with vulnerability 
but one of its principal driving forces’ (p.293). In the case of the Delta communities, a 
population in extreme poverty had fewer assets of strength that could withstand a 
hazard. An obvious manifestation is that there appeared many stories of strong 
buildings and houses that saved many lives in several villages, yet some suffered under 
the direct storm path due to having little barrier between the sea and their houses (for 
example, the villages in Zone I of this study). From the field visit and narratives from 
the villages, the linkage potential of better housing and public buildings such as 
schools in villages with improved livelihoods was very tangible. Unfortunately, in the 
poverty-dominated rural community of the Delta, the quantity of stronger houses that 
can provide better survival chances is limited. With respect to locating a safe place to 
take refuge, almost all of the villagers in this research echoed the following quote of a 
woman participant of research Zone III: 
Running was my only option. My house was too small. It could not be safe for 
my three-month-old daughter and me. I crossed the road and run into the 
opposite house which looked stronger. Oh, too many people there. (Ma Thida, 
30 years old female farm worker from Eastern Tawkhayagyi, Zone III) 
While it is less tangible to assess, the potential for improved education to save lives is 
also high. Having awareness of the incoming storm, a better comprehension of early 
warnings and a good understanding of the Delta’s geography, could all contribute to a 
local process of disaster preparedness measures so that people could probably have a 
better chance of survival. 
In addition to health impacts on both poverty and education, which factored in having 
tangible and intangible assets for disaster resilience as mentioned above, poor health 
and malnutrition showed another visible dimension in the storm emergency: a weaker 
position to survive in the storm. It is not hard to imagine how lopsided it was for old 
people, children, and people with weak physical strength struggling against the 
ferocious storm surge and storm wind of Cyclone Nargis.   
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4.4 Place 
When George Orwell wrote an article about Myanmar in 1929, he referred to the 
country as an ‘earthly paradise’ (Blair 1929). He said, ‘Its abundant natural resource 
offered the potential of a great source of wealth that world capitalists were attracted 
to’. Stating that Burma was as an immensely fertile land of Southeast Asia, George 
Orwell condemned that ‘the British were robbing and pilfering Burma quite 
shamelessly’. In his observation, the Burmese could not notice that they were being 
exploited because hunger and unemployment were words with which they were 
familiar and there was adequate works and food for everyone. But George Orwell 
foretold that, ‘the Burmese will begin to suffer when a large part of the richness of 
their country has declined’.  
Capitalism or ‘market economy’, as it is referred to by the military government, started 
to shape Myanmar’s economic policy after the beginning of the second military 
takeover in 1988. Skidmore (2005) noted the influence of the market on public life as 
‘the encompassing domain of the popular is infused with power and with 
commodification. The penetration of capitalism and dictatorship into even the most 
intimate provinces of personal relations is an increasing reality in daily life (of Burma)’ 
(p.8).   
With changes in economic policy, natural resource extraction accelerated. At the end 
of the first military/BSPP rule, many natural resources were left intact due to the 
prevailing disengagement with the outside world and restrictions on possessing private 
property whereas the country was in poverty nonetheless. Under the second military 
regime, natural resource exploitation was common amidst corruption, favoritism and 
self-enriching schemes under the name of the market economy. Fast forward to 2008 
or 2015, a general description of Myanmar as a country with natural resources does 
not translate into prosperity or development. When describing Myanmar’s renowned 
resources of teak, Bryant (2007) observed that ‘little profit has ‘trickled down’ to 
Burmese residents in terms of improved social services or infrastructure. Instead, 
tighter political and military control over and interference in the lives of local people 
has been a norm’ (p.144). 
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In the Delta, the dynamics of natural resource depletion, poverty, and vulnerabilities 
are complex. In the pre-colonial days, the colonial days and sometimes post-
independence, informal land tenure was held by whoever cleared the land and 
cultivated it. If a family continued to possess a plot of land for three generations, the 
land would become ‘ancestral property’ (Schendel 1991). Population pressures, 
migration, and poverty pushed the extension of agricultural land into mangrove forest 
areas over the last several decades. While the Forest Department was the government 
unit responsible for managing and conserving forest resources, in theory, its aim in 
practice was to generate revenue. As Htay (2016) noted, the ‘existing forest 
management system is based on the revenue target defined at a particular time, not on 
the carrying capacity of the forest itself’ (p.75). 
Energy poverty added another dimension on deforestation and vulnerability of place 
in the Delta. Until 2011, over 95 per cent of the people in Myanmar used solid fuel for 
household lighting, cooking and value-added income generation activities 
(Mercycorps 2011). According to Nam et al. (2015), Myanmar’s average rate of 
electrification, calculated based on the number of electrified households connected to 
the grid over the total number of households, increased from about 16 per cent in 2006 
to 31 per cent in December 2013 (Nam et al. 2015). However, the rural/urban divide 
and regional disparities still exist. For instance, while Yangon, the former capital, has 
the highest electrification ratio (78 per cent), the Ayeyarwady Region has only 11 per 
cent by the end of 2013. Ayeyarwady has the third lowest electrification among all 
provinces of Myanmar. In this study, only six villages from Zone III, which are also 
part of the rural area of Yangon Region, have access to electricity while the other 39 
villages are living with zero electricity. Only in January 2013 did the government adopt 
the first ever energy policy in history with short-term and long-term energy 
development plans (Nam et al. 2015). Paradoxically Myanmar is among five major 
energy exporters in the region with 35 per cent of total foreign direct investment going 
to the energy sector in 2015. But Myanmar is referred to the World Energy Outlook of 
2012 as a country in ‘extreme energy poverty’ (IEA 2012).  
Previously in Zone II of this research, charcoal production was known as one of the 
major energy sources for the former capital city of Myanmar, Yangon. An official ban 
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on charcoal kiln construction and charcoal production was announced in 1994 
(Mangrove Service Network 2006; Aung 2012). Nevertheless, charcoal making still 
exists as some kilns are exempt from the ban (Htay 2016). With population expansion 
and household consumption, corruption inside the regional government was reported 
as a causal factor in more rapid deforestation in the years following the charcoal 
making ban. When Cyclone Nargis hit the Ayeyarwady Delta in 2008, the charcoal 
price in Yangon suddenly went up, indicating that the Delta was still a key energy 
source for the urban area. 
From the 1990s to the early 2000s, the military government’s procurement policy also 
contributed to deforestation in the Delta. With ever-increasing pressure from the 
government to sell set amounts of paddy at a fixed price to the government, many 
farmers were pushed into the forest. A more problematic issue was lack of official 
recognition of their settlement. Farmland and villages location were not officially 
recognized as they were situated in reserved forest areas. As long as the farmers met 
the sales quotas of rice, they could keep farming in extended areas (Htay 2016). The 
focus of the rice procurement policy was not conservation or sustainable development 
but extraction from the local people.  
In a context of rampant corruption with little regard to sustainability from vertical 
layers of authorities, commercial industries came into the area for profit. Their arrival 
resulted in environmentally highly degrading business ventures such as shrimp 
farming and land reclamation for industrial agriculture. On the edge of the Delta and 
the reserved forest area, it was shrimp farming that created most damage to the ecology 
of the local communities. Mangrove waterways and saline water are regarded as 
preferred conditions for shrimp farming. It was common for business companies in 
Myanmar to pay the bribes to local authorities to encroach on mangrove reserve forest 
areas. These activities were in full swing in the 1990s (Htay 2016; Aung 2012). In the 
short term, the villagers received some income by becoming manual laborers on 
shrimp farms, but later when the normal routine of shrimp farming resulted in the the 
polluted land being abandoned, the villagers’ livelihoods were left in a worse situation. 
Apart from shrimp farming, the military government launched an extensive land 
reclamation program after the 1990s. The land was then given on a thirty-year lease, 
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free of charge on the condition that it would be developed for industrial agriculture. 
The state provided subsidies in various ways such as advising local banks to provide 
loans, selling fuel at discount prices, and giving permission to import equipment 
(Steinberg 2001). In the World Bank report on Myanmar (1999), experts warned that 
the current land expansion policy was uneconomical because all the projects were 
heavily subsidized, and did not really reflect the market cost of the operations. The 
costs of the projects would be even higher if the effects of environmental damage and 
local community access to the wetlands were added (Thawnghmung 2004). Now the 
sustainable livelihoods of the Delta are largely challenged as the success of these 
agriculture industries did not last for long and the environmental impact is no longer 
negligible (Soe 2016).  
The cumulative impacts were unmistakably destructive and reminded that forests are 
now at the margin of total disappearance in Delta (Webb et al. 2014; Phyu 2012) as 
shown in Figure 6. JICA (2005) also reported that the lost areas are amounted to 82 
per cent of the whole coverage of the Ayeyarwady Delta. It is estimated that the area 
of the Ayeyarwady Delta covered by mangrove forests totaled some 2,623 square 
kilometers in 1978, but that figure had declined to just 938 square km by 2011 (Webb 
et al. 2014). In comparison with natural forest in other areas of Myanmar, mangroves 
depletion was three times higher in the statistics of the Forest Department (Htay 2016). 
 
Figure 6 Mangrove forest depletion rate in Myanmar since 1975 
Source: Webb et al. (2014) 
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If deforestation of the Delta is placed into the perspective of regional comparison with 
other cyclone hazard-prone countries, mangrove forests in India and Bangladesh 
remained unchanged or increased slightly between 1975 and 2015 (Giri et al. 2016). 
In the same period, the annual deforestation rate was higher in the mangrove forests of 
Myanmar than it was in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka (Webb et al. 
2014). After Cyclone Nargis the verdict was in. In their study ‘Mitigation effects of 
forests as a natural shelter in the cyclone Nargis in Myanmar’, Thant et al. (2010) 
stated that, 
Human mortality decreased with distance from the cyclone track and was 
significantly reduced by the presence of forest stands near or around 
communities. The most remarkable result is that no mortality was recorded in 
communities located in forest reserves with dense forest cover, even in those 
located in the high-mortality zone. (p.1)  
4.5 Governance 
In a broader conception of ‘power’ in Myanmar in the context of military rule after 
1962, Steinberg (2001) observed that factionalism has become common and patron-
client relationships have been prevalent. He also stated that a meritocratic civil service 
that could act as a brake on personalized authoritarianism had not developed in 
Myanmar (Steinberg 2001, p.38˗39). In this background of power setting, Steinberg 
explains how the traditional role of village leader has changed over time. The village 
headman, who traditionally was locally appointed and was often hereditary, was the 
top village official: it was his job to keep the central government (the king) away from 
the village. The British administration transformed the position into the lowest 
government appointee, whose function was to represent the state at the lowest level. 
This completely transformed local governance, no doubt making it more efficient even 
as it eliminated autonomy. The state thus reached to the village and could, and did, 
more easily intervene, as it still does today (p.39). 
In bureaucracy under military rule, directives to the people from various layers of 
administration (central, regional, township) or from various line ministries based at the 
township level, stop at the village head to instruct people or to implement the 
instruction himself. Local headmen have relatively little autonomy and bargaining 
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power in relations with the State to protect the interests of their residents. 
Thawnghmung (2004) describes the problem of leadership at the village level of 
Myanmar as follows:  
Pressure from the central authorities who not only had access to the use of force 
but also had no scruple about using it, was immense enough to impair the 
village headmen’s capacity to protect the interests of their communities. (p.81)  
The implications of pressure from a central authority are especially visible once a 
community has a leader who in most cases is powerless to protect the community at 
best or corrupt at worst. In this context of local governance under authoritarian rule, 
two aspects of community resiliency to disaster can still be identified. The following 
section discusses these two factors in the frame of ‘community process’ and 
‘community assets’.  
4.5.1 Community process: civil society and social capital 
Adger (2006) stated that even poor people have capacities in the form of networks, 
knowledge, and skills. For the poor people at the bottom, social capital is one of the 
few remaining assets available (Fukuyama 1996; Dordick 1997; Woolcock 2001). In 
the Delta, social capital in the form of bonding exists and in many places, these bonds 
are being transformed into collective efforts in what one can refer to as civil society. 
Individual agency and different types of collective resilience are evident in Delta 
communities even under the difficult authoritarian context, as recognized in local-led 
relief efforts after Cyclone Nargis. But as Sen (1999) noted, individual agency is 
‘qualified and constrained by the social, political and economic opportunities’. Under 
military rule, the Delta communities were living with all these constraints to their 
individual and collective agency.   
Steinberg (2001) asked the question in his book on the State of Myanmar, ‘To what 
degree will the state allow citizens to band together to pursue common interests?’ 
(p.40). In other words, will it allow civil society to be formed or to flourishing? After 
Cyclone Nargis with its much-lauded civil society effort, it is now safe to say that civil 
society did exist even under the difficult circumstances of authoritarian government in 
Myanmar. After observing the crucial role of civil society in relief efforts after Cyclone 
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Nargis, one observation on civil society was that ‘a dynamic, varied, active, mobilized 
and intelligent civil society exists in Myanmar’ (CCPS 2009, p.v).   
But the different dynamics of civil society before and after Cyclone Nargis can be 
understood from local and national governance contexts. Most villages in all zones 
stated that they had informal groups functioning around religious activities before 
Cyclone Nargis. Larger and more well-to-do villages had social groups that could 
extend voluntary works in providing service to vulnerable populations such as old 
people. Whenever these groups raised their visibility, they were being watched by the 
local authorities. An example that illustrates such a working environment comes from 
research Zone III. The name of the informal organization is called ‘Saturday Group’ 
and it was formed by young men and women from the town of Kungyangone and 
satellite areas. The name ‘Saturday Group’ came from the day of the week they usually 
gathered at the temple for merit making. Later they were involved more in social work 
by mobilizing resources among themselves. This kind of activities is reflected in the 
observation of Doan (2008): 
Rural communities in Myanmar are relatively socially cohesive, providing a 
strong foundation for effective local safety net that is extremely important 
particularly in the absence of safety nets from the state and employers. (p.36) 
But the Myanmar government, like many authoritarian governments, did not want to 
see these groups’ services as they were assumed as proxy indicators of the 
government’s capacity shortage. Local groups had to manoeuvre carefully in order not 
to appear to be undermining local authority in their initiatives. Still, once the actions 
became visible, the local authorities monitored them in many ways. As in the case of 
the ‘Saturday Group’, the local authorities closely watched group activities even after 
Cyclone Nargis, when interaction with civil society groups from the town increased. 
In fact, the ‘power over’ mood of the military government is at odds with the ‘power 
with’ mood of civil society which is based on social capital among the local people. 
The civil society operated in various forms under the military regime and social capital 
aspects demonstrate changes in civil society before and after Cyclone Nargis.  
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Aldrich (2012) used the commonly used concepts of social capital namely bonding, 
bridging and linking capital, as shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7 Social capital formation (Aldrich 2012, p.33) 
The first type of social capital called ‘Bonding social capital’ represents strong ties 
within a community connecting individuals in the form of a horizontal network 
(Szreter and Woolcock 2004; Putnam 2000; Aldrich 2012). Bonding is usually strong 
in communities sharing similar demographic characteristics (Nakagawa and Shaw 
2004). It is common to see such strong bonding social capital in the Delta society as 
the religious leaders, friends, family members, and neighbors form a network in 
varying degrees in village communal settings.  
‘Bridging social capital’ is formed by the social ties between people who share similar 
social and cultural traits such as economic status, interests and political stance (Aldrich 
2012). The third type, ‘linking social capital’ is the least personal form of social 
capital. It represents a vertical connection by which individuals can build mutual 
interaction with institutions and individuals who have relative power over them 
(Szreter and Woolcock, 2004). Australian Red Cross (2012) echoed that the positive 
contribution of these three networks was ‘vital to sustaining community vibrancy and 
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prosperity and form part of an interrelated system of group and individual 
relationships’ (p.14). Aldrich (2012) claims that the bonds are important for reducing 
vulnerability of communities and promoting their resilience. He argues, 
Recovery from natural and other disasters does not depend on the overall 
amount of aid received nor on the amount of damage done by the disaster; 
instead, social capital – the bonds which tie citizens together – functions as the 
main engine of long term recovery. (p.1) 
Conceptually, it can be argued that what was strongly present in the Delta before 
Cyclone Nargis was ‘bonding’ social capital. When the poor people in the Delta tried 
to ‘get by’ with the vulnerable emergency, they needed to leverage bonding social 
capital. But resources available in the rural area via bonding social networks were 
rarely adequate to move up to greater resiliency. The dominating features of poverty 
provided merely small opportunity and options to bridge and access resources, 
knowledge, and information to strengthen themselves. Barr noted that bridging can 
help people to move up from a stage of ‘getting by’ to ‘getting ahead’ (Barr 1998).  
In the restricted environment of the military rule, civil society in Myanmar lacked 
venues to link to the institutions that could bring ideas and resources. Therefore, 
without bridging and linking social capital which could empower and enhance their 
resilience, rural communities happened to be struggling with all available bonding 
social capital which provided relative resiliency with little social safety net supported 
by the military government. While local leaders could play a role in enhancing social 
capital by focusing more on collective actions, the national political framework did 
not give much space for networking among civil society groups. Participants at 
discussions in research Zone III stated that the local leaders sometimes assumed the 
role of civil society leaders as competitors to their authority and influence.  
From a social capital point of view, leadership in the community must have a ‘shared 
sense of fairness, including mutual respect between all concerned’ for a collective 
action (Szreter and Woolcock 2004, p.656). The success of disaster risk reduction and 
emergency preparedness largely rely on collective efforts. Many limitations were put 
on civil society by the governing structure before Cyclone Nargis. When the local 
governance did not always accommodate local initiatives, community resilience could 
           
          
 
127 
 
not be present in significant ways. Limits on bridging and linking activities among the 
communities and outside institutions also hampered cross-fertilization of ideas 
regarding environmental change and risk knowledge. Restriction of movements turned 
out to be one of the limiting factors as revealed in the three research zones of this study. 
Later, larger villages in all three zones could organize DRR education activities such 
as public talks and smaller villages also obtained chances to participate in such 
occasions in nearby areas, especially after 2010. Due to the government’s restrictions, 
such activities were even limited before Cyclone Nargis. (Interview with local 
organizers in research zones and educators in Yangon.)  
Restrictions by the authoritarian government on outside organizations also prevented 
them from reaching the local community. This impaired linking social capitals. In 
October 2007, 13 international non-governmental organizations based in Yangon sent 
an open letter to the government appealing for more space for humanitarian actions 
needed inside Myanmar (Reliefweb 2007). The letter stated that, 
Current social and economic policies have led to conditions which have pushed 
many below subsistence levels, continuously weakening existing coping 
mechanisms of local communities.  
This is compounded by the lack of investment at the scale needed to meet the 
needs of the people. Low public expenditure in the health and education sectors 
leave people with little to no access to basic affordable services in many parts 
of the country. In the absence of adequate public services, civil society groups 
have attempted to respond to local needs but are constrained in their ability to 
operate formally.  
Despite efforts by the humanitarian community to provide international 
humanitarian assistance, the level of support is highly insufficient, programs 
are too narrowly defined and the humanitarian space for organizations to 
operate is frequently at risk. Although international humanitarian organizations 
have been able to develop and expand their actions, there are restrictions placed 
on the geographical and sectoral coverage of their operations.  
We believe that the above factors have contributed to the existing humanitarian 
crisis. It is essential to consolidate and sustain existing programs as well as to 
reassess and seek new ways to expand and work together to better serve the 
people of Myanmar.  
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This letter got a harsh response from the government in return and spaces for 
humanitarian work with NGOs and local groups were more scrutinized. Nevertheless, 
this letter validated the need for intervention in promoting human security in the 
communities. The vulnerable reality was also witnessed in the Cyclone Nargis tragedy 
few months after the above-mentioned letter.   
After Cyclone Nargis, waves and waves of civil society from different areas of 
Myanmar came down to the Delta and helped their fellow countrymen. What they did 
was bridging and linking up with the local community for rebuilding their lives. In the 
process, the communities also benefited from bridging and linking social capital after 
the bonding capital had raised them from the devastation in the immediate days after 
Cyclone Nargis. As James (2012) stated, 
The conjunction of domestic and international civil society and the resources 
and networks in their bridging level social capital has been critical in facilitating 
both relief and recovery phases in Myanmar. (p.20) 
The changes in spaces of civil society before and after Cyclone Nargis were noticeable. 
Interactions and networking in humanitarian spaces and increased functioning of 
different social capitals were obvious to many observers (Kramer 2011; CPCS 2009). 
Before Cyclone Nargis, the old authoritarian structure did not give much space to a 
civic forum and civil society as their movement could be a ‘social obstacle’ 
challenging the legitimacy of the powers that be by revealing their shortcomings and 
the prevailing injustices. When the military came to power in 1988, one of their initial 
decrees was to prohibit assemblies of more than five people (Lall 2016). Although this 
limitation was not enforced strongly, later, many other formal and informal restrictions 
were put in place to control the community. Such a mood of inhibition hurt the local 
community and their resilience to disaster.  
Discussion with former village leaders demonstrates that the authorities abandoned 
most of these restrictions after Cyclone Nargis, in varying degrees, accepting the 
urgent need for communities’ survival and tried to accommodate domestic and 
international assistance. Focus group discussions also revealed that if formal village 
leaders are not prioritizing villages’ welfare, informal leadership tends to step up in 
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the form of civil society and mobilize resources to rebuild the community. Still, as was 
shown in the blockage of aid in the immediate days after Cyclone Nargis which 
prompted the international outcry, human security was not much of a focus for the 
military government. As Steinberg (2013) noted, Myanmar’s military regime was 
ruled by its rigid hierarchy characterized by disdain and distrust towards civilians 
(Steinberg 2013). This rigidity was on display against civic initiatives before Cyclone 
Nargis.  
4.6 Discussion 
A formidable social feature of the Delta before Cyclone Nargis was poverty, as in 
many other places of Myanmar. While impoverished people in all parts of Myanmar 
suffered in different ways, the Delta had one additional dimension of human 
insecurity: extreme vulnerability in the face of natural hazards which cost lost lives 
and vanished property. While the nature side of the disaster is less debatable, the 
human side of the disaster was obvious in the discussion as the factor that pushed 
people to vulnerablility. As outlined in the previous three sections of this chapter, 
several conditions had apparently weakened families and communities. High poverty, 
lack of proper education, and poor health care reduced disaster-resilient assets and 
resilience capacities such as housing, awareness and physical strength. The ‘place’ in 
the rural communities has been increasingly exposed to declining natural resources 
such as depletion of mangrove forests, which could provide barriers against storm 
surge and wind. Local governance is supposed to build resilient communities but it did 
not function well to protect the ‘people’ and the ‘place’.  
This chapter makes a case for the military regime’s failure to take responsibility in 
reducing community vulnerability and promoting human security before Cyclone 
Nargis, with an emphasis on selective policy implications over the issues of poverty 
and social and environmental decline. The ‘politics of disempowerment’ in the context 
of authoritarian rule had a negative impact on social capital and resilience of the 
community. As Bass et al. (2005) stated, 
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If poverty and environmental problems persist, it is in large part because poor 
people and environmental concerns remain marginalized by –and from – 
sources of power. (p.1) 
In the Ayeyarwady Delta, a combination of poverty, environmental degradation and 
powerlessness was translated to vulnerability and collectively turned into a disaster 
when natural hazard in the form of the storm swept through the land.  
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter tries to outline changes in the Delta along the national history. It also tries 
to analyze the pre-existing vulnerability of the village communities there before 
Cyclone Nargis. The people, place, and governance formed three domains of a local 
community. This intends partly to dispel the notion of ‘natural’ once a hazard turned 
to a disaster.  
Several aspects of the Ayeyarwady Delta were similar to the overall situation of 
Myanmar under military rule. However, human insecurity and vulnerability in the 
Delta were revealed in a staggering loss of lives at one stroke of the storm. In this 
context of human tragedy, pre-existing conditions were revisited and regional 
experience was extracted in analyzing the national history and community narratives.  
In a better scenario for the Ayeyarwady Delta, the current political transition and 
improved space for civil society means more possibility for better ‘assets’ in terms of 
physical and environmental together with an enhanced ‘process’ of community in 
collective efforts for safety and wellbeing. These two aspects were in a much weaker 
condition before Cyclone Nargis as discussed in this chapter. The following chapters 
on the early warning process and emergency response will also highlight the state of 
the community’s vulnerability and resilience in an ‘assets and process’ frame. 
Discussions there will also reach back to the pre-impact conditions in both implicit 
and explicit manners.  
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Chapter 5 
Revisiting the early warning system 
5 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the role of the Early Warning System (EWS) at the time of 
Cyclone Nargis and its structural vulnerability, which has been embedded in the 
political setting of a military dictatorship. In a way, this chapter tries to analyze the 
conditions and characteristics of the early warning system. The consequences of its 
shortcomings at the time of Cyclone Nargis were discovered during my field studies 
and the community narratives are used to portray the whole EWS process in the 
emergency phase and its impact on the response capacity of society.   
Before the institutions for early warning systems (EWS) were well developed, storm 
surge was the main cause of mass mortality in many cases of major storms. Before 
early warning systems as well as technology for risk evaluation came to exist, 
drowning accounted for 90 per cent of deaths related to cyclones (Chowdhury et al. 
1992; Keim 2008; Shultz et al. 2005). In the past few decades, technology has been a 
great help in developing a highly advanced early warning system although it is not 
perfect yet (Kelman and Glantz 2014). The technical aspect of Myanmar’s early 
warning system in 2008 was relatively weaker than that of any neighboring countries 
and even the basic function of forecasting was not properly equipped (Lwin 2015). 
Even in countries in which EWS is technically advanced, it is still likely to be 
ineffective as it is not able to be successfully incorporated in the social context (Paton 
2003). Kelman and Glantz (2014) suggest that the technical components of any EWS 
be embedded in the social context of all levels from the frontier to the national level.  
The notion of people-centered early warning (Anderson 1969) emphasizes raising 
awareness of the people about the degree of risk they are likely to face, to engage with 
disaster agencies for an efficient disaster risk communication and respond to the 
message with action in a timely manner. A good design of a people-centered early 
warning system involves a nice combination of a bottom to top and top to bottom 
approaches. The essential elements of a people-centered EWS are good governance, 
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strong institutional and social arrangements, technical resources and reliable 
communication mechanism (Villagran de Leon 2012). 
An EWS should not merely have a technical focus that is largely occupied with 
observing hazards and acting as an expert body with a top-down operating system that 
has no or little contact with end-users who are likely to be affected by the very action 
of an EWS (Basher 2006; Kelman and Glantz 2014). EWS must be socially engaged 
to keep up a continual relationship with communities to enhance awareness for disaster 
risk reduction as much as possible. Technically, it also requires the government 
agencies to extend actions beyond the monitoring of hazards and the dissemination of 
warnings. It functions well only if ‘those who can benefit from the information 
provided by the system are empowered to participate in ‘all stages of development of 
the system (design, testing, routine operation and evaluation)’ (p.491). Only if the early 
warning system can function in a proactive manner rather than reactive one, action for 
the evacuation process can proceed safely. 
Paton (2003) describes how early warning system functions technically and socially: 
Thus, during periods of hazard quiescence, when most readiness work must take 
place, natural hazards will compete with their social counterparts for attention, 
with the salience, or otherwise, of a hazard (natural or otherwise) evident in how 
much people think and talk about it. This contention is based on discursive 
arguments to the effect that people use language both to construct and to express 
their judgements. (p.211) 
No matter how good is the system, temporal factor still can make evacuation process 
more complex. (Buckle, Philip, 2012, p. 496). He suggests that any warning process 
this temporal factor (day or night, rainy season or hot summer) into account, so that 
risk can be responded effectively with enough flexibility and adaptation. 
5.1 Was Cyclone Nargis predicted? 
The BBC (Jackson 2008) posed the question in its story about the early warning system 
of Myanmar: ‘was Cyclone Nargis predicted?’ It was four days after Cylone Nargis 
had hit Myanmar. Questions over the accountability and efficiency of the national 
early warning system sprang up in other media outlets too. Even one year after Cyclone 
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Nargis, the Voice of America (2009) revisited the debate over early warning and 
reported on 27 October 2009 with the title ‘Indian forecasters gave Burma advanced 
warning of Cyclone Nargis’. 
The following paragraph provides an excerpt from an MSNBC interview by science 
writer Chris Mooney (Mooney 2008), who authored ‘Storm World: Hurricanes, 
Politics, and the Battle over Global Warming’ (Mooney 2007) on 7 May 2008:  
MSNBC: But you had written about Nargis, gosh, more than a week in advance and indicated 
that this would be a pretty bad storm. 
Mooney: Yeah, I wrote about it over at the Daily Green. I track cyclones, so whenever I see 
something developing in the Bay of Bengal, and I see the ocean temperatures are really warm… 
you just know that it can’t be good. I didn’t know how strong the storm was going to get, but 
I knew that the ocean temperatures were warm and I knew that it was already completely 
formed – and it had this ocean ready to pounce and ready to draw energy from. If you look at 
the Bay of Bengal, it sucked a couple of degrees Celsius out of the ocean and flung that at the 
coastline. (Mooney 2008) 
The article that the host of MSNBC referred to was published on 28 April 2008 with 
the title, ‘Tropical Cyclone Nargis: Get Ready for the Worst: A Very Warm Bay of 
Bengal Means Cyclone Nargis Will Hit Hard – Somewhere’ (Mooney 2008). In this 
article, Mooney (2008) stated,  
This storm, which formed over the weekend, is now a Category 1, and the 
official forecast right now is for steady intensification up to Category 4 at least. 
No one is sure where the storm will make landfall, but India, Bangladesh, and 
Burma/Myanmar all have worrying to do. 
Similarly, Dan Shapley, the Daily Green editor wrote on April 29 a short post titled 
‘Tropical Cyclone Nargis will Strike Myanmar; Downgraded, Storm Will Still Reach 
Category 2 Strength’ (Shapley 2008). When the World Meteorological Organization 
completed its fact-finding mission to Myanmar in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, its 
report stated that,  
The first tropical cyclone advisory indicating landfall over Myanmar coast was 
issued at 0600 UTC on 1 May based on observations at 0300 UTC (about 36 
hours in advance). It was indicated in the bulletin that the system would cross 
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Myanmar coast between Lat. 16.0 and 18.0 degrees N around night of 2nd May 
2008. On the morning of 2nd May, it was indicated that the system would cross 
Myanmar coast near 16.0 degrees N around evening of the same day. (WMO 
2009, p.24)  
All these statements from experts and professional organizations provide significant 
evidence that there is not much room for debate and make excuses that Cyclone Nargis 
was not expected to hit land in Myanmar. The specific location of the cyclone landfall 
was given in an alert by the Regional Specialized Meteorological Centre in New Delhi 
36 hours in advance (WMO 2009). In this context of early warning, process, outcome 
and issue from three sides as shown in Figure 8 will be explored according to four 
functions of the early warning system. 
 
Figure 8 Four founctions of an early warning from three domains of government, 
institutions and community 
5.2 Four key functions of an early warning system 
Although the ruling military regime of Myanmar had to shoulder a large portion of the 
responsibilities for various shortcomings during the cyclone, it is important to look to 
several linkages of failure that explained the root causes of mass mortality in Cyclone 
Nargis. What factors that influenced people’s risk perception even if they received 
cyclone warnings? Why did the warning not prompt a systemic response earlier? Did 
the international community, which opposed the regime, fail to find a way to improve 
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the infrastructure of the Myanmar disaster risk reduction system? Consequently, had 
the transboundary nature of climate risk been forgotten in a politically charged 
environment by donors? The World Meteorological Organization said all disasters are 
not totally unavoidable, although some are inevitable (WMO 2005). Disaster risk can 
be mitigated by the EWS’s function of providing weather forecasts and early warnings 
in an efficient manner. In recent decades, science and technology have helped improve 
early warning systems in many parts of the world (WMO 2005). The United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction defines an early warning system as:  
The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful 
warning information to enable individuals, communities and organizations 
threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time 
to reduce the possibility of harm or loss’. (UNISDR 2009)  
A well-known myth of EWSs is that they are activated only when a hazard is looming 
(Kelman and Glantz 2014). ESWs should be in operation at all times even without 
signs of a forthcoming hazard. Theoretically, an EWS is expected to be functioning to 
educate people about disaster preparedness, to raise disaster awareness of the 
community by exercising drills and demonstrations, collecting baseline data and 
enhancing vulnerability maps and updating community’s hazard risks (Kelman and 
Glantz 2014, p.93). The UNISDR Platform for the Promotion of Early Warning 
specifies the role of an EWS as having four key functions as follows: 
(1) Monitoring and warning service: To develop hazard monitoring and early 
warning services 
• Are the right parameters being monitored? 
• Is there a sound scientific basis for making forecasts? 
• Can accurate and timely warnings be generated? 
 
(2) Risk knowledge: To systematically collect data and undertake risk assessments 
• Are the hazards and vulnerabilities well known? 
• What are the patterns and trends in these factors? 
• Are risk maps and data widely available?  
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(3) Dissemination and communication: Communicate risk information and early 
warnings 
• Do warnings reach all those at risk? 
• Are the risks and warnings understood? 
• Is the warning information clear and useable? 
 
(4) Response capability: Build national and community response capabilities 
• Are response plans up-to-date and tested? 
• Are local capabilities and knowledge made use of? 
• Are people prepared and ready to react to warnings? 
Despite the world experiencing a 50 times increase in extreme hydro-meteorological 
events over the past five decades, the life-saving capacity of the new technology has 
significantly reduced the death tolls from various hazards such as floods, droughts, and 
storms (Golnaraghi and Douris 2009). Nevertheless, experiences in the past decades 
showed that top-down early warning system is hard to ‘induce the desired actions’ in 
emergency response among the people (Kelman, 2012, p.483). In the case of Cyclone 
Nargis, the ‘last mile’ that Kelman (2012) referred to as a gap between ‘where the 
knowledge comes from and where the knowledge is needed and used’ (p.483) was big 
and wide. It was revealed that the EWS was carrying heavy constraints in all four key 
functions specified by the UN.   
5.2.1 Monitoring and warning 
Institutional capacity of weather forecasting and storm warning 
The scientific and technical dimensions of a robust early warning system or process 
are centered in monitoring, forecasting and ‘nowcasting’ (WMO 2011). The British 
Meteorological Office define nowcasting as ‘a technique for very short-range 
forecasting that maps the current weather, then uses an estimate of its speed and 
direction of movement to forecast the weather a short period ahead’. The WMO 
distinguishes nowcasting as a current weather alert which extrapolates a future weather 
pattern for a maximum of six hours from now. Up-to-date radar, satellite and 
observational data are a prerequisite for getting current details of a small area with 
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accurate focus. Alerts for high impact weather patterns such as a moving storm needs 
nowcasting as it can effectively contribute to saving lives and property (Anderson-
Berry 2006). However, many of the developing and least developed counties do not 
have operational systems or are struggling for maintenance and sustainability of this 
apparatus which requires rich data sources (Coning and Roberts 2012). Myanmar was 
one of the countries lacking a nowcasting system 2008 because there was no adequate 
radar for forecasting function.  
Myanmar has been on the list of 189 member countries and territories to which the 
WMO provides data exchange for hazard observation, monitoring, forecasting and 
warning capabilities (IFRC 2012). Under the supervision of the WMO, the Regional 
Specialized Meteorological Centre (RSMC) New Delhi was the responsible agency 
for issuing tropical weather outlooks and tropical cyclone advisories to the regional 
countries bordering the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea including Myanmar (WMO 
2008). At the time of Cyclone Nargis, the information coming from the RSMC was 
used by Myanmar’s national meteorological agency, the Department of Meteorology 
and Hydrology (DMH), which operates under the Ministry of Transport. However, the 
India Meteorology Department mandate does not include warning for storm surges. 
Sadly, 80 per cent of mortality in Cyclone Nargis was related to storm surge (Webster 
2008). 
Dr Tun Lwin, the head of DMH at the time of Cyclone Nargis wrote in his memoir 
that the only radar (WSR 74, Weather Surveillance Radar) that Myanmar relied on for 
weather forecasting was an old 1974 model (Lwin 2015) and it had not been 
operational since 1997 (IRIN 2014). Lwin tried to improve the situation in his capacity 
as Director General and he ordered spare parts from the original production company, 
GE, in the United States. He got a reply stating that the company had already stopped 
manufacturing this model, and the stock was no longer available as it was too outdated. 
He compared this inadequacy of equipment with better situations of neighboring 
countries by showing numbers of radars as an indicator of preparedness; five radars in 
Laos, nine in Bangladesh and 26 in Thailand, by 2008 (Lwin 2015). 
In his article on ‘Why the cyclone (Nargis) in Myanmar was so deadly’, Casey (2008) 
quoted the WMO and commented that Myanmar, unlike Bangladesh and India, did not 
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have a radar network to help predict the time, location and height of the storm surge. 
While not complaining about not having an advanced system in Myanmar in 2008 
given the socio-economic and political situation, it is an even more tragic state of 
affairs for not having basic meteorological and hydrological infrastructure. In fact, the 
Director General and his team at DMH made attempts to update the weather forecast 
by utilizing very outdated tools and relied on their mathematical skills to track the 
storm and issued a warning for the approaching Cyclone Nargis (Lwin 2015). The 
WMO in their inquiry into the efficiency of DMH’s Cyclone Nargis warning states, 
The position of the cyclone center was also manually determined by Dr Tun 
Lwin at NMC Yangon by using a magnifying glass and the satellite 
meteorology knowledge and experience. Then the x-y coordinates of the 
cyclone center measured by using a pencil and a ruler were calculated into the 
latitudes and longitudes by using Excel program on a small laptop PC. The 
same procedures were applied to the measurements of radius of storm, 
movement, speed of propagation, distance from the coast, radius of maximum 
winds and storm coverage. (WMO 2009, p.8) 
After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Myanmar’s weather forecasting and monitoring 
system was upgraded with data exchanged with India and Thailand via the global 
telecommunication system (GTS). The Department of Meteorology and Hydrology 
(Xinhua 2006) called it the biggest change in 20 years as the data exchange rate would 
be 600 times faster than before. But the system was internet-based and access to the 
internet in DMH is limited. The WMO also reported the record of system breakdown 
during Cyclone Nargis as follows: 
The frequent power shortage disrupted the operational services of DMH and 
the blackout after the landfall of Nargis significantly affected its services. All 
communications were broken down in Yangon from 20:00 MST on 2 May to 
17:00 MST on 3 May 2008. (WMO 2009, p.9)  
Functioning of DMH was almost impossible while the office of DMH was without 
electricity and interagency communication began to halt soon after the storm started 
hitting Yangon around 9 o’clock at night (Lwin 2015).  
Locating political will in early warning 
           
          
 
139 
 
Myanmar became a signatory to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) in 2005 and 
as a member state it is expected to implement the following five priority actions 
(UNISDR 2005): ‘(1) Ensuring that DRR is a national and local priority, with a strong 
institutional basis (2) Identifying, assessing and monitoring disaster risks and 
enhancing early warning systems (3) Using knowledge and education to build a culture 
of safety and resilience at all levels (4) Reducing underlying disaster risk factors, 
whether social, economic, environmental or land use, and (5) Strengthening disaster 
preparedness to promote effective response at all levels’ (pp.6˗12).  
As a member of the HFA, the military government set up the Central Committee on 
National Disaster Prevention with notification No. 14/2005 dated 25 January 2005 
(ADPC 2009). Despite the initial institution set up after signing the HFA, the roles and 
functions of central and regional governments at all levels, including village councils, 
were not clearly defined until 2009 (Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and 
Resettlement 2010). Since 2005, progress for implementation had been slow and the 
national standing order on disaster management was issued only one year after 
Cyclone Nargis. Only after the standing order, was the problem of lacking clarity of 
roles and responsibilities between ministries and departments improved and 
institutionalized responsibility was assigned formally (Relief and Resettlement 
Department 2009). Nevertheless, incorporation of disaster risk reduction elements into 
national policy was very much constrained by a lack of budget. The state of financial 
challenges imposed on the DRR system was described by the national interim report 
to HFA (MSWRR 2010) in the following way: 
There is an absence of a policy directive for allocation of funds for specifically 
for DRR. Financial resources are not adequate and not available yet…To ensure 
the DRR budget allocation, State budget should have separately 
allocate/mention DRR component) and the consolidation efforts among 
ministries and capacity development/ institutional strengthening should be 
reinforced. (p.6) 
Under all these constraints, it is not surprising that the EWS was weak in all 
dimensions at the time of Cyclone Nargis. The DMH, which was the focal agency for 
dissemination of the cyclone warning, tried to inform the township general 
administration offices about incoming cyclone and even advised local administration 
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bodies to coordinate with local NGOs and the Red Cross if they were present in their 
area (Lwin 2015). A leaked US embassy cable dated 2 May 2008 (WikiLeaks 2008b) 
also showed that the US embassy’s knowledge of the cyclone had already been 
distributed to some townships where American tourists were likely to be visiting. 
Moreover, the military attaché tried to directly contact his Myanmar counterpart to 
give the warning. During the fieldwork for this research local respondents confirmed 
that the Township Peace and Development Council in Bogale township relayed the 
news to the village tract leaders, this was not the case for other townships. But the 
cyclone warning at that time did not include action plans that specified the next steps 
to be taken for safety. In fact, the DMH’s mandate did not include specifying what to 
do next for evacuation or preparation (Lwin 2015).   
What becomes clearer is that disaster preparedness plans and contingency plans were 
not in place at all administrative levels (Relief and Resettlement Department 2010). 
The fact that no contingency plans or procedures existed or were tested shows that 
political will was essential for a functioning EWS; upgrading the technological aspects 
of hazard monitoring was insufficient.  
5.2.2 Risk knowledge  
On 6 May 2008, four days after Cyclone Nargis, the head of the Ministry of Social 
Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, General Maung Maung Swe, told a press briefing 
that the government took preemptive action for disaster risk reduction to a certain 
extent but the high death toll was caused by the storm surge (The Voice 2008). After 
Cyclone Nargis’s landfall, storm surge become an easy target to transfer responsibility 
(WMO 2009, The Voice 2008). While it must be acknowledged that surging water 
killed most people, it still begs the question of why these risk factors were not elevated.  
In retrospect, the existing risk factors in the Delta needed to be incorporated into the 
risk analysis of the approaching Cyclone Nargis. The prime risk factor was the tidal 
pattern. As Cyclone Nargis hit the shore at high tide, it greatly increased the impact of 
the storm surge. The tidal range in the Delta under normal conditions was around five 
feet between low tide and high tide (Masters 2009). Another known risk factor was a 
shallow continental shelf. The immediate water area to the south of the Delta is the 
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Andaman Sea, which has an extensive shallow continental shelf, which built a bigger 
storm surge compared to the western costal area of Myanmar (Webster 2008). 
Additional aspects that need to be taken into account as risk factors are low-lying 
geographical features, and high population of the Delta. These risk factors should have 
alarmed everyone by the time a powerful cyclone was approaching the densely-
populated areas. ‘On 30April 2008, the detailed route, speed and locations of landfall 
were known’ (p.38) said Pattie (2009) and in this context what we can analyze is that 
the warning was there but the risk factors were not well incorporated into the EWS. 
As Golnaraghi (2012) reminds us, saving lives with effective warnings needs careful 
analysis of risks and incorporation of risk information in emergency planning and 
warning dissemination.   
On the local people’s side, many did not take serious action based on their own risk 
perceptions and evaluations, even if they received proper warnings. One example of 
this response pattern comes from Zone I: 
People were saying that the flood and strong wind were coming. I thought I did 
not need to care because I have seen flood in my life many times. I was happy 
to see seasonal flood. We had nice memories of flood indeed. In the past, we 
were joyful when the wind and rain shook the mango and coconut trees. We 
collected fruits together with friends. We were carefree. (Aye Aye Mon, Aung 
Hlaing, Zone I)  
In the context of Cyclone Nargis, it might be not fair to leave people of the Delta with 
their own risk analysis and let them face the consequences. Even if individual or 
community risk perception can vary depending on many attributing factors, the risk 
information provided in the early warning likely weighed in on their own risk 
evaluation. When the message did not convey the level of risk involved, generally the 
people were left to evaluate based on their experience or were neglected outright.  
5.2.3 Disseminating and communication 
In the study of EWS, it has long been acknowledged that ‘excellent meteorological 
forecast will not necessarily result in minimal damage’ (Elsberry 2003, p.169). 
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Dissemination of warnings was crucial to follow up with other assigned tasks. As 
Pattie (2009) noted,  
The greatest challenge in fact, is determining how to disseminate warnings 
effectively in the shortest time possible to large numbers of people who possess 
considerably diverse communication resources and are spread across vast areas. 
(p.42) 
Regarding the shortcomings of the EWS in Cyclone Nargis, the controversy about who 
issued what kind of warning at what exact time finally had to be settled by the fact-
finding mission report of the World Meteorological Organization published in 2009. 
In this report, the WMO absolved the two governmental departments. One was the 
DMH and the other was the Regional Specialized Meteorological Center (RSMC) for 
Tropical Cyclones based in New Delhi. The main responsibility for the technical side 
of storm monitoring and tracking and providing advisories and warnings falls on to 
these two departments. RSMC provided data to DMH via GTS. The mission report 
stated the communication between RSMC and DMH in detail. For instance, RSMC 
New Delhi issued ‘tropical weather outlook (3 times); tropical cyclone advisories (41 
times every three hours); and tropical cyclone advisories for aviation use (19 times 
every six hours)’ for Cyclone Nargis (WMO 2009, p.7).  
Nevertheless, a statement by the WMO that said that, ‘the early warnings and relevant 
information were duly delivered to villages’ (WMO 2009, p.9) was not corroborated 
by the findings of this research in three different zones of the Delta. It was not clear 
which level of the village-level administration that the WMO referred to. ‘Is it village 
tract (a group of villages) or individual village?’ Verifying based on the records of the 
former director of the DMH, reaching to the village tract level was more realistic while 
it was almost impossible to deliver the warning to each individual village due to the 
geographical distance and communication barriers. Villages that received a storm 
warning directly from the administrative structure were very few and were outlier 
cases rather than part of a general pattern. For their part, the DMH tried to reach 
various levels of government, hoping that the top officials concerned would do 
something in their power (Lwin 2015, p.17).  
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Ronan and Johnston (2005) highlight a number of factors that impact disaster 
preparedness: These factors related not only to the institutional shortcomings but also 
have to do with the people’s motivation to response.  
• ‘Preparedness or warning messages that do not provide specific guidance, are 
not consistent and repeated over time, do not emphasize controllable and 
preventable aspects of the hazard, and do not emanate from multiple sources 
that can be trusted;  
• Personal factors including low levels of personal responsibility, concern, self-
efficacy and personal control, low levels of belief in adjustment efficacy, low 
levels of community bondedness’. (p. 30) 
General guidelines for effective warnings have been formulated in international EWS 
systems and used in various public communication structures across the world. Some 
examples of these guidelines include ‘the warning must have a heading that should 
stand alone and stand out, the components of the message must be clearly defined, the 
location references must be related to well-known places, plain language must be used 
and recommended action must be included’ (Zillman 2003, p.150). A national EWS 
usually must deal with issues of (1) whether the warning reaches its target audiences, 
(2) whether a warning is understood correctly, (3) whether appropriate actions are 
taken upon receiving a warning (Kelman and Glantz 2014). Referring to these factors 
and guidelines, the operation of the EWS regarding dissemination of warnings at the 
time of Cyclone Nargis will be evaluated in the following sections. Analysis will be 
based on the voices of local people from focus group discussions and individual 
interviews with some stakeholders in the media and communications sector of 
Myanmar. 
5.3 Did the medium give the message? 
At the time of Cyclone Nargis, the most common medium was radio, the second most 
widely used medium was television and the third was daily newspapers in the three 
regions this study covers. Television-programs ran only two times a day. They started 
the morning broadcast at 7 am and ended at 9 am.  For the evening program, it lasted 
from approximately 4 pm to 10 pm. At that time, under the restrictive censoring 
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regime, both television and daily newspapers were state owned. The government runs 
two Burmese-language papers and one English-language paper. Only the English- 
language newspaper featured a weather forecasts section while the Burmese-language 
paper carried them from time to time in various formats.  
All these mass media arms of the military regime were heavy in propaganda and did 
not feature much public service information (IMS 2012; Moe 2014). Generally, the 
content of these daily newspapers in this period serves as a guide to policy direction 
and the government’s priorities. Agenda-setting of the military regime for public 
policies in those days was clearly stated. By analyzing the content, the readers, 
including junior level bureaucrats or township-level administrators and the general 
public, could get clues about the seriousness of the issues of the day.  
 
Figure 9 The weather alert on 1 May 2008 in the State-owned Newspapers 
Source: Myanma Alin newspaper dated 1 May 2008, p.13 
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When the tropical depression system formed and made its way through the Bay of 
Bengal in the last week of April in 2008, the military regime in Myanmar was gearing 
up for the coming referendum. The priority of the day was the upcoming referendum 
for the new constitution. All the government-owned mass media gave a lot of space 
for content of propaganda items the public to support the new constitution. The storm 
warnings in the newspapers were low profile at best and minimal at worst in allocating 
place, space and wording of the storm news in the run up to Cyclone Nargis’s landfall. 
Figure 9 is taken from a newspaper of 1 May 2008, one day before storm landfall. In 
this paper, of a total 20 pages, Cyclone Nargis news appeared on page number 13 in 
the bottom left corner, 2 x 2 inches in size (Myanmar Alin 2008a).   
Regardless of overall credibility of the mass media under the military government’s 
control, these were the main outlets to disseminate the storm alert and the public had 
to rely on limited options for information access. All the small alerts and low profile 
warnings about the incoming storm from 28 April 2008 to 3 May 2008 reflected a low 
priority towards the approaching hazard. The presentation and packaging of the storm 
news did not covey the seriousness of the approaching storm and exhibited little regard 
to public safety and human security. Although there was little chance to break through 
this rigid structure of governmental control on information, efforts of individual 
agency were also recorded in alerting the public to the seriousness of the approaching 
storm. One initiative from the DMH was recorded for this matter. 
Figure 10 shows the printed version of an interview that appeared in a newspaper on 
2 May 2008 (Myanmar Alin 2008b) which was given by the Director General of the 
DMH. In this interview, he tried to raise concern about the approaching storm. In his 
personal reflections, he revealed how the unusual circumstances happened: 
My deep concern over the situation drove me to contact directly to a reporter from the State-
owned paper, Myanma Alin. I decided to give him an interview which highlighted the 
preparation measures we should have taken in coming hours. This is the first time in my life 
to call a reporter to request writing an interview column stating my views. When I was 
interviewed by the reporter, it was 11 am of 1st of May 2008. It was 36 hours away from the 
landfall and the eye of cyclone was still 450 miles away from Myanmar coast. (Personal 
communication with the researcher in 2013)  
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Even in this serious effort of conveying the message in interview form, the newspaper 
formatting was problematic with three different strengths of storm stated on a single 
page as shown in Figure 10. Lwin mentioned in his interview with Myanma Alin 
newspapers that 100 miles per hour would be the wind speed, the top right of the box 
said 130 miles per hour and the bottom right box said 50 miles per hour. Even with the 
contradictions, this newspaper, which contained the most serious alerts on the 
intervening days of Cyclone Nargis, was delivered to homes in central areas of big 
cities on the morning of 2 May. But one or more days of delivery time to reach beyond 
urban centers meant this newspaper had little chance of reaching the public on time as 
the storm was about to cross the Delta that afternoon.  
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Figure 10 The storm warning in 2 May newspaper (note different forecasts of the 
storm strength on a single page 
Source: Myanma Alin newspaper dated 2 May 2008, p.13 
5.4 Did the people have means to communicate? 
Information and communication technology (ICT) plays a critical role in disaster risk 
reduction (UNESCAP 2010). Fearn-Banks (2002) noted the phrase ‘Crisis 
communication’ which comes in various forms of ‘verbal, visual, and/or written 
interaction between the organization and its stakeholders (often through the media) 
prior to, during and after the negative occurrence’ (p.480). Innovative use of ICT has 
been more accelerated after the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 2004. During the 
‘The movement of the storm 
in the Bay of Bangel still 
slow. Yet, at the center, the 
wind speed is estimated as 
130 miles per hour. It is 
transforming into a stronger 
cyclone’, Joint Typhoon 
Warning Center (JTWC) 
said. The direction has 
shifted from the Northwest 
to the East. The areas which 
are likely to be affected by 
the storm are Western 
Thailand, Southeast 
Bangladesh, India. Myanmar 
will also be affected said 
JTWC. JTWC said the 
height of the wave in the sea 
was as high as 20 feet.  
The storm will pass the 
western Delta and the speed 
will be as high as 100 mph. 
Heavy rain and shower are 
expected in coastal areas. The 
wind speed will be 50 mph.  
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Tsunami, procedures to deliver warnings to the governments concerned and 
infrastructure were not adequate in the region, meaning the transmission of the tsunami 
warning was delayed unnecessarily (UNESCAP 2010). UNESCAP observed that ‘The 
lack of access to ICT and connectivity is a critical bottleneck in establishing end-to-
end EWS’.  
Cyclone Nargis was another example of poor telecommunications capabilities that 
hamper early warning efforts to reach people in various locations (Zillman 2003). At 
the time of Cyclone Nargis, development of the telecommunications sector in 
Myanmar lagged far behind many of Myanmar’s Southeast Asian counterparts. The 
following Table 6 compares Myanmar and Thailand in terms of mobile, fixed line and 
internet penetration in 2007. 
Table 6 Comparison of telephone penetration between Myanmar and Thailand 
Country Mobile penetration 
Fixed-line 
penetration 
Internet 
penetration 
Myanmar 0.7% 1% 0.01% 
Thailand 81% 11% 11% 
Source: Evans (2008) 
In the research areas, telephone availability in Zone I and Zone II was very limited. 
Zone III, which is closer to Yangon, has more telephone lines and there were cases of 
families that received the cyclone warning via telephone: 
The cyclone news was given to me by my friends from the other side of the 
village who kept regular communication with Yangon. They got news from the 
telephone conversation with Yangon people. (Ma Aye Khine, 39 years old, a 
housewife, Kyun Chaung village, Zone III) 
ICT development was hampered in Myanmar in the years leading to Cyclone Nargis 
mainly due to restrictions of the military government. Government’ policy was known 
to be designed to be overpriced control the information flow and make communication 
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options beyond the reach of ordinary people (Freedom House 2011). While limited 
access to mobile phones was allowed, the cost was astronomical. In 2008, a mobile 
phone SIM card cost more than 2400 USD2 and one-off installation for a broadband 
internet line was charged at approximately 1500 US dollars with monthly service 
charges ranging from 45 USD to 130 USD (Freedom House 2011). Land lines were 
available in most townships (mostly for government offices and local businesses) but 
were more difficult to obtain in the Delta area due to geographical barriers. These 
prices were prohibitively high for the majority of the citizens, whose annual per capita 
income, according to the International Monetary Fund in 2007, was only 250 USD.  
What the coastal areas across the Delta could access was a particular mobile 
telecommunication service, locally known as ‘coastal phone’ or ‘CDMA’ (Mizzima 
2008). Just before Cyclone Nargis, coastal phone became popular among local 
businessmen and officials who could afford the price tag of 1500 USD per SIM card. 
Of the 45 villages in this research, four villages were found to having access to CDMA 
phones before Cyclone Nargis. In these four villages, it was referred to as very useful 
to convey the cyclone warning to some areas. More than that, after the storm these 
phones became valuable tools to reach out for external help.  
 Looking back to the Cyclone Nargis experience, the use of mobile phones could have 
helped in two areas. Firstly, they gave a chance for people to communicate among 
each other to alert others to the risk posed by the cyclone. Such ‘communicative action’ 
could help for preparation or evacuation. Secondly, mobile technology was a chance 
to overcome the geographical barriers of the intricate waterways in the Delta regarding 
to early warning and emergency responses. 
One of the most vulnerable places in the Delta was farm houses or huts (normally made 
of bamboo and nipa with various sizes and strengths) which were scattered across a 
wide paddy field. These shelters are built for temporary use in each cultivating or 
harvesting season to facilitate easier access to daily farm work. Normally when 
farmers and farm workers are away from the village community, they do not have 
                                                 
2 This was the price of a mobile SIM card I bought in May 2008 right after Cyclone Nargis for 
communication purposes in the disaster relief operation in Labutta and Kungyangone areas.  
           
          
 
150 
 
much access to the outside world unless they are using radios. At the time of a cyclone 
emergency, person-to-person contacts are the only way to access information at the 
farm houses. In Zone III of the research sites, several orphans reported that their 
parents had died while in the farm house. An eldest child of a farmer’s family from 
Seik Kyi village (Zone III) who is now taking care of her two younger siblings 
recounted her story:  
When the storm hit at 9 pm, we, three children were at home while our parents 
were staying in the farm house of faraway paddy field. Here, our house was 
built on a bit higher ground. But it also collapsed around 10 pm and we had to 
rush for our uncle’s house. His house was also damaged and only the kitchen 
was remaining stable place for all of us. Both of my parents were seen by their 
friends drifted away by the surging water. A friend of my father who survived 
and was swimming together with them in this very minute said my parents were 
deeply worrying about us and talking about our safety before they separated 
from each other. (Moh Moh Thu, 23 years old dress maker, Zone III) 
5.4.1 The role of radio and television  
The Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union stated that 95 per cent of Myanmar’s people 
listened to the radio in 2012. Again in 2012, a Gallup poll showed that 67.3 per cent 
of respondents from both urban and rural areas said they got news from the radio at 
least once a week (Gallup 2012). The same poll noted that 86.7 per cent of listeners to 
the radio said their primary interest was the weather report.  
During fieldwork, when the respondents were asked how they received the news about 
Cyclone Nargis, the two answers most commonly found were from the radio and from 
their neighbors. For DMH, state radio is most accessible medium for disseminating 
weather news to the public as it is flexible to request to announce breaking news if 
needed (Lwin 2015). At the time of Cyclone Nargis there was a limitation in this 
favorite media, too. Back then, the state-owned radio programs started from 7 am and 
ended at 10 pm with one or two intervals in between. There were several foreign-based 
Burmese-language radio programs such as those from the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, Voice of America and Radio Free. In short, when Cyclone Nargis came 
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to the shore of the Delta, there were no 24hour broadcasting services to keep track of 
and provide updates about the cyclone’s progress to the public.  
Regarding television, in many villages in Zone I and Zone II covered by this research, 
TV signals were weak and received transmissions intermittently. Some families 
possessed TV only for entertainment purposes as they were used for watching movies 
with DVD players as the TV channels were difficult to access. Regardless of the socio-
economic conditions of the community, villages in all three research zones stated that 
most of them got news about Cyclone Nargis via the radio:  
We got the storm news from radio around 1 pm on that day (referring to 2nd 
May). I was not serious that much. We thought we, people from the Delta were 
resistant to storm wind and rain. TV is useless for news here as we could not 
access to the channels. (Focus group discussion, Ywar Tharyar village, Zone 
II)  
Even if transmission smoothed out and rural people had electricity to turn it on, TV 
programming was not the best stage for disseminating weather news back in 2008. 
Back then news programs on TV started at 8 pm The prime-time news was mostly 
extensive coverage of the daily activities and travels of senior military officials, largely 
for propaganda purposes of military legitimacy in taking care of national and religious 
affairs. Only after these lengthy news stories about individual or group visits by high 
ranking officials, came the weather news. By then it was almost 9.30 or 10 pm or 
occasionally 11 pm. The former Director General of the DMH recalled how the DMH 
worked with the state broadcasting station for weather news as follows: 
My department was responsible to deliver the weather news every day at 2 pm 
as the latest to TV station. Even if it happened that a storm would make a 
landfall at 6 pm, the people might already be dead when this weather news was 
broadcasted late at night after all this long news program dedicated to the 
official and ministerial daily digest. (Lwin 2015).  
In the view of the Cyclone Nargis survivors who lived in areas stretching from the 
Southwest to the Northeast (Zone I to Zone II and Zone III), even the same news which 
was announced at the same time had different implications. Villages in Zone I had the 
earliest exposure to the storm and the local people did not have much time to prepare 
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when the initial cyclone landfall started affecting their area around noon. For some, 
the time they received the warnings from the radio and the time they started running 
got little interval as in the following quote from Zone I: 
I heard the warning from the radio. I was in my house listening while many 
others did not have direct access to radio. It said, the intensity would be 120 
miles per hour. It was 12 o’clock news and in this hour, the sky was dark and 
the wind became violent (Focus group discussion, Kong Gyi village, Zone I).  
For the people from Zone III in Kungyangone and Dedaye, the landfall was at least 3 
to 6 hours away when they received the storm warning. In spite of having a few more 
hours for preparation compared to Zones I and II, the warning mostly failed to prompt 
actions. Hypothetically, real time coverage such as ‘nowcasting’ with a forecast for 
the next few hours could have informed people from the other side of the Delta about 
what had been going on at the other corner. A more specific warning could have saved 
more lives.  
Another problematic feature of TV programming was the lack of roll-on or pop-up 
captions on TV screens which have already been widely used in the world. This feature 
was introduced few days after Cyclone Nargis after the apparent request of a senior 
military official for such a feature (Lwin 2015). Based on DMH’s own reflection, the 
following were bottlenecks in the dissemination of the storm warning via radio and 
TV in the context of Cyclone Nargis:  
• It was not an end-to-end warning system. DMH could not reach the audience 
directly. Due to poor communication infrastructure, there was no micro-
messaging opportunity.   
• The end receivers (users of the media) could not have the latest news because 
no broadcasting media provided 24-hour services in 2008. In the absence of 
up-to-date channels, a fixed broadcasting time for weather news could have 
offered an exact time slot to tune in for updates. Yet, this option also was not 
working before the cyclone’s landfall. 
• There were media-blind areas in the Delta (and several places in Myanmar) 
where either transmission did not reach people or there was no facility at all to 
receive news; one such example is fishing groups residing for days in boats.  
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5.5 Response capacity and activation of an emergency plan 
In WMO’s fact-finding mission report, it was noted that, 
DMH had also tried to communicate with the respective authorities and state/division Peace 
and Development Councils in a repeated manner. A good lead time was there as well for 
making evacuations (WMO 2009, p.9).  
Interestingly, WMO did not state whether such evacuations happened and neither did 
it investigate what the reasons were for this not happening. In the WMO guidelines for 
early warning, it was clear that an early warning needed to be (1) clearly understood 
by the people, (2) easily and readily accessible to people, (3) timely, and (4) tied to 
response actions to be taken by the people in advance of, during, and after the event 
(WMO 2010).  
In the process of the EWS at the time of Cyclone Nargis, there was no such thing as 
activation of an emergency plan, as there was only a structure on paper for emergency 
management for a natural hazard in Myanmar before Cyclone Nargis. Regarding the 
response of the government, Tun Lwin, former Director General of DMH pointed out 
that,  
There are some government departments which should have acknowledged the 
level of vulnerability in the Delta and could have initiated some precautionary 
activities. The problem is they did not realize it was their responsibility. After 
Asian Tsunami of 2004, Myanmar government form ‘National Disaster 
Preparedness Central Committee’ in which Prime Minister was the chairman 
leading 17 ministers, all chiefs of the State and Divisional General 
Administration Departments and two mayors who were members. Officially it 
consisted of 8 sub-committees. What did they do during Nargis, before Nargis? 
(Lwin 2015, p.67).  
His narrative clearly conveyed the facts yet in the sensitive context of the political 
situation in Myanmar, even under a more open transitional phase, he did not say 
anything upfront against the military government.  
The Myanmar Government’s national progress report in regard to Hyogo Framework 
for Action (HFA) (MSWRR 2010), which was dated November 2010, carried 
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indicators that demonstrate a lack of efficiency in disaster management. Although it 
was more than two years after Cyclone Nargis and some initial progress had been 
made, it acknowledged that resources and capacities had fallen short. A summary of 
HFA’s core indicators and Myanmar’s performance ratings are presented in Box 1.   
Box 1 HFA’s core indicators and Myanmar’s performance 
Core Indicator 1: National policy and legal framework for disaster risk reduction exists with 
decentralized responsibilities and capacities at all levels    
Level of Progress Achieved: 3  
Institutional commitment attained, but achievements are neither comprehensive nor substantial  
Core Indicator 2: Dedicated and adequate resources are available to implement disaster risk 
reduction plans and activities at all administrative levels     
Level of Progress Achieved: 2  
Some progress, but without systematic policy and/or institutional commitment  
Core Indicator 3: Community participation and decentralization is ensured through the delegation 
of authority and resources to local levels       
Level of Progress Achieved: 2  
Some progress, but without systematic policy and/or institutional commitment  
Core Indicator 4: A national multi-sector platform for disaster risk reduction is functioning   
Level of Progress Achieved: 3 Institutional commitment attained, but achievements are neither 
comprehensive nor substantial. 
In a close-up assessment of the four components in the Early Warning (System) of 
Cyclone Nargis, the following observations came out: (1) monitoring and forecasting 
of the storm turned out to be accurate although the risk analysis was inadequate 
especially in identifying vulnerability, (2) dissemination of the warning was 
problematic although it could have been worse, (3) an emergency plan did not exist to 
activate per the warning. Under the heavy constraints of the prevailing social and 
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political systems, initiatives of human and institutional agency were still visible. Sadly, 
even if one component of the EWS worked, mass fatalities still occurred. Being 
effective in one component does not mean preventing failure in others. The overall 
results are still negative; in this case thousands of people perished.  
5.6 Why did the warning fail to warn? 
Unless the most vulnerable people can receive information in a timely manner in 
understadable language, there will be limitations to acting on the warning message 
(Basher 2006; Collins 2009; Kelman and Glantz 2014). UNESCAP (2015) referred to 
the challenges in the form of gaps for ‘extension of the warning chain down to the 
local level’ as the last mile. More often, reference of the ‘last mile’ is used as 
synonymous to the ‘first mile’ giving importance to the most vulnerable people at the 
frontline of disaster. In recent decades, proposals have been raised to disaster 
management policy makers to replace the ‘last mile’ approach with a ‘first mile’ 
approach that means putting the involvement of vulnerable people in the first place of 
the warning system (Richardson and Paisley 1998; Lassa 2008; Kelman 2009). 
Beyond improving the disaster risk reduction system, keeping people and communities 
at the center of the EWS from the beginning can contribute to sustainable development 
and more livelihood safety for the people.  
The experience of Bangladesh in Bhola cyclone in 1970 is a case comparable to 
Cyclone Nargis in the aspect of slow response from the government. The political 
leadership of Bangladesh (East Pakistan) at that time was heavily criticized by their 
political opponents as ‘gross neglect, callous indifference and utter indifference’ for 
their failure to take serious action at the initial information release and evacuation. 
Estimated some 500,000 people were killed when the storm surged intruded to the 
low-lying the Ganges Delta. Inefficient rescue and relief operation triggered mass 
grievance that eventually led to the downfall of the government in the cyclone affected 
region. The Awami League led by political opponents of the main Pakistani 
government gained a landslide victory in the next general elections of December in the 
province. Similar to Cyclone Nargis experience, the President of the whole Pakistan 
was condemned by its own people for playing down the news coverage and let the 
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people died where they were sleeping in their own houses (Mathur 2014). In East 
Pakistan, the failure in rescue and relief led to the protests that demanded to make a 
new liberated Bangladesh. A political consequence was different in Myanmar from 
that of Bangladesh. In the authoritarian context, the Burmese people could not directly 
punish the government by means of the election. Instead, the constiutional referendum 
which favored the supremacy of the army in politics was approved. Since the 1970s, 
Bangladesh has taken the necessary steps to improve early warning systems. With the 
development in the mid-1990s, cyclone prediction became exact and the country 
avoids extreme casualties. Although a cyclone on 19 May 1997 had the same intensity 
as that of 25 May 1985, it caused only 127 death which is much lower than the death 
toll caused by the latter that resulted 11069 deaths. In addition to the improved early 
warning system and pro-active disaster risk preparedness measures, 1350 cyclone 
shelters were built by 201and 26.6 per cent of the population is covered by cyclone 
shelter (Akhand 2013, p.50). In addition to significant progress in early warning 
system, in 2007 the people-centered cyclone preparedness programs mobilized 43,000 
volunteers successfully. They have been stationed in the coastal districts and hold the 
responsibility of disseminating cyclone warnings among villagers via megaphones and 
by house-to-house contact (Paul 2009, p.292). Regardless of type of political system, 
what Myanmar need to do is to learn from Bangladesh for DRR experience.  
The national EWS does not necessarily need to be a separate system that comes into 
use only when the community is exposed to a hazard (Kelman and Glantz 2014). To 
move people and communities from the add-on position of the ‘last mile’ to the ‘first 
mile’, and help them benefit from an effective warning system, strong political 
commitment and durable institutional capacities are crucial (Basher 2006; Jacob 
2008).  
Tapscott (1997) also stated that early warnings must ‘warn’ and be ‘early’. There are 
persistent questions about why people in the Delta were not warned by the warning 
when many of them at least knew the cyclone was approaching. Even though the 
warning did not come that early and it is still difficult to count as an effective warning, 
some of them heard directly from the DMH. Here, the risk perception is embedded in 
the socio-economic situation of communities, government policies and cultural 
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factors, is another determinant of success in saving lives. As in many other disasters, 
the EWS turned out to be a social process that equally weighed the importance of 
technical aspects. Hence, non-technological aspects also need to be considered to 
check whether predictions of an extreme weather event really prompted the 
communities’ responses (Alusa 2003; Sorensen and Sorensen 2007). 
5.7 Education could save lives 
There is some research that highlights the role of education in early warning and 
disaster management (Tong et al. 2012; Muttarak and Pothisiri 2013; Gaillard and 
Mercer 2013). Landis (2003) argued that it must be ‘a knowledgeable public’ that 
understands and is aware of natural disaster risks. Muttarak and Pothisiri (2013) 
concluded that the education level of household members is positively related to 
disaster preparedness.  
Education plays a critical role in building understanding of natural phenomena 
(Smawfield 2013). In the context of the overall decline in the education system, 
schools and curriculum in Myanmar did not provide knowledge for comprehensive 
understanding in recent decades. While local weather forecast knowledge such as 
movements of animals and tidal patterns has been passed from generation to generation 
in some communities of the Delta, in general the majority rely on formal education for 
living. In fact, local knowledge of disaster risk reduction is in decline as it is in many 
other places in the flux of modern ways of life. The gap between young people and 
traditional knowledge is widening and comprehension nature by means of local 
wisdom is fading gradually.   
Smawfield (2013) also noted that the education of children could be a means of passing 
relevant messages and practices to homes and communities; initiatives of that kind 
were referred to as ‘let our children teach us’ (Wisner 2006). Ronan et al. (2001) argue, 
if a child is more educated and more knowledgeable, the caregiver is more likely to be 
better informed if the child is encouraged to share information. In Cyclone Nargis, 
stories of children and how they contributed to the safety of the family were recorded 
in community narrative. A story is shared in a focus group discussion in Zone III in 
the lower Kungyangone area:  
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Initially I didn’t know about storm but later I heard the announcement from the 
TV and Radio, but I did not have much concern. My daughter stressed that she 
learned storm news in newspaper and asked her father not to go fishing. I 
wanted my husband to go for fishing but he listened to our daughter and 
fortunately his life was saved (Daw Khin, a street vendor, Auk Seik village, 
Zone III) 
In the experience of Cyclone Nargis, the narrative of residents revealed that 
comprehension of the Delta map and coastal geography had an influence on the level 
of seriousness among individual families and persons over hearing the storm warning. 
Lack of understanding may possibly have been rooted in a low-level of formal and 
informal education. Geographical awareness-raising could have been possible in 
informal ways as part of the public service media. The respondents tried to link low 
education and limited understanding of the warning message with the negative 
consequences they saw in the evacuation process. A brief classification of the most 
common responses to the cyclone warning is shown in Box 2. Some of these 
perceptions have roots in limited knowledge and lack of experience while some are 
linked to low levels of trust in the early warning and the government. Some are related 
to poor communication infrastructure and lost opportunity to interact regarding 
emergencies. 
Box 2 The community’s response to cyclone warning 
I heard the news and acted 
• ‘There was only one radio in the village. But the owner of the radio made his earnest effort 
to share the news by mouth to mouth to the whole village.’ (Thaung Thar)  
• ‘When the villagers received the warning, they also gave alert to an army unit stationed near 
the village.’ (Auk Seik) 
• ‘As soon as I know my surrounding area Haing Gyi island was included in the news I went 
to my aunty’s house which is two-storey building and big enough for us.’ (Mar Dar Aai) 
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I heard the news but I was very indecisive 
‘We listened to the radio and got the warning. But we were very indecisive what to do next. I was 
still guessing the direction of the cyclone. I was lost in my thoughts without doing any preparation.’ 
(Toe) 
I did not receive the news 
• ‘Here we lost nine out of every ten people in the village because we did not hear about the 
storm.’ (focus group discussion, Chaung Byal Gyi) 
• ‘I locked my radio in the cupboard. When I noticed the rising tide, it was already too late.’ 
(Hnar Gyi)  
• Radio transmission was so poor and no radio was working around us. (Shwe Sar Yan) 
• ‘I was living in the far end of the river and did not know anything about the storm.’ (Chit 
Thaw Maung, 35) (Say Yoe Kwin) 
• ‘Here, the houses were sparse and very far for a message to go from one household to 
another. A more established and collective community had better chance to get 
information.’ (Western Yay Kyaw Gyi) 
• ‘TV has not been useful in seaside village like us because there is no signal to any broadcast 
channel.’ (Ywar Thar Yar) 
• ‘The village council received the news from the central administration of the village tract, 
but the council did not share to the community members.’ (Kyein Chaung Phyar) 
I heard the news but did not trust it 
• ‘I do not remember where I got the news. It reached me two days before the actual landfall. 
But I did not trust the news.’ (Pauk Sein Kya) 
• ‘The storm news came like a rumor. The message could not be verified whether it was true 
or not. Weather news style back then was not serious. Not many people know the truth. I 
did not have access to any TV channel. I got TV but my family did not watch the news. We 
used TV only for watching movie with DVD players. People back then were not interested 
in State TV.’ (Kyun Chaung) 
• ‘People used to listen to the radio. But we listened only to the music and turned off the radio 
when the news and weather report came.’ (Sar Kyin) 
• ‘We were poor and we did not own TV.’ (Bhone Daw Pyae) 
 
 
           
          
 
160 
 
I heard the news but there was no safe place 
• ‘We received the news, but we did not have any place to go except going to the trees nearby.’ 
(Seik Kyi village) 
I heard the news but I did not care 
• ‘Many working in the paddy field neglected the warning and did not want to leave their 
work.’(Kyunchaung) 
• ‘I heard the news from radio. But I was not so worried about that because even my 
grandparents who lived till 70 and 80 never heard of such a violent storm.’ (Kwin Yar) 
• ‘A boy from my neighboring village came to me with a bicycle and he said, ‘Big brother, a 
storm called Nargis is coming.’ I replied ‘Whatever name it is, I do not care’. I left to Bogale 
on that day. When I arrived to the town, I listened to the radio and heard the warning. I keep 
listening and listening but at some point, I did not hear the news any more. Because my 
radio was already flying off from my hand. The storm was that violent.’ (Ko Aung Zaw 
Latt, Say Yoe Kwin)  
• ‘As people never heard of such a strong cyclone in one hundred years, no matter how many 
times we heard the warning from radio, we did not care.’ (Aung Hlaing) 
I heard the news but I was confused about the name of the place the media was 
referring to 
• ‘The radio was announcing the storm news again and again in hours before the landfall. I 
thought the storm would strike other places rather than my home.’ (Pyi Daw Thar) 
• ‘We were confused. Most of us here did not know the place the radio was referring was just 
beside our village.’ (Bhone Daw Pyae) 
I heard the news but I could not inform others 
• ‘I heard the news from radio but I cannot go to the paddy field where my children were 
working. It was too far for me to reach them.’ (Thone Gwa) 
• ‘I told the people that I heard the storm news from the radio. But people from the village 
thought I usually behaved strange and not worth listening.’ (Pay Gone) 
• ‘We watched TV with the battery and heard the warning after the prime-time news around 
9 pm After the battery, had gone, we were in the dark and could not go out to inform friends.’ 
(Thayet Thone Bin)  
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I heard the news but did not understand the technical terms 
• ‘I did hear the cyclone warning in every hour but I did not know what they mean by mile 
per hour of the storm clearly. I also did not know which areas will be affected.’ (Pyi Daw 
Thar) 
• ‘We did not understand the usages the radio use. The information was not clear to me.’ (Taw 
Ku) 
5.7.1 Lack of comprehension: Where is that island you keep referring to?  
When the storm warning was issued, the announcement stated that ‘Hlaing Gyi Island’ 
would be the first and foremost landfall point in the Delta. This name, as used in 
official announcements was geographically accurate and clear as there is no other 
name to describe it. However, a clear name which referred to one of the significant 
landmarks in Myanmar still created misunderstanding and confusion, according to the 
focus group discussion in nearby villages. The people who lived in Zone I knew Hlaing 
Gyi island (the initial landfall point) well as they are close to the island. But that was 
not the case for many people in Zone II and Zone III. In many focus group discussions, 
the villagers mentioned that they were having a hard time getting a mental image of 
that location. As most of the schools in these areas were extremely poor, access to 
physical images of Delta maps was difficult. This problem is somehow linked to the 
poverty of Zone II in which schools often lacked support from the government because 
they were not yet formally recognized or teaching aids such as maps were scarce. 
Confusion over locations was stated in Zone II: 
My aunt and I got the news from the radio while we were eating lunch and but 
the problem was we did not understand what was meant by ‘Haing Gyi island 
was at the centre of the storm.’ Where is Haing Gyi? We wondered. We thought 
it was very far away place from us.’ (Focus group discussion, Ywar Tharyar 
village, Zone II)  
Similar narratives were recorded in different discussions at research Zone II and III. 
Also, there are some positive stories highlighting the benefits of knowledge and 
comprehension over the movement of the cyclone's path:  
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When I heard the announcement for the first time in the morning of cyclone 
day, the radio did not include our area, the Southern part of Yangon region in 
the cyclone path. So, I did not think it was serious news for us. Later we found 
out that our region was included in the warning list, I called one of my workers 
and assigned him to shout loud the warning across the whole village. Around 8 
o’clock we prepared to be ready. No sooner than the clock had struck 10 pm, 
houses in the other side of the village started to collapse. So, people moved to 
this side of the village where the ground is a bit higher than their low lying 
plain. Even the army unit residing in our village was moving to my house. We 
did not have cases that led to death here because of the warning. Many people 
from the other side of the villages died because they did not have information. 
(U Sein Win, 56, Toe, Zone III)  
 
Figure 11 Map showing the location of Turtle Island or Thamee Hla Island 
Source: Colin Limpus, IOSEA Advisory Committee and Douglas Hykle, IOSEA Coordinator 
Another issue of confusion with names in radio announcements relates to local 
knowledge in stating geographic entities in the weather announcements. When the 
warning was heard by the people from Zone I, which is close to initial landfall point 
of Haing Gyi, they tried to interpret a specific reference that they heard from the 
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announcement. It said, ‘the storm would pass the areas between ‘Haing Gyi Island’ 
and ‘Thamee Hla Island’ which is shown in Figure 11. Most of the people were not 
clear about the name, ‘Thame Hla Island’. In the local understanding, the people 
referred this island as ‘Lake Kyun’. A colonial name ‘Diamond island’ (at 15° 51' N 
94° 17' E) was changed to ‘Thame Hla Island’ in the government registry but local 
people just know it by the name of ‘Turtle Island’ (Lake Kyun in Burmese). Local 
names and local understanding in early warnings were critical for effectiveness. 
Kelman (2012, p.483) recommends applying ‘locally contextual warnings’ 
considering the nature of risk and effectiveness of the language. A female participant 
from focus group discussion in Kone Gyi recalled her experience with the message 
that she was not able to comprehend because of unfamiliar name, 
While we are preparing for a wedding reception of the next day (day of 
landfall), I did receive the news about cyclone. They said it would come from 
somewhere near the Thamee Hla Kyun. I did not notice that it was our Lake 
Kyun. (Htay Htay Hlaing, a housewife of 34, Kone Gyi village Zone I) 
5.8 Failure to provide awareness and indirect experience 
In the evaluation of the EWS in Cyclone Nargis, the WMO noted that, 
 Both local authorities and people faced difficulties due to lack of knowledge and low public 
 awareness to the warning. (WMO 2009. p.10) 
This statement brought another layer of questions: Why did public perception evaluate 
the risk as low? Most respondents in this research attributed a lack of experience to the 
failure to prepare. This also brought another ‘why’ question over their knowledge 
domain: why did they lack indirect experience by means of education or exposure to 
media content?   
5.8.1 Where did the weather map go? 
The older generations in Myanmar who had grown up after Independence were more 
familiar with weather maps in day-to-day experience (Lwin 2015). Whenever they 
picked up the newspapers, the weather map was part of daily content in the past. But 
this content lost space on the pages of state-owned newspapers in the mid-1990s. This 
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long-existing tradition of providing public knowledge space disappeared from 
newspapers when newspaper contents were driven by a heavy dose of propaganda and 
revenue generation by inserting more commercial advertisements. Only the English 
version of the newspaper put in the map as the intended audience was a limited number 
of diplomats and expatriates. As shown in the following Figure 12, the weather map 
in the New Light of Myanmar newspaper for 2 May 2008 provided an example of the 
description of the cyclone path.  
 
Figure 12 Weather map for an English-language newspaper audience 
Source: The New Light of Myanmar, 2 May 2008, p.15 
Such a visual description was not available for Burmese-language newspaper 
audiences.  For the local audience in Myanmar, they had not seen this designated space 
for the weather map and related information for a long time as it no longer existed in 
the public sphere. The former Director General of DMH lamented that,  
Weather map and news, which existed in newspapers since the DMH started 
Myanmar Daily Weather Report since 1 June 1947, just disappear from public 
domain like that. People nowadays are less familiar with weather map and the 
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rural area might not know how weather map look like. (Lwin 2015; personal 
communication with Lwin in 2013) 
Zillman (2003) attributed the effectiveness of satellite images to public awareness in 
some areas. Although some privately-owned media outlets occasionally used for 
satellite images relevant to their contents, the state-owned media rarely utilized such 
images for public awareness. This knowledge gap is significant in the context of little 
internet penetration and mobile phone availability in the years leading up to Cyclone 
Nargis.  
5.9 Questions of experience and frequency of disaster  
Although it is more and more difficult to believe that large-scale natural disasters are 
likely to be events of low-probability in the current climate change context, it is certain 
that they are consequential irrespective of frequency. Hence, an EWS must be a part 
of community consciousness, irrespective of hazard frequency (Kelman and Glantz 
2014).  
Webster (2008) noted that four major cyclones have occured since 2006 in the North 
Indian Ocean, compared to eight major cyclones in the previous 25 years. Lwin (2015) 
also noted that cyclone tracks in the Andaman Sea similar to Cyclone Nargis (although 
not the same path of landfall) had happened in 1982. Landfall in cyclone Nargis was 
16'N compared to the 1982 landfall of 18'N. In the 1982 cyclone (locally known as the 
‘Gwa Storm’ named after the nearest, small town of landfall), wind speed was 120˗140 
mph (in Cyclone Nargis it was 140 mph) and similarly devastating in terms of property 
but not as much in the loss of lives. Another devastating storm was recorded in 1975, 
locally known as ‘Pathein Storm’ in which the western part of the Delta was affected 
by 381 deaths and more than 10,000 cattle were lost in the storm. These two big storms 
happened in one generation (Lwin 2014).  
In 134 years of records (from 1877 to 2010), a total of 84 storms crossed Myanmar 
and 43 storms (51 per cent) happened in the early onset of monsoons in April and May. 
On average, one in two storms in the Bay of Bengal during this season usually crossed 
Myanmar’s western coast. Lwin (2015) cited the respected meteorologists in Myanmar 
who compiled a data set of 100 years and published their research. The highlighted 
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remark of their book was, ‘if a storm is originated near Preparis Island which lies 
between the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal, 82 miles from the coast of Myanmar, 
they are likely to cross Burma’ (Lwin 2015, p.48). Remarkably Cyclone Nargis’s 
origin was near Preparis Island (Lwin 2015). Also in the Asian Tsunami of 2004, 
several villages of the Delta suffered an estimated death toll of 71 people (Satake et al. 
2006). In 2006, Cyclone Mala hit both Rakhine and the Delta, and in 2007, Cyclone 
Akash had moderate impact along the coast of Myanmar near the Delta.  
Frequency and experience of tropical storms is high in the Bay of Bengal and Myanmar 
is never free from the negative impacts of storms in this region. Why was Myanmar 
not ready to disseminate disaster preparedness education in the public domain and why 
did it not create a knowledge base from secondary experience to build a 
‘knowledgeable public’? General attribution will go to overall declines in the socio-
economic situation under the military regime, while poverty shrank the space 
knowledge and a cultural depository. For most people, day-to-day subsistence has been 
an utmost priority. Specific attribution will go to the decline in formal, informal and 
non-formal education. Especially in non-formal education, government propaganda 
crowded out space for public awareness.  
One underlying factor for the poor state of public awareness is strict censorship.  As 
Emma Larkin chronicled in her book No Bad News for the King, the prevailing conduct 
of the military government was attempting to control bad news from reaching the ears 
of higher levels of power and the wider public. At the time of Cyclone Nargis, there 
were privately-owned media outlets in Myanmar that worked under heavy censorship. 
News about internal natural disasters was mostly prohibited or drastically toned down 
to look like small, insignificant events, no matter what it was, even an earthquake or 
flood with high destructive power (interview with former press scrutiny board 
member). The reason behind the censorship was that press scrutiny officials were 
instructed to think of disaster news or stories as undermining the government’s 
credibility (personal communication with a former censor official). This was the 
default mood of information control under Myanmar’s military rule, in which the 
rulers focused on regime security and in the process, they trumped public security by 
limiting public awareness of disaster risks.  
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As Friedman (2008) says, censorship restricts the people’s imagination. In the case of 
Myanmar, public awareness and the knowledge depository was undermined under 
information control. As we have seen in Cyclone Nargis, much of this links to human 
security.  
5.10 Did the cultural narrative create a false sense of security? 
In the focus group discussions in all three research zones, I tried to get the views of 
villagers on cultural aspects related to the disaster. It was assumed that some elements 
of culture enhanced community resilience. On the other hand, there are some cultural 
aspects that are arguably not helpful. On example is that many Burmese abstain from 
talking about negative scenarios such as ill health or disasters. Such cultural traditions 
constrain people from talking about possible negative impacts that need adjustment 
and could contribute to the community’s resilience.  
There are two arguments on culture and the Burmese community: ‘it is the culture that 
blinds us’ argument and ‘it is the culture that bind us’ argument. During the summer, 
almost every Buddhist village has what is locally known as ‘continuous recital of Pa 
Htan’ (a ceremonial reading of a part of Buddhist holy scripture) performed 
collectively over a few days to a week. Such a recital of Buddhist text is believed to 
protect the community from possible danger. One of the famous poems in Burmese 
that was blacklisted by the censorship board for several years underscored how life in 
Myanmar was vulnerable to disasters even with this recital. A few verses are translated 
to reflect the cultural dimension of the people’s risk perception: ‘......it is good to have 
Pa Htan recital for freedom from harm, but what is not good is we are not free from 
harm’ (Pwint 2015, p.5). 
People who challenged the prevailing culture argue that the ‘practice of asking 
protection from higher-up power does make us weaker. It takes our attention away 
from working on real things for protection’. (discussion in Bogale of Zone II during 
preliminary field trip) 
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On the other hand, the ‘it is the culture that binds us’ group believed these traditional 
religious activities carried deeper meaning than asking help from the people who hold 
power: 
We did this because we are aware of risks and uncertainty. Contrary to assumption that it is a 
blind faith, this is an idea of caution in practice. Without these activities, where these poor, 
helpless (little support from their own government) will gain strength. These cultural activities 
give them strength. When you walk in paved road you do not need much to care as traffic 
police even will work for you. But when you are going inside the forest there are a lot of unseen 
and unpredictable. So, homage to the forest guardian or religious text recital before going 
inside the forest gave you some sort of strength. You may think yourself wise for not adhering 
these practices if you have protective gear and equipment enough and when you can really feel 
safe to go inside the forest. But for most of us, these cultural activities give us chance to come 
together as a group and help building social cohesion that leads to a sort of resilience. 
(Discussion in Pathein with local community based organizations during preliminary trip)  
Harris (2012) argues that behavioral changes for disaster preparedness may link to 
existing cultural and religious practices. In the case of the Delta community, cultural 
attribution of risk perception is visible but it is hard to delineate how it extends to the 
boundaries of vulnerability or resiliency.  
Regardless of disapproval between these two perspectives, both cultural arguments 
somehow have common ground in understanding that the military government’s 
incorporation of cultural practice to enhance its legitimacy did not help disaster 
resilience. The military government attempted to portray themselves as providers of 
safety and security. They set up ‘organized religious activities’ aiming to show the 
Buddhist majority people that they were the true patron of religion and defenders of 
the faith and the country (Ganesan 2007). For many years under the military regime, 
the State-owned television frequently broadcast the early morning sermons of popular 
monks, one of which carried the remark, ‘this monk protects the country in palm of his 
hand’. It is plausible to say that the military government was buffering themselves 
from poverty and the struggles of the people, and even enhancing their credibility with 
such a plain security narrative. On the other hand, the regime failed to provide practical 
measures of human security for the people.  
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However, community-based cultural practices with multiple connections to the lives 
of local people are very different from state-led rituals. Still the administrative 
authorities usually occupy cultural and religious spaces and propagate grand narratives 
of security that have impacts on village communities. When the power, propaganda 
and false security narrative in the form of cultural and religious images replaced real 
action based in real life, it was the local community that had to deal with distorted 
belief systems and live with weakened resiliency: 
When some people in our village said ‘nothing bad is going to happen such as 
disaster, because we are devoted Buddhist and honorable monks are here to 
protect us too’, I was responding to them in my thought. No. No. This is not 
mentioned in Buddhist teaching and this is not correct thinking. But you see, 
where do the people get this kind of narrative? The answer is the State 
television. (A founder of a local NGO) 
5.11 Complex relations between censorship, rumor and trust 
When information is tightly controlled and a strict censorship rule defines the norm of 
a society, rumor is abundant as a way of discreet communication (Kapferer 1990). 
When people receive word-of-mouth information, it is their responsibility to evaluate 
whether it is rumor or the valid truth. Under a given situation, the news can be either 
undervalued or overvalued (Kapferer 1990) based on many other factors such as who 
said what by citing which sources. Some respondents from the research areas said they 
had initial confusion over the storm news in this manner. The following quotes from 
Zones I and II relate to this: 
I do not remember where I got the news. But it reached to me two days earlier 
before the cyclone. Like many people in the community, I did not trust and 
thought it might be rumor. On the day of landfall, I heard the 12 pm news from 
the radio with my own ear. Then I did not have much time left to prepare for 
evacuation. (U Aung Myo Thet from Pauk Sein Kya village, Zone II) 
We did not hear directly from radio. It was spreading like mouth to mouth 
rumor. People were saying that flood and strong wind were coming. (Aye Aye 
Mon, 49, Aung Hlaing Zone I)  
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As described above, the military in the Delta got direct alerts from the DMH. But trust 
between the military and ordinary people had deteriorated under the long military rule 
and a country in decline. Their warnings in some areas did not prompt actions. The 
following story came from Zee Thaung village of Zone I which is close to the initial 
cyclone landfall area. The soldiers from the navy and army unit near the area were 
obviously on high alert. The following story came from group discussions in that area: 
On that day, the patrolling soldiers came and told us about the approaching 
storm. We did not pay attention to the soldiers because the storm was not new 
to us and we were confident seafarers. Around 12, the soldiers came back again, 
they were already impatient and shouted at us, ‘You all must leave here’. 
‘Now’. Then people were already moving to the hill as more and more intense 
wind came. (U Kyaw Thin, 60 years old fisherman, Zee Thaung, Zone I) 
Issues around rumors and trust were involved in these stories of early warning. Trust 
could help people to verify the news quickly and act. The role of trust in early warnings 
again highlights the need for community processes to be prioritized in DRR.    
5.12 The current state of EWS  
After Cyclone Nargis, the Japanese government helped DMH to establish three radar 
stations in Yangon, Mandalay and Kyaukphyu and 30 automatic weather observation 
stations which would be ready by 2017. DMH established a new section for Remote 
Sensing and Geographic Information System (GIS) on September 2012. 
Multifunctional Satellite Images (MTSAT) are provided by the Japan International 
Cooperation Program for accuracy of storm forecasts. Skills and data management for 
daily weather forecasts and detecting extreme weather condition were also built up by 
training given by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center with the financial support of 
the government of Norway. In addition, training for effective disaster communication 
linked with early warnings was also supported by UNESCAP and RIMES. Assistance 
from bilateral donors including Japan has contributed to the improvement of the 
equipment and capacity of DMH (Tun 2016). 
The example of Bangladesh can also inform the DRR process in the current political 
transition in Myanmar. In a cost benefit analysis of the EWS based on Cyclone Sidr, 
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it was calculated that ‘for every $1 invested, a return of $40 in benefit over a ten-year 
period may be realized’ (Hunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2013, p.465). In addition to 
these improvements in assets for detecting and forecasting, community process 
initiatives were taken in some area. As this chapter shows, institutional and community 
assets, together with processes centered on people and communities are critical to the 
success of EWS in Myanmar.  
5.13 Conclusion 
This chapter explored and analyzed issues of early warning in Cyclone Nargis. In the 
first part, the role of government and responsibility in the failure of the early warning 
were outlined. Lessons are drawn from the past experiences rather than blaming the 
responsible actors and institutions. Based on the four phases of early warning, weak 
linkages among all three domains of ‘government’, ‘institutions’ and ‘community’ 
were observed. Areas of governance and institutions are studied from secondary 
sources and expert interviews while the community side was explored from the 
community narratives. It concludes that during Cyclone Nargis, assets for effective 
early warning such as communication technology were limited. Community processes 
in getting messages, verifying risks and taking actions were also problematic due to 
various factors that linked to decades of national political regime which did not put 
much effort for human security. In the context of authoritarian rule in Myanmar, the 
role of governance weakened physical assets and local processes. For future 
implications for resilience, communities’ active involvement is needed to improve 
both tangible assets (ICT/risk map), and intangible assets (human capital/education). 
Both tangible and intangible assets should be enhanced in parallel.  
With regard to Early Warning System (EWS), a good example of EWS for Myanmar 
is Cuba. In Cuba, the year 1995 brought a major turn in the country’s early warning 
system. This year was registered as the second most active hurricane season of the 
20th century in Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Basin and many of its 
neighbors suffered from disaster. Without being affected by major hazards, Cuba 
revitalized the early alert system befor the tropical cyclone in 1996. Immediate benefit 
from a newly installed EWS came to Chua during Hurricane Lili which crossed central 
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Cuba in the same year. Since then EWS of Cuba has been more strengthened and 
institutionalized (Torres & Puig 2012).  
Another example which carries a lot of lesson to Myanmar is Bangladesh. A cost-
benefit analysis of EWS based on the Cyclone Sidr showed that ‘for every one US 
dollar invested, a return of 40 US Dollar in benefit over a ten-year period may be 
realized’ (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2013, p. 465). After extensive calculation, 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2013) made the following recommendations for 
developing countries: ‘to start investing more systematically in DRR rather than 
focusing almost exclusively on post-disaster assistance’, ‘to put more time and energy 
into reflecting ways to reduce future losses rather than focusing solely on emergency 
relief’. For developed countries, it is suggested to provide resources to low-income 
countries for the above-mentioned measures (p. 472).  
In the context of political transition in Myanmar, some of these recommendations are 
taking shape even though some bureaucratic bottlenecks still exist. An as an example 
is a recent planning to set up tidal gauge for Tsunami warning near the Diamond Island 
with the support of UNESCO and International Tsunami Information Center (Swe 
2011). This installation plan was delayed due to red tape in the administrative system 
of Myanmar and finally, it chose the Philippines instead of Myanmar as the project 
end date became closer at the end of 2010 (Lwin 2015). Yet, Myanmar has seen some 
institutional setup. Japan is a major donor for disaster risk reduction plan of Myanmar 
and it provided US$ 40 million to set up three weather stations in three major points 
of Myanmar and 30 automatic weather observation stations across the country by 2016 
(ABCID 2015). Referring to these improvements, one of the leaders of a local 
community-based organization said, ‘it’s not going to bring back my fellow villagers 
from death, but that is good news if our children in the village become safer’. 
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Chapter 6 
Resilience and vulnerability in the cyclone emergency 
6 Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the characteristics of disaster vulnerability as well as the ‘assets’ 
and ‘processes’ that constituted resilience for community security in the emergency 
phase of Cyclone Nargis. When a life-threatening danger was imminent, the village 
communities in the three research zones needed to locate disaster-resilient assets 
through self-organized evacuation processes.  
Studies on the behavior of people in emergencies (Quarantelli 1954; Dynes et al. 1972; 
Wenger et al. 1975; Barton 1969) have stated that communities’ actions are usually far 
from irrational. Knowledge of the community members may be limited to analyzing 
the whole complexity of risk. They may not be able to choose the safest option under 
the given time and resource constraints. Yet, in an emergency they have many reasons 
to protect themselves and their loved ones as best possible (Fritz and Williams 1957). 
Regardless of priority for self-survival, Ronan and Johnston (2005) argue that the 
pattern of response among affected communities tends to be pro-social rather than anti-
social. It is observed that positive human nature had influence over choices for life 
safety in Cyclone Nargis’s impact phase despite people’s actions being constrained by 
many factors rooted in the structural vulnerability of the society.  
The first part of this chapter will explore sources of resilience for the people by 
exploring the ‘physical assets’ available for safety, and dynamics in evacuation as 
‘processes’ for survival. The second part will analyze the underlying causes of social 
vulnerability in this unique context of political complexity, and impoverished yet 
close-knit community.  
6.1 Human security in the ‘impact’ phase: determinants of survival  
One of the guiding principles of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
denotes that ‘the state has primary responsibility’ for disaster reduction measures and 
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for taking immediate action in an emergency. This responsibility must be shared by 
‘relevant national authorities, sectors and stakeholders’ for protecting a community 
and its ‘property, health, livelihoods and productive assets, as well as cultural and 
environmental assets, while promoting and protecting all human rights, including the 
right to development’ (UNISDR 2015, p.13).  
Observations on disaster emergency were noted in studies by Quarantelli (1980), Fritz 
and Williams (1957), Kiel (1995) and Pursiainen (2007). Quarantelli (1980) observed 
that mass movement was characterized by behavioral complexity in which the process 
is full of interactions that develop along multiple lines rather than a single path. Kiel 
(1995) and Pursiainen (2007) stated that disaster emergency of any kind is a nonlinear 
event in which constantly changing variables are likely to confuse decision making. 
Fritz and Williams (1957) point out that lack of communication heightens vulnerability 
during the impact hours. Panic is most likely to occur when there are limited choices 
for action and finding escape routes is not easy or they do not exist (Fritz and Williams 
1957, p.44).  
During Cyclone Nargis’s emergency phase, the state’s involvement in disaster 
evacuation was minimal to none. People did not have ambiguity about the role of the 
authorities and realized that they were on they own. Generally, it came down to 
individuals or households, in most cases, to decide what actions to take. Flight from 
an unsafe place became a solution for most people when they started to feel the strength 
of the storm wind and storm surge. Even in normal conditions of the Delta, person-to-
person communication was the main method of sharing information, and in the 
increasing intensity of the storm and the accompanying storm surge, villagers were in 
an emergency situation with many unknowns. Especially for Zone III of this research, 
where the storm surge came in the dark of night, survival was most difficult in the 
drifting water.  
Human security in the emergency phase of Cyclone Nargis was determined by the 
availability of assets (shelter, stronger buildings) for safety, processes that could 
facilitate actions needed to reach assets (for example, the evacuation process), and 
withstanding the emergency. Group activities with collective actions were the norm in 
the village cultures of the three research zones. Many altruistic stories were recorded 
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in the emergency phase of the disaster in Cyclone Nargis. But the intensity was 
unexpected for many of villagers and preparedness for the storm surge was almost nil. 
Based on the interviews and focus group discussions in the village communities, 
survival in the cyclone emergency was attributed to a community’s capacity or capital 
that provided ‘assets for safety’ and ‘processes for safety’ as shown in Figure 13. 
Generally, emergency mechanisms and survival strategies of the community were 
derived from the existing capital of the community, such as physical, cultural, human 
social and political capital. The conditions of these capitals are not independent of 
national policy and governance and, in many cases, they are hampered by government 
policy that increases vulnerability when human security is not the focus. Apart from 
the government, communities in their own ‘social interaction’ possess varying degrees 
of social and other capital. How assets and processes were critical to human security 
of the Delta in the storm hazard context is explored in this chapter by looking at the 
critical hours of the emergency struggle. Assets, process and capital linkages to 
national governance are also examined in this chapter.  
 
Figure 13 The assets and processes frame of community security in the emergency 
phase 
6.2 Assets for safety in the cyclone emergency 
The cyclone passed to the western side of the villages in Zone I between 12 and 1 pm. 
With the help of daylight, the communities at the edge of the Southwestern Delta could 
make sense of routes and their surroundings more clearly than the other regions. In 
contrast, the villages from Zone II and III, which started to experience the storm later 
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around 3:30 pm and 8:30 pm respectively, had difficulties finding the way to a safe 
place.  
When their own houses started to collapse, immediate action was needed to locate any 
accessible building or shelter for refuge, i.e. ‘assets’ for safety. Local assets for refuge 
were the stronger houses of neighbors, rice depots nearby, a church or a monastery, or 
higher ground. In a desperate situation, when no man-made shelter could be found as 
the water level rose, it could be a big tree. In most cases, people needed to move from 
one asset to another until the storm stopped. When the strength of the refuge became 
questionable under intensifying wind and surging water, quick thinking was a must to 
locate another shelter amidst narrowing options. In most of the villages, village leaders 
or leading figures in the neighborhood facilitated the evacuation process until they 
were separated by the storm surge or they could settle in a safe place until dawn.  
6.2.1 Private property as emergency assets  
In all 45 villages of the three research sites, most people lived in bamboo and woven 
nipa houses, some people had wooden houses and few lived in brick houses. This 
general pattern was the same in all 45 villages while although half of the villages did 
not have brick houses at all. In general, most bamboo houses collapsed in strong winds 
at the initial stage of the storm. Most wooden houses endured the strong winds but not 
the storm surge. Normally the brick buildings were stronger at withstanding both wind 
and storm surge. Cases of mass survival in the big houses were found in all three zones 
but Zone III had the highest number of cases as the local economy was stronger in 
Zone III. In comparison with the other two zones, the average house damage in ten 
villages of Zone III was 86 per cent and the lowest in comparison with Zone I (average 
97 per cent) and Zone II (average 98 per cent). Relatively, Zone II hosted the poorest 
of the poor among the three research areas. Except for Gway Chaung Gyi, Ayeyar, 
Shwe Sar Yan, Thabyay Yoe, Dani Chaung, Thama Seikta and Ywar Thar Yar villages 
(in which less than 100 per cent of houses were damaged or collapsed), the other 
villages from Zone II lost 99 per cent to 100 per cent of houses. Even under this 
circumstance, a few standing houses became refuges for most community members in 
many villages. Although Zone I did not have many good houses, Aung Hlaing village 
was one of the examples that showed mass survival was possible in a single house:  
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We run to my father’s house and it hosted more than 100 people when we 
arrived, we all survived. Before Nargis, Aung Hlaing village has 548 people. 
Nargis killed more than 300. The total population now (2015) is less than 250. 
(Focus group discussion, Aung Hlaing village, Zone I).   
Apart from the houses, rice depots were another type of private shelter used for refuge. 
Land owning farmers usually keep paddy in rice depots in the backyard for long term 
rice storage after the harvest. As they are designed to support the heavy weight of rice, 
they are usually strong, although they existed in limited number in most villages. There 
were cases of survivals in rice depots in all three areas but not all depots were able to 
resist the storm surge. Some people saw tragic endings of family members in the rice 
depots:  
All my family members, our workers and I went to the rice house when the 
storm hit the village. We were altogether over 100 people. The rice house had 
over 3000 baskets (one basket of paddy is equivalent to 20.9 kilogram) inside. 
The rice pile was as high as 20 feet. I thought we would be safe there even if 
the flood was as high as ten feet. At midnight, after all the houses in the whole 
villages were shattered by the wind, it was the only remaining structure. When 
the water level was getting higher and higher it was finally uprooted and moved 
along with the drift. Out of over 100 people, only six survived. The night was 
too dark and I was the only one still breathing among the dead. (Kone Gyi 
village, Zone I) 
The important role of private houses in life-saving is clear in the case of Wah Taw 
Kone village in Zone II. At the tip of Kadon Kani Peninsula, this village saw only two 
surviving houses when the cyclone passed while the rest of the 75 houses disappeared 
with the storm surge. These two houses sheltered half of the total population of around 
300. This village had minimal death toll compared to its neighbors. The high survival 
rate of the village was also attributed to other factors such as storm surge levels but 
the role of the two surviving houses in sheltering half of village was also significant.  
However, future implications of the use of private facilities as temporary refuges must 
count upon the integration of risk factors such as storm intensity and possible storm 
surge levels in the larger context of risk and vulnerability assessment. At the same 
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time, capacity assessment must be done within a community to identify possible ways 
to enhance safety with socially embedded physical structures in the village context.  
6.2.2 Community and religious spaces as emergency assets 
Beyond the private houses, there are public places including religious buildings such 
as temples, monasteries or churches. Villages with populations of more than 1000 
people tend to have bigger religious buildings or other public spaces such as primary 
schools. In Zone III, eight villages out of ten have populations above 1000 people and 
their monasteries were strong enough to host most community members in the 
emergency. These monasteries also functioned as rescue centers in the early days of 
shock after Cyclone Nargis and continued to be involved in the rehabilitation process 
as centers for aid distribution or meeting points for people. For example, two 
monasteries in Taw Khayan village helped displaced people who arrived in the hours 
after the cyclone. Sadly, this hardly happened in smaller villages. The field study 
observed that the smaller the population of the community, the weaker the public 
spaces. For example, small villages such as Eastern Yay Kyaw Gyi, Thaung Thar, Dani 
Chaung, and Mone Tine Lay of Zone II did not have monasteries.  
The role of religious buildings as emergency shelter was recognized in the report of 
the Shelters Cluster of the TCG after Cyclone Nargis (Alexander 2009). Right after 
the cyclone, an estimated 239 temporary formal and informal settlements emerged. 
Out of them, 70 per cent were monasteries and 28 per cent were public buildings such 
as schools and hospitals. Only 2 per cent were tented camps (OCHA 2008, p.1).  
Out of 25 villages in Zone II, 19 villages had a monastery and among them only ten 
villages could use their monastery as an emergency refuge while as other monasteries 
were damaged or destroyed by the storm. Out of these ten, only six from Say Yoe 
Kwin, Thama Seikta, Thabyay Yoe, Aye Yar, Kywal Phyu, Ma Pway Tan villages had 
enough strength and space to continue to function as relief center or temporary camps 
for displaced people.  
In Zone I, the monastery in Dee Du Kone village is a good example of leadership in 
the disaster cycle. The monastery gave refuge to more than 200 people from 
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neighboring villages. The monastery-turned-relief center attracted national-level civil 
society networks and formal NGOs through its existing contacts with the city and 
towns in non-affected areas. Relief efforts from the monastery with multiple 
connections made a substantial impact on the whole area. Similar cases happened in 
Christian villages in Zone I. A Roman Catholic church in Nant Thar Kone village 
saved the whole village and helped neighboring communities with relief support:  
My family arrived to the door of the Church just in time. The church was one 
and half story brick building. We carried elderly people to the upstairs. We 
spent the whole night there. Around 130 children who took refuge there, only 
one child died of injuries. It was my son. He was badly injured when a beam 
fell over him. People outside the church were unfortunately more helpless than 
us. When the wind finally stopped, we found out that we had lost over 200 
people. Only three persons survived among those who left outside of the 
Church. (Nant Thar Kone village, Zone I) 
Being common infrastructure in the community, monasteries and churches are a proxy 
indicator of the status of wellbeing in the community as the main contributions to these 
religious institutions come from the community. Collective efforts and bonding social 
capital help to organize religious and cultural activities around the monastery. It is also 
a public sphere where bridging and linking social capital happened when monks 
became facilitators in communication between local people and visitors. These 
religious spaces usually support community cohesion when the monk or leader of the 
church are highly respected and socially engaged.  
As Burmese day-to-day life is bounded by religious rituals, it is hard for a community 
without a monastery. Having no monastery in the village means this is a place with 
less pride and more dependence on other villages for religious activities and other 
cultural rituals embedded in village social life. That is why community members 
usually try to have one even if they can only afford a weaker physical structure. Before 
Cyclone Nargis, Aung Hlaing village was very enthusiastic about building its own 
monastery, hoping that they would no longer be dependent on nearby Kong Gyi village 
for religious functions. This story explains social capital and cultural aspects in having 
the common asset of a monastery. Unfortunately, the monastery in this story did not 
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survive but the community function of the past and current aim can be seen from this 
story:  
A few years before Cyclone Nargis, we organized community’s common pool 
of labor contributed by young people from all households. For paddy harvest, 
each farmer hired the laborers from this collective pool. The labor charges cost 
10 baskets of rice for one week duration. When the whole season was finished, 
we could collect 200 baskets in each year. We all agreed to sell this rice and 
save money for building monastery. After five years, we came to afford a 
wooden monastery. But storm surge of around 14 feet swallowed this brand-
new building. Now we are poorer than the past. But we still want to build 
another one. (Focus group discussion, Aung Hlaing village, Zone I) 
Linkages between social capital accumulated around religious infrastructure, and 
communities’ resiliency was apparent in most areas but physical and economic capital 
also played a crucial role in sustaining the strength and capacity of structures to save 
lives. An important distinction here is that in an area with high storm surge and direct 
exposure to a waterbody, any type of structure (whether house or monastery or church) 
regardless of strength, could not withstand the storm and provide safety. Two villages 
of Zone I (Aung Hlaing village and Phonedawpyae village) showed that mass refuge 
in such shelters tragically turned to mass fatalities in the case of a powerful storm 
surge. But in many other villages, stronger shelters saved many lives and proved to be 
valuable assets for the community.  
Human agency and evacuation processes to ‘assets’ also set an example in Thama 
Seikta village of Zone II. U Hla Tin, a man of 44 at the time of Cyclone Nargis, quickly 
teamed up with his teenage son and friends to mobilize the relocation of over 30 
households from the whole village to the monastery in the first two hours of the initial 
strong winds. In this village, only two persons died although only three houses were 
left the next morning. People felt relieved at the minimal death toll compared to others. 
Here, the leading figure of this rescue effort was the informal leader. His higher wealth 
ranking in the village and his family’s status of influential wellwishers in the 
community and donors to the monastery contributed to building social capital around 
him. This convinced people to move to safer places even in the early hours of the 
storm.  
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6.2.3 Natural environment as an emergency asset 
The natural environment, in the form of mangrove forests, barrier islands or 
geographical features of relative higher ground, provided protection to some areas, in 
general the flat land of Delta. The integrity of these structures changed according to 
the socio-economic structures of villages in the context of the national regime.  
In villages located around the hilly ranges of Zone I (May Dar Ai, Zee Thaung, Dee 
Du Kone, and Kyauk Kalat villages) the death tolls were much lower. The people in 
these villages could run up the hill in the surging water and wind. This area was on the 
perimeters of the initial Cyclone landfall with the highest intensity. The conservation 
history of this hilly range is an important part of this story. Before Cyclone Nargis, 
some parts of the hill had lost their strength because of the stone extraction business 
from the hilly range over many years. For poorer local people, commercial quarrying 
of stone became one of the extra income generation activities. Later the respected 
abbot of Dee Du Kone village from the monastery next to the hill conveyed a message 
of sustainability and showed concern for community safety. Due to the abbot’s 
advocacy and the cooperation of the village, the extraction rate was dramatically 
reduced. After Cyclone Nargis such extraction was stopped and the protective value 
of the hill was mentioned in focus group discussions in this area.  
The opposite storyline of the hill is located not very far from Dee Du Kone village 
tract. The experience of Bhone Daw Pyae village is an example of how a degraded 
environment weakens community resilience. This village used to have a natural barrier 
between the sea and the village in the form of a barrier island for many years. When 
the market economy opened after the military coup of 1988, some traders from the city 
came to Bhone Daw Pyae village to buy the calcium-rich sand which was found on the 
surface of the barrier island to the village. In the context of poverty and limited income 
options, local people enjoyed the short-term economic benefit of extracting the sand 
from the barrier island. Since no regulation was there to monitor the extraction, rapid 
depletion followed and later half of the barrier island was eroded. When the Asian 
Tsunami hit the area in 2004, the big wave removed the remaining half. After losing 
the whole island, the village was totally exposed to the sea. When the storm surge in 
Cyclone Nargis reached the area, there was nothing between Bhone Daw Pyae village 
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and the open sea. The storm caused 100 per cent damage to houses and half of the 
village population, approximately one thousand, was recorded as dead. The question 
raised here is not ‘How many lives might have been saved if the barrier island still 
existed?’ Given the intensity of the storm and storm surge, not many people could have 
been saved by the island alone. But the question could be asked, ‘In what ways did the 
stronger natural protection increase the village’s resilience?’ The local people 
projected that a little more protection could have saved many more lives even if it 
could no longer be proven in the chaotic struggle in rough winds and waves.  
Moreover, in all three zones of the research, trees and mangrove forests were rarely 
described in a negative light even though some people were killed by falling trees. A 
clear reason for this sentiment towards the trees as guardians of the community was 
explained in the group discussions. When people drifted along the path of the storm 
surge, there were very few options to survive. Hugging the closest tree was one of the 
few choices.  
When coastal communities have mangrove forests around the village, these forests can 
manage to slow down the surge and reduce the speed of surface waves (McIvor et al. 
2012). Storm surge reduction research by McIvor et al. (2012) indicated that a 
kilometer-width of mangrove trees can reduce ‘5 to 50 centimeters of storm surge 
water level’. In addition, surface wind waves can be reduced ‘by more than 75%’ (p.3). 
Global experts and scientists also agree on the protection value of well-designed and 
managed coastal forest belts (Blankespoor et al. 2016). 
Several stories of gaining benefits from having mangroves around villages were stated 
in Zones I and II. In Kone Gyi village of Zone I, focus group discussion identified that 
the survival of people until the end of the storm was mainly contributed by the trees:  
In my village, six houses which could survive until the end of the storm were 
those which were protected by surrounding trees. The others even if they were 
newer ones, collapsed because they were situated in plain area without trees. It 
seems that the intensity of wind is reduced by the trees. (Daw Phwar Myint, a 
female farmer of 50, Kone Gyi village, Zone I)   
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In general, the experience shared in all group discussions, strongly confirmed that 
forests and trees are assets for safety.  
These illustrative cases show that the environment as an asset for safety highlighted 
the importance of the ecosystem-based disaster risk reduction (Eco-DRR) approach at 
the village level. According to Estrella and Saalismaa (2013), Eco-DRR refers to,  
Decision-making activities that take into consideration current and future 
human livelihood needs and bio-physical requirements of ecosystems, and 
recognize the role of ecosystems in supporting communities to prepare for and 
cope with disaster situations (Estrella and Saalismaa 2013, p.26).  
The core elements of Eco-DRR as denoted by PEDRR (2010) recognize the multiple 
functions and services provided by ecosystems, including natural hazard protection or 
mitigation. Investment in ecosystems is worthwhile as they are readily available and 
effective solutions to reduce underlying risk factors. However, the contribution of hard 
engineering for disaster risk reduction cannot be neglected either (Uy et al. 2016). ‘A 
hybrid approach combining both natural and ‘hard’ defenses’ is also possible to 
increase disaster resilience (Gupta and Nair 2012 p.13).  
The coastal embankments in Zone I and Zone III were built by the government in the 
1970s and they have not been well maintained since then. Cyclone Nargis only added 
more damage to these embankments. Experts argue that dykes can be constructed to 
protect the Delta’s low-lying land from flooding. But the function of embankments 
cannot be effective for disaster risk mitigation if they are not properly maintained and 
designed (Driel et al. 2015). In Zone III some villages such as Seik Kyi, Kyun Chaung 
and East Tawkhayan Gyi, shared about the hybrid system of protection they tried to 
maintain. Mangroves are essential in backing up the strength of embankments around 
farms: 
 If we do not have mangroves along the dyke, the dyke can easily be broken and the flood 
 would  come. (Daw Tin Hlaing, a female farm worker of 59 years from Seik Kyi village, 
Zone III) 
Even when strong natural assets exist to provide refuges, processes for safety still need 
to be mentioned as in the example of May Dar Ai village in Zone I. Focus group 
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discussion there shared the experience of a local woman who tried to help her 
neighbours who were not taking serious action in the early hours of storm or were 
losing orientation in the increasing storm intensity:  
When I was shouting ‘we should go uphill direction’, some people did not 
appreciate my warning. They responded to me like I was overreacting. Under 
the speedy wind and higher water level, some were foolish to run around the 
village instead of running up to the hill. (Zar Zar Khine, a housewife of 33, May 
Dar Ai village, Zone I)  
In such cases, it also highlighted that knowledge of how to use Eco-DRR should be 
more integrated into the daily lives of people.  
6.2.4 Lesser known assets for safety 
While running in the dark without any guidance and preparation, some readily 
available assets were a great help for safety. These items ranged from floating balls 
that were attached to fishing nets, to torches. In fishing communities, the floating balls 
cut from fishing nets helped children and women to stay afloat on the surface of the 
water and the torches showed the way to those who were running along unpredictable 
escape routes. When people huddled in houses or monasteries or churches, they were 
anxious to know what was happening and what could happen next; in that regard radio 
was also an important tool to get the news. Discussion in a few villages said that 
sometimes the worry prompted circulation of rumors, even in a small group that 
survived in a confined space. The rumors of coming big waves or no survival outside 
their place were expressed in focus group discussions as a common thing that 
demoralized survivors until daylight came. Current day availability of mobile phones 
might be helpful for such a situation in the future but even in my fieldwork days in 
2013, five years after Cyclone Nargis, there were still families who did not possess 
gadgets such as radios or proper torches.   
In Zone III of the Upper Delta, in which the lead time for evacuation was a few hours 
longer than the other two zones, many respondents wondered if they might have had 
better options to evacuate quickly if they had owned boats with more powerful engine. 
Most of the boats in the Delta during Cyclone Nargis were hand-row boats without 
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engines. Evacuation with fishing boats was the only option for some of the Delta 
residents who used the boats for daily livelihood activities such as fishing, commuting 
to farmhouses, and ferrying people in various waterways. The boats, regardless of the 
power of the engine, found it difficult to survive the high intensity of the storm. Yet 
they proved to be very useful in the early evacuation of families in all three zones of 
the research.  
6.3 Processes for safety in the cyclone emergency 
‘Disaster response’ is a more complex function than disaster mitigation, preparedness 
and recovery because ‘it is conducted during periods of very high stress, in a highly 
time-constrained environment, and with limited information’ (Coppola and Maloney 
2009, p.55). As Blaikie et al. (2014) noted, in many cases of disaster, the community 
themselves are the leaders of the response. But ‘coping’ mechanisms are defined by 
limited ‘resources’ and ‘methods of handling stress’ (p.113).  
The process of disaster response, especially in Cyclone Nargis, was characterized by 
a highly-constrained environment without institutional support from the government, 
adequate communication or organized evacuation plans. Especially in the emergency 
hours of Cyclone Nargis, it was distinctly local-owned initiatives from which 
resilience mainly came from the community’s social capital. 
In the experience of the Cyclone Nargis emergency, physical assets such as shelters 
were vital but the existence of these structures alone did not guarantee safety. 
Mobilization and evacuation to safety was revealed as a part of a social process that 
involved political capital, social capital, human capital and cultural capital. In the 
Cyclone Nargis situation, taking necessary precautionary measures by local or regional 
leaders (administrative structure) and working together with people to benefit the local 
community were considered forms of political capital.   
Exploring family or individual processes for safety in Cyclone Nargis, the roles of 
bonding and bridging capitals were easy to identify. Especially in the emergency 
(impact phase) of the cyclone’s landfall, it was the bonding social capital of inter- and 
intra-group social ties that counted the most. After losing a home, making an initial 
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decision of ‘where should we go’ was influenced by social ties with relatives and 
neighbors. In several cases, village leaders guided their community members in group 
evacuations and showed the direction to places that appeared safe. However, the 
effectiveness of such emergency response processes depended on the amount of lead 
time to communicate and coordinate effectively. Based on the contents of focus group 
discussions in the three research zones, the community processes for safety were 
defined by interactions among different kinds of capital: political, human, cultural, and 
social.  
6.3.1 Political capital for safety processes for safety 
In this category, a formal village leader is supposed to have influence in over collective 
efforts. The leaders who could give alerts and coordinate on ground processes were 
using political capital that could help the community. Discussion with current and 
former leaders from the village council of Kyein Chaung Gyi village in Zone II showed 
the role of political capital in the emergency; unfortunately, the outcome of such 
leadership had more impact in the rehabilitation phase than in the emergency hours as 
revealed in story below. Kyein Chaung Gyi village used to have 3260 people before 
Cyclone Nargis. After Cyclone Nargis, the village leader could gather only 308 people 
as most perished in the storm. At the time of the interview (January 2013), the 
population had increased to 1392: 
On 1 May 2008, we were gathering in town for a meeting and the participants 
were from all the village tract level leaders. We were informed that the cyclone 
was coming. On return to the village next morning, we decided to use loud 
speakers from three places including a monastery and two from the privately-
owned video hall where community gathered for watching TV with pay. We 
also went around the village to make sure the alarm reached all members. We 
told all to stay together with their own family members and repair the houses 
immediately within hours to ensure the storm resistance. We also instructed to 
build a shelf close to the roof top for storing our property to avoid the flood. 
We warned all the boats at the village harbor not to leave the shore within 24 
hours. We also instructed the boats sitting near the exit water way to carry 
families and friends in case the level of water was rising. As we got the news 
20 hours earlier than the landfall, we could make some preparation. However, 
the intensity of the destruction was huge and I was the only one who survived 
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from my family of seven. At 5 pm, the storm hit our village and around 7pm, 
we could barely move from one place to another. At 8 pm, our village was 
vanished. (U Thaung Shwe, former village council member, Kyein Chaung Gyi 
village Zone II).  
Although political leadership was visible in Kyein Chaung Gyi village, negative 
outcomes might be attributed to the lack of physical assets such as cyclone shelters. In 
a village with higher land and stronger physical assets, such active political leadership 
could achieve more positive outcomes. Another example is seen in Bhone Daw Pyae 
village in Zone I. For its people, safety assets of higher hills could be found just across 
the river, but the political leadership failed to give an effective warning and 
evacuations were not registered there.  
6.3.2 Human capital and cultural capital for processes for safety 
Jonjoubsong and Thammabunwarit (2016) argue that human capital can be knowledge, 
skills and the experience of humans. When formal education and media literacy 
enriches the knowledge of the people, community also becomes more informed and 
equipped to take proper action. Discussion in this section focuses on understanding 
and acting on early warnings that bordered with the impending emergency as a process 
for safety with human capital and cultural capital as some of the contributing factors. 
A story of human capital exhibits that the value of formal education and promoting 
human security in saving the life of family had in one study village. This story, stated 
below, was from the much-damaged Bhone Daw Pyae village: the name of village can 
literally be translated as a ‘place of miracle’:  
My neighbor, U Maung Maung, sent his children to the high school and college. 
They read books and they are more educated than us. They listened to the radio 
and looked at the map when the news came. So, they realized that the storm 
was coming toward us. When they were looking at the map and had a group 
consultation with family members and neighbors, we were mocking at them. 
We thought they were insane. They were the only family around the village 
who realized Thamee Hla Island announced by the radio was an island near to 
us called Lake Kyun. They could analyze coming risk and packed their stuff as 
quickly as possible. They moved to the other side of the river since the morning 
of that day. All four family members of them survived. When they moved out 
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of the village, we were still busy with our own routine jobs. If we could interpret 
the early warning as correctly as they did, we could also run. (U Khin Shwe, a 
farmer of 49, Bhone Daw Pyae village, Zone I) 
In disaster risk reduction, local knowledge that is embodied in cultural and human 
capital is grossly underutilized, although there have been proposals for hybrid 
management of risk in the last decade (Wisner 2003). The villages in the Delta have 
their own cultural construction of risk perception, which is based on knowledge gained 
from coexistence with nature. Elders in the villages of Zone I generally describe the 
learning process as the warnings are being carried to humans by other living creatures.  
People from Thaung Thar village in Zone II stated their awareness of the potential bad 
weather situation came from groups of seagulls flocking inland, passing over their 
village on the day of the storm. Seagulls flying inland were assumed to indicate 
impending bad weather. Unusual flocks of seagulls confirmed the storm news they got 
from other sources. In this case, direct observation of natural phenomena, embedded 
in the community as cultural capital, helped to confirm the news from outside in 
assisting processes for safety. Manuel-Navarrete et al. (2007) argue that a failure to 
communicate scientific knowledge effectively to a community can increase disaster 
vulnerability. Even if scientific knowledge is readily available, traditional knowledge 
can be a complement to understanding risk. In the rural society of the Ayeyarwady 
Delta, traditional knowledge has the potential to promote awareness and alert levels in 
community processes of disaster preparation. Unfortunately, inter-generational 
transfer of knowledge has been weakening due to changing values of local knowledge 
in the context of modernization. In addition to the depletion of the traditional 
knowledge body, a tragic aspect of Cyclone Nargis was the death of old people who 
were more knowledgeable about weather signs. Only in two villages of Toe and 
Thaung Thar was indigenous knowledge relating to weather and nature actively 
transferred from the elders to the new generation in a community social setting. The 
following Box 3 displays commonly found weather forecasting methods in the local 
knowledge of the three research zones. Some of these traditional ways of knowing 
signs are said to prompt alerts at the individual and family level.  
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Box 3 Common local weather reading methods in the research areas  
• Homecoming Seagull is another indicator of storm weather. If seagulls 
choose to stay near the shore, the storm could not be so serious. But if 
they came straight to the inland human residents’ areas, we can guess 
the weather be strong. If people cannot shoo them away and they are 
trying to stick to the house roofing, it means they are giving you an 
alarming storm warning. If jelly fishes are coming to the shore and 
staying in the small creeks instead of wide streams and rivers, this mean 
strong storm is approaching. (Focus group discussion, Kone Gyi village, 
Zone I)  
• In normal condition, birds, crabs and snails are weather forecasters for 
us. If snails are trying to climb to a higher ground and pole, this mean 
the flood is likely to come. They never remain stable in hours before the 
flood. We have to keep watching their movements from time to time. 
(Daw Khin Aye Kyiang, a farm worker of 55, Auk Seik village, Zone I) 
• I can read weather condition in childhood by looking at the sky. In deep 
sea, we have to read the wind direction by looking at the winking stars. 
(Tun Tun Win, a seafarer of 37 from Kyun Chaung village from Zone 
I) 
• I went to my radio and tuned it on when I heard a roar from the sea or 
little bee-eater (Merops orientalis) and Seagull are flying rushing to the 
land. They are telling us to stay alert. (U Sein Win, A farmer of 56, Toe 
village, Zone I) 
 
6.3.3 Social capital for processes for safety 
In the social capital literature, it is argued that social capital such as trust among people, 
social norms and networks can be observed and measured (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004). 
Several studies on the role of social capital in disaster preparedness and disaster 
recovery process also use collective actions as an indicator (Aldrich 2012; Nakagawa 
and Shaw 2004; Cox and Perry 2011; Hawkins and Maurer 2009). Most stories in the 
three research zones reflected the positive nature of people helping in times of need 
and distress. Even without using social capital attributes, the distinctive feature of each 
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village in the storm emergency was people helping each other to reach a safer place. 
Some link to the social capital aspects of community as shown in following story: 
On that dark night of storm, I knew that my house was not strong enough to 
stay longer. I listened to my neighbors who forcefully encourage me to join 
with him to go to another house which was two stories wooden building. When 
storm intensify, we decided to break the walls and windows of house so that the 
wind could pass through. That house withstands the storm with hundreds of 
people there. In total ten big houses, which stood stall until the cyclone had 
passed. (Focus group discussion, Lay Yin Kwin village, Zone I)  
Two aspects of social capital can be seen in the above story, one in the social network 
influencing people to move to a safer place and another in collective action (to break 
the walls and windows of the house in high wind) at the place of refuge.  
Other social capital aspects such as reciprocity are reflected in the case of the Dee Du 
Kone village tract where a self-helping disabled group was founded after finding 
difficulties during emergency and relief. In an interview with founding members of 
this group, it was discovered that even in the emergency hours of Cyclone Nargis, 
some of them were able to extend assistance to other community members as well as 
their fellow disabled people.  
When the storm passed, the first thing people attempted was self-organized search and 
rescue for missing people. In this moment, most people went out in search of missing 
relatives or community members. Social processes and social capital continued to 
function as local people tried to seek outside help. Group activities were mobilized in 
the village for cleaning and the construction of temporary shelters. They also helped 
in finding food for collective kitchens or food provision was managed in temporary 
shelters such as monasteries or churches. The survivors also managed the burial of 
dead bodies. This turned out to be the most difficult work for the community with few 
survivors and many fatalities.  
The role of bridging and linking social capital turned out to be more important in cases 
in which the whole village disappeared (Western Yay Kyaw Gyi, Aung Hlaing, Bhone 
Daw Pyae, Nant Thar Kone, Lay Yin Kwin, Khar Gyin Kyun, Thanyet Thone Bin). A 
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case like this stands out in Khar Gyin Kyun village as its reconstruction was primarily 
contributed to by bridging social capital.  
During the storm, we were all displaced. In our village of around 150 people, 
70 per cent of the people died on that night. While the rest were having shortage 
of food in the following days, my big brother who lived in the upstream village 
came to pick up over fifty people with two motor boats. He accommodated all 
of us in his compound and provided food for twenty days as he still had rice in 
private storage. Then he motivated us to rebuild the village back with all 
remaining energy. He contributed a lot for reconstruction too. (U Tun Shwe, a 
village leader of 52 from focus group discussion of Khar Gyin Kyun village, 
Zone II)  
6.4 Discussion on assets and processes during the cyclone 
emergency 
At Cyclone Nargis’s landfall, the Delta communities found themselves in a struggle in 
the absence of proper communication channels, evacuation assistance from the State, 
and limited assets for safety. At this moment, a process of evacuation to presumably 
safer assets was facilitated by the available physical, social, political, cultural and 
human capital. There are several previous studies on disaster with a focus on factors 
of vulnerabilities rooted in geographic location, dwelling and socio-economic 
characteristics of the community (Bates and Peacock 1987; Hewitt 1998; Quarantelli 
1987; Quarantelli 1995). Anderson (1995) also classified causes of vulnerability into 
three categories: (1) nature as a cause of vulnerability, (2) cost as a cause of 
vulnerability, and (3) humans as a cause of vulnerability. In this part of study, causes 
of vulnerability are discussed from a ‘limiting factor’ perspective and the five limiting 
factors of ‘assets and processes’ in the cyclone emergency are identified. These 
limiting factors significantly and repeatedly appear as the most common findings in 
all villages but mostly in different degree from one research zone to another.  Village 
level resilience is largely undermined when these following factors are present and 
mutually reinforcing: (1) economic wellbeing of the community, (2) lack of strong 
political leadership, (3) exclusion of gender and marginal groups, (4) top-down 
approach to disaster risk management, and (5) lack of social learning from the past and 
the present. 
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6.4.1 Poverty as a limiting factor 
In the experience of all three research zones, having disaster-resilient buildings was 
strongly linked to chances of survival except in the cases of the highest intensity of the 
storm surge with direct exposure to a water body without any natural or vegetation 
buffers. Nevertheless, the presence of strong houses was the exception rather than a 
general pattern in most places, especially in Zone II and Zone I. Reflecting the 
prevalence of poverty in the region, the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) 
reported that 50 per cent of housing in the affected area was built of a wood and 
bamboo mixture. Only 35 per cent were all-wooden and 15 per cent were brick or 
concrete (TCG 2008a, p.13). Figure 14 shows the scale of house destruction in eight 
affected townships. The respective destruction levels of all three research areas have 
already been stated at the beginning of this chapter. Nearly all bamboo structures were 
blown away by the wind and water when the storm crossed their area or near their area. 
In community narratives, self-evacuation and displacement were the dominant theme. 
 
Figure 14 Number of houses collapsed or damaged in eight affected townships 
Source: TCG (2008a) 
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Anderson (1995) argues that vulnerability can be reduced with the help of technology, 
but affordability dictates community security. Technical options are available to build 
resilient housing in the Delta but the high cost does matter to impoverished 
communities with day-to-day struggles for basic needs. In all three research zones, 
landless casual workers compose more than 60 per cent of the population. Their daily 
income ranges from 1000 to 3000 Kyat (approximately 0.8˗2.5 USD) per day but food 
consumption on average absorbs more than 90 per cent of earnings. In these 
circumstances (let alone a strong house) having small gadgets such as torches is not 
even an option although people know that they are useful in the dark night of 
emergencies. Cyclone shelters are an essential part of disaster preparedness in the 
research areas but are still very limited in terms of number and size. Furthermore, 
almost a decade later, the cyclone shelters that were built after 2008 are standing there 
with communities that rarely can afford proper maintenance. Also, with the current 
cyclone shelter coverage, convenient access by a scattered population of big, medium 
and small villages located in intricate water-ways is not easy in storm emergencies. In 
this context, poverty reduction or rural development can help to enhance villages’ 
disaster resilience. Potentially, when the economy is improved, overall wellbeing 
might lead to more resilient community processes which could include establishing 
locally appropriate assets such as stronger buildings in community settings or proper 
maintenance and access to existing cyclone shelters if they are nearby.  
6.4.2 Lack of political leadership as a limiting factor 
Alam and Collins (2010) use the phrase ‘localized vulnerability’ as a reference to 
underlying causes of vulnerability that weaken the capacity of local people to negotiate 
hazards and rights and freedoms in response to disasters. One main feature of 
vulnerability in the specific context of Myanmar or the Ayeyarwady Delta in Cyclone 
Nargis was a missing link between the community and political leadership in the pre-
impact, impact and post-impact phases of the cyclone. There were some initiatives 
from local administrative structures to help communities in a few places, but that was 
more ad hoc action than a coordinated effort with pre-planning and clear procedures. 
It was difficult to see effective evacuation without pre-planning with guiding 
principles on where to move and how to decide collectively for safety, let alone 
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consideration to protect public assets and the environment for the safety of the 
community.  
In all villages that took part in this study, there were no guided rescue or search 
activities at the time of the storm. The Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and 
Resettlement is a key DRR policy-implementing body (Mizzima 2015a) but 
unfortunately was not authorized to conduct rescue and search during the emergency 
phase. The Relief and Resettlement Department at that time could not do much for 
disaster management; later it was involved in relief efforts though. In terms of 
institutional strength, it also did not have township-level departments. The size and 
strength was also relatively smaller than other departments under the same ministry 
(Mizzima 2015b). Only the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is authorized to conduct 
search and rescue functions if the country is hit by a disaster. The Fire Brigade and 
Police Force, under the MHA, are responsible for going to communities to give help. 
In the best scenario, the MHA must cooperate and coordinate with other government 
bodies, including the Army and General Administration Department (GA). For the 
Relief and Resettlement Department, its role was to request assistance from the GA 
and the Ministry of Home Affairs as a liaison on behalf of affected communities 
(Mizzima 2015a). In a devastating situation, such as Cyclone Nargis, when the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and township-level GAs or their affiliated bodies were not 
known or there was no preparation for conducting any rescue and search activities, the 
villagers were left to struggle themselves to search for missing relatives.  
In terms of resource allocation under the military rule of 1988˗2010, the Delta was 
among the regions underserved by development policies (Driel et al. 2015). As case 
studies in this chapter have exemplified, multiple dimensions of vulnerability were 
manifested in the villages. The communities were left to cope with the risks with 
whatever means available.  
Nevertheless, local initiatives and community processes exist even under difficult 
circumstances. An example is a local initiative by Dee Du Kone village of Zone I, 
which led the relief efforts for the surrounding area after Cyclone Nargis. The abbot 
of the village monastery tried to get permission from the administration to run an 
evacuation drill as a practice for disaster preparedness. It was 2009, one year after 
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Cyclone Nargis and politically still restricted in Myanmar. It was a community 
exercise involving a few villages around the monastery but it was not easy to get 
permission to carry it out in the context of military rulers suspicious of mass 
mobilization. Yet, the authority granted a permit and it turned out to be a success story. 
Given the current context of political transition and greater engagement with the global 
community, if this could happen then, it also can happen now in a more effective way 
with multi-level participation of the people, the state and other disaster risk reduction 
institutions.  
6.4.3 The missing link to gender in DRR and marginality as a limiting 
factor 
In PONJA, it was reported that the storm left a disproportionately high female death 
toll. The majority of those dead, 61 per cent, were female (TCG 2008a, p.155). During 
fieldwork interviews for this research, discussions often highlighted the role of women 
as primary caregivers to children and elderly family members. Traditional gender roles 
appeared strong even in the emergency setting as men were expected to go out and 
engage while women were supposed to take care of children and the elderly. For 
women who were not physically as strong as men or as skillful in surging water, 
swimming was difficult even if they knew how to swim. People who died in water 
were those who could not swim or who did not find something to hold on to stay afloat 
above water. Women with children were vulnerable especially when they were 
carrying infants. A Karen woman from Nant Thar Kone village of Zone I shared her 
views on the struggle of mothers: 
I was not a mother of any child. So, I survived. If I had children, I might not be 
here now speaking to you. Those who died in this village were mothers with 
young children. (Nant Thar Kone village, Zone I) 
Ochola et al. (2010) claim that ‘gender determines what is expected, allowed and 
valued in a woman or a man in a given context. It determines opportunities, 
responsibilities and resources, as well as powers associated with being male and 
female’ (p.215). From a gender perspective and from a traditional way of life in a rural 
society, it was the women who needed to take a bigger role in taking care of children 
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than men. In normal circumstances, it could be a less debatable aspect of division of 
labor between men and women, but in a time of emergency this situation clearly 
dragged down many women to a more vulnerable position. The following case is a 
story of a 37 years old housewife from Bhone Daw Pyae village of Zone I. When 
Cyclone Nargis struck, she was looking after her elderly mother and two young 
children in her house, which was merely a bamboo hut beside the river. Out of the 
whole family, only she and her husband survived. Seemingly a story of equal struggle 
for both men and women, it still reveals the gender pattern of assigned roles in the 
emergency and the emotional burden faced by the woman in this story:  
My husband is a seafarer. He is skillful at sea. When the tide got higher, we 
decided to evacuate quickly from our place. I was shocked and did not know 
how to take care of my two young children and my old mother at the same time 
in the boat. What I could rely was only the floating balls cut from our fishing 
net. We women and children tied the balls to our bodies. When we crossed the 
water, the balls were not strong enough to protect us. All family members were 
scattered all over the place by a strong blow of water. When I spot my mother 
in last minute was when the water dragged her away with a high speed. I lost 
my consciousness not knowing how long. Later I found myself clinging on a 
wooden altar floating over water without children. (Ma Yin Yin Htwe, a house-
wife of 37, Bhone Daw Pyae village Zone I) 
Stories of women from the focus group discussions indicated several issues relating to 
women’s vulnerability. It was stated that women’s mobility was also hampered to 
some degree by the traditional costume and long hair. In many parts of rural society, 
women with long hair are regarded as traditionally more decent although it is an 
individual choice to maintain a preferred length. For some women, traditional dress 
hampered their mobility. Like Bangladeshi women’s experience with saree in the 
storm (Alam and Collins 2010), Myanmar traditional dress Htamein or Longyi were 
believed by some to restrict body movement in the water while others stated that they 
were easy to remove. The gender aspect of good lead time in evacuation needs to be 
stressed here as movement with children and the elderly’s needs should be taken into 
consideration in advance.   
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Issues relating to marginality were also found in focus group discussions as the villages 
selected for this research were mostly at the edge of the Delta and marginal in terms 
of infrastructure development and resource allocation from the state. The 
consequences of marginality weakened community resilience and their ability to 
survive and thrive. An example was the inadequate allocation of schools for several 
villages in Zone II. As the villages inside the Kadon Kani Reserved Forest were not 
recognized as legal settlements in government records, the children from these villages 
did not have access to formal school and health care service allocation. Marginality 
within marginality was identified in villages of Zone III. One fishing community, 
located along the river near Toe village tract lost homes for 19 households. As they 
were not part of any village around and were assumed to be migrating people, this 
community had difficulty in staying safe. Even without active discrimination, social 
facilitation to help these people was hard to materialize in the wider network of villages 
in which they tried to seek refuge.  
6.4.4 Top-down approach as a limiting factor 
Two focus group discussions in Zone I and II showed that there were cases of 
confusion in the evacuation due to military orders coming from the security forces. In 
the context of military rule, orders coming from the power hierarchy were often 
associated with pressures on the community. Usually, the command structure imposed 
rules over the people rather than engaging with them. Cases from villages in Zone I 
and Zone II stated that using military units in a disaster emergency without proper 
training and understanding in community processes was hardly helpful for the 
community. Military-style orders given to civilians to leave home and undertake quick 
evacuation were perceived as a usual pattern of domination and did not prompt a 
desirable action in a village from Zone I and another in Zone II, while the Zone I case 
even led to a conflict between the army unit and the villagers. While local people 
frequently complained about lack of leadership from authorities in the early warning 
and evacuation, most community narratives in this research showed that what they 
expected was inputs and coordination to enhance their capacity rather than commands 
from a higher-up authority.  
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6.4.5 Lack of social learning as limiting factor 
The following Figure 15 shows a roadside memorial for the loss and damage of 
Western Yay Kyaw Gyi village from research Zone II. A UNDP project supported the 
stone monument which inscribed with the following data:  
Damage from Cyclone Nargis in Yay Kyaw Gyi village, death 85 per cent, 
house damage 100 per cent, public building damage, 100 per cent, household 
livestock damage 100 per cent, livelihood tools loss 90 per cent, loss of 
livelihood activities 90 per cent. The loss of the past carried the lessons to learn 
and to prepare for our future and sustainability.  
Social learning here refers to ‘a process of collective and communicative learning, 
which may lead to a number of social outcomes’ (Muro and Jeffrey 2008, p. 330). 
UNDP-sponsored memorials in these villages are intended to facilitate learning in the 
community for disaster preparedness. This kind of memorial exists in some villages of 
Zone II but is not present in the other two zones. These memorials provide inputs for 
collective memory and social learning with the object being community preparedness. 
 
Figure 15 Cyclone Nargis memorial at Yay Kyaw Gyi village of Zone II 
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The world was reminded of the Bangladesh cyclone of 1971 to make a large 
improvement in the early warning system in the 1970s onwards. Then serious attention 
was given to community disaster preparedness by the international community after 
the Kobe earthquake of 1995. And a rethinking of land use planning became a 
necessity after the Asian Tsunami of 2004. O’Brien et al. (2010, p.499) generated the 
following question, ‘Does it have to be a big event to learn better disaster planning?’  
A similar question is needed in the context of Cyclone Nargis. All three zones had the 
experience of small and medium scale disasters in the years before Cyclone Nargis. 
Especially, Zone I had been prone to storms and tsunami wave more than the other 
two areas. It is true that the intensity of Cyclone Nargis in terms of the storm surge 
was incomparable to any other disaster experience. But that the lack of experience led 
to a lack of awareness of the risk is not a totally valid point. It is saying that past 
experience did not lead to learning and preparation. In the case of Bhone Daw Pyae 
and Aung Hlaing villages of Zone I, both suffered from the Tsunami of 2004, the Mala 
cyclone of 2006 and a huge loss of life again in Cyclone Nargis. There are records that 
these two villages received international assistance after the Tsunami in 2004, which 
was known to be an exceptional case of outside organizational involvement in 
reconstruction under the strict rule of the military regime. International organizations 
including UNICEF (UNICEF 2009), FAO (FAO 2006), Oxfam and their partners 
including the local NGO Metta, were there for relief and rehabilitation in coordination 
with the Myanmar government (WFP 2005; OXFAM 2006). Despite reconstruction 
aid, risk reduction and preparedness was not effectively constituted after previous 
experience of hazards.  
In the years leading to Cyclone Nargis, adaptation and disaster risk reduction were 
high in the national agenda of many countries in the region, in the context of global 
climate change. Myanmar should have learned either from inside the country or 
international experience such as from the next-door neighbor Bangladesh. But failure 
of learning was echoed and in all three zones of research there was frequent utterance 
of ‘never heard of storm surge before’, ‘never experienced before’.  
After Cyclone Nargis, the Department of Meteorology identified reasons for the high 
death toll as: (1) very low-lying nature of the Delta (2) population density of the Delta 
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(3) complex tributaries of the river system with seven major river mouths (4) no storm 
shelters and little higher ground (5) no hazard maps and risk assessment for the region 
(6) poor mobility, mostly people using small boats to move along in water ways (7) 
powerful wind-induced waves, plus the natural cycle of high tide and shallow 
continental shelf off the coast to create a high storm surge (8) depletion of mangrove 
trees and vegetation buffer (DFID 2009).  
The above arguments concerning the vulnerability of the Delta, mostly drawn from 
fixed geographical aspects, could be incorporated into the learning process of the Delta 
society. Even before Cyclone Nargis, the Delta experienced smaller levels of 
devastation from previous cyclones. The storm surge of Cyclone Mala in 2006 reached 
4.57 meters at the highest level, while Cyclone Nargis’s storm surge reached a 
maximum of 7.02 meters (WMO 2009; Lwin 2015).  
Awareness and preparedness issues will be crucial for building resilience to future 
hazards in the Ayeyarwady Delta. The nexus between social learning, development 
and resilience is discussed by O’Brien et al. (2010) as follows: 
Resilience building is needed in pre-disaster planning within a context of 
sustainable development to develop the social and institutional capacity to 
respond to produced unknowns. Resilience is argued as process that aims to 
reduce harm, both now and in the future. The focus of resilience is on wellbeing. 
Resilience building is a learning process at all levels. (O’Brien et al. 2010, 
p.506) 
So far in all three zones, social learning initiatives are limited especially for the 
children who were born after Cyclone Nargis. In a preliminary trip for research in Zone 
II, the research observed that social learning issues could be a dilemma for the 
community. On the one hand, the adults wanted to forget painful memories of the 
cyclone. On the other hand, they still recognized that they needed to transmit their 
knowledge and experience the younger generation with the aim of better preparedness. 
Collective efforts at the community level to overcome such a dilemma were also 
observed in a few villages of Zone I, during the field visit.  
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed the characteristics of the emergency response of 
communities in the ‘impact’ phase of Cyclone Nargis. Survival chances of the 
community were defined by the assets that could provide safety and the processes that 
could facilitate a community to reach a safe place and survive in it. Stronger private 
homes, higher ground or robust public building such as schools, monasteries or 
churches were assets perceived to be safe places. These processes were often mixed 
with spontaneous struggles to locate shelter while moving with uncertainty and coming 
together with a group under the storm and alone after losing sight of family and friends.  
Levels of structural vulnerability were exhibited in the form of poor or inadequate 
structural assets and natural protection. Chaotic processes of evacuation in the absence 
of preparedness often took lives. Community security would have been possible only 
if, multidimensional capital and strong structural assets such as cyclone shelters, 
schools, churches or monasteries existed. In the context of learning from Cyclone 
Nargis, the importance of community-based disaster risk reduction activities was 
highlighted. Human capital and economic capital need to be strengthened with 
community-centered development, which potentially could provide more viable 
physical structures and well-informed communities. The social learning of experience 
during Cyclone Nargis was also crucial to enhancing resilience and should be 
considered for long-term safety.   
 In summary, Cyclone Nargis provided two frames of reference from the storm 
emergency: ‘Did the village communities have assets for safety?’ And ‘Were the local 
community ready to proceed to safety with a form of evacuation and collective 
preparation to survive in the storm emergency?’ 
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Chapter 7 
The dynamics of recovery 
7 Introduction 
Recovery is a multistage process through which people and organizations move at 
varying rates (Phillips 2016, p.25). It is a common approach to divide recovery in to 
‘short term’ and ‘long term’ phases. Short-term recovery is defined as efforts to return 
‘vital life support systems to minimum operating standards’ (NGA 1979, p. 13). 
Although short-term and long-term overlap to some degree, long-term recovery refers 
to activities with the purpose of ‘returning life to normal or improved levels’ (NGA 
1979, p.13). Recovery can also be looked at in terms of physical and social dimensions 
(FEMA 2011).  
The first part of this chapter tries to situate the Cyclone Nargis recovery process in the 
political context of Myanmar since the recovery process coincided with a time of 
political transition which started around the 2008 constitutional referendum. The 
second part of the chapter analyzes recovery outcomes by using profiles of each 
research region and a small village sample selected from each research zone. In the 
third part, recovery is discussed from the ‘process’ aspects within and beyond the 
affected communities with a follow-up section on recovery outcomes. Similar to the 
emergency phase, recovery outcomes are also illustrated with overall concern for the 
communities regarding safety, sustainability and capabilities aspects in having 
resilient community processes and locally relevant physical assets. Although my 
research scope does not cover measuring households’ level of recovery, the overall 
analysis of human security of the village in the recovery context is explained 
representing views from the individual people and households who participated in 
focus group discussions.   
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7.1 Situating disaster recovery in the political transition of 
Myanmar 
After Cyclone Nargis, several high-profile visits, including the UN Secretary 
General’s trip, were made to persuade the military government to accommodate the 
international aid efforts. The Tripartite Core Group, was comprised of ASEAN, the 
Myanmar government and the UN with humanitarian and development communities, 
was also formed as a diplomatic breakthrough (Amador 2009). The TCG led the relief, 
rehabilitation and recovery works for two years until 2010. The TCG and ASEAN-led 
mechanism ended in July 2010, and media reports at that time alleged that the 
Myanmar government was cutting cooperation with the international community 
before the planned election in 2010 (Jagan 2010). For whatever reason, it is true that 
the Myanmar government decided not to extend the mandate of the TCG beyond July 
2010 (IRIN 2010). In terminating the TCG, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General 
of ASEAN for Post-Nargis Recovery in Myanmar referred back to the Myanmar 
government for recovery: ‘As we move into a longer-term recovery process, it is time 
for the Myanmar Government to take full charge over the process’ (Marr 2010, p.83). 
The Social Impact Monitoring Report III observed that, ‘The steady decline in aid 
provision since the cyclone has been accompanied by a significant change in the 
priorities of aid providers’ (TCG 2010, p.7). A report called ‘Another Nargis strikes 
every day: Post-Nargis social impacts monitoring five years on’ was published during 
the final round of assessment for the Nargis-affected area in 2014. In this report, co-
sponsored by GFDRR and World Bank (GFDRR 2014), the recovery is assessed as 
follows: 
In most post-disaster situations, the aid provided is insufficient to meet 
everyone’s needs, and Myanmar proved to be no exception. The largest portion 
of post-Nargis aid was provided within the first year of the cyclone, even though 
the Tripartite Core Group remained in place for another year. Four years would 
pass after Nargis before political developments allowed for a deeper 
engagement of the international community. The Ayeyarwady Region and the 
Delta area have never been among the poorest areas of Myanmar, and 
development assistance after the political opening in 2012 focused on other 
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parts of the country. Aid to the Delta was no longer seen in a post-disaster 
context, even though the socioeconomic situation in highly affected areas in the 
Delta would still justify targeted recovery assistance. (p. 68) 
Cyclone Nargis caused destruction of wealth even for those who could generate wealth 
before Cyclone Nargis. In the very first trip to Myanmar in 2009, Nobel Prize winner 
in Economic Sciences, Joseph Stiglitz reminded that, disaster impact can be even more 
cruel to those owning no wealth. To examine the long-term impact of Cyclone Nargis 
and the evolving changes of socioeconomic life across the time, a master plan was laid 
down by TCG to conduct a regular monitoring since 2008. The four rounds of periodic 
reviews and social impact monitoring reports illustrated how aid response can be best 
help to the Delta population (GFDRR 2014). All these reports discussed not only how 
the villages regain their capacity to resist the subsequent shocks but also the attributing 
factors that slow down the process of recovery. Especially the latest Social Impact 
Monitoring Report (SIM4) reflects on their experiences over the five years that marked 
a rapidly changing political environment. As agriculture is the mainstay of the Delta’s 
economy, the post Nargis periodic review I summarized experience of agricultural 
sector in the first year of the post-Nargis recovery in December 2008 as,  
The sheer number of people killed has dramatically reduced the labor force. 
The storm surge salinated, washed away or flooded large tracts of land. 
Animals, crops, trees and the equipment needed for fishing and farming were 
lost. Without the capacity to produce their own food or income, communities 
will remain aid-dependent. (TCG 2008c, p. 46)  
Loss and damages also led to the rising number of casual landless workers in the 
subsequent years. It was not easy for the Delta people to see sooner recovery as most 
of the livelihoods pattern are closely connected to nature. For a period of five years 
between, 2008-2013, production in both farming and fishing did not meet the pre-
Nargis level (TCG 2008d, TCG 2008c, GFDRR 2014). In 2008, SIM 1 (TCG 2008d) 
reported:  
Reductions in harvests have increased the debt burden of farmers, who have been 
unable to repay old loans and have had to borrow to meet their consumption needs. 
Fishing has also been severely affected. Fishermen are struggling to recover. This 
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has affected those at every point in the value chain. Reduced catches and a lack of 
fishing boats and nets mean fishermen have been unable to repay their debts. (p.ix) 
Productivity loss also contributed large a scale to joblessness, job instability and 
outgoing migration. It has not changed much until the SIM 4 was completed after five 
years of Cyclone Nargis. In SIM III which was conducted in March and April of 2010 
summarized the state of the Delta as,  
There were signs of a recovery in the farming sector though output in the majority 
of villages was still over 30 per cent below pre-Cyclone Nargis levels. The 
situation of fishermen deteriorated significantly over the year preceding the study 
due to a decline in fish stock and a lack of credit and livelihood support. Debt 
continued to undermine the prospects for recovery, with the poorer groups (small 
farmers, fishermen, and labourers) carrying the greatest debt burden. (TCG 2010, 
p.6) 
SIM IV which revisited the cyclone affected areas in April and March of 2013 states 
that, 
Five years after Nargis Delta, villages still found themselves in a dire economic 
situation. This situation cannot be attributed to the cyclone alone, as multiple other 
factors influenced the path to recovery, such as climatic variability, crab and rat 
infestations, and flooding. Highly affected villages were significantly more 
exposed to these events because of Nargis’s follow-on effects (p.8).  
In this situation, threats to human security persists in many forms. Stiglitz (2014) 
argues that ‘human Society that cannot install good shock absorbers are likely to live 
with downward spirals’. In these downward spirals, it is not implied that every village 
or every township are living in the same speed of recovery. As SIM IV notes that aid 
delivery that was made with participation of formal leadership enhance aid 
effectiveness and it ‘shaped a village’s path to the long-term recovery.  
After the TCG’s termination and the 2010 election, a semi-civilian government came 
into power. The new government was led by former Prime Minister U Thein Sein. 
Relating to Nargis, U Thein Sein was given credit for opening the door for foreign aid 
during the tense stand-off between the military government and the international 
community after Cyclone Nargis (Fuller 2012). Under the new government, several 
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measures of disaster risk reduction were introduced. The draft of the Natural Disaster 
Management Law was approved by the Parliament in 2013. In the drafting process, 
the Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group (DRRWG) was composed of various 
local and international humanitarian actors that were engaged in the recovery phase of 
Cyclone Nargis and they played a vital role. The Law was later followed by the disaster 
management rules endorsed by the government in 2015. The Law recognized that DRR 
elements should be integrated into national development programs and DRR should 
include both ‘short and long-term measures to mitigate the effects of natural disasters’ 
(MCCR 2013, p.41).  
Regardless of these DRR measures and activities in general, the priorities of the 
national government and humanitarian and development community were shifted to 
other areas in the context of more freedom and space to engage. Alesch (2005) 
describes recovery as a process in which people ‘struggle to achieve viability in the 
newly-emerging environment within which they exist’ (p.3). In the recovery process 
after Cyclone Nargis, the Delta communities faced multiple layers of changes 
happening within their own community, their region and also in the national polity.  
After Cyclone Nargis, changes in their community had occurred, starting with clearing 
dead bodies and cleaning debris piled in the villages, and they later moved to self-
mobilization for relief and recovery. With the arrival of relief and reconstruction 
resources and political, humanitarian, developmental and civil society actors from 
outside, the community witnessed changes in terms of networking and outreach. The 
national political regime gradually moved in the direction of expanding engagement 
with the international community in the context of disaster risk reduction. Changes in 
the political regime also impacted the community, this time in a positive way with 
some space for the community to be able to engage in decision making that had impact 
on their own affairs. Even though it has not been happening uniformly in the context 
of the selected communities of the Cyclone Nargis-affected areas, the benefits from 
changes depend much on local leadership and outside actors who have sensitivity 
regarding local participation.  
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The political context before Cyclone Nargis had negative impacts to the delta 
community’s resilience and human security as shown in Chapter 4 of this thesis. If 
disaster recovery is narrowly defined as ‘bouncing back’ to its pre-disaster level of 
conditions in society (Wildavsky 1991), this was not desirable for most of the affected 
communities in the Delta. In this regard, the current political change with enhanced 
local rights and freedom was welcome as a contribution to the recovery process in the 
Delta. The new administrative structure was designed to accommodate more local 
participation in governance. Humanitarian space was gradually expanded after 
Cyclone Nargis and the new environment in national politics with accompanying 
structural changes at the local level contributed to the long-term benefit of Myanmar, 
including in the Delta community.  
The political change had shown low priority for disaster recovery in the affected region 
but national development is assumed to have a trickle-down effect on regions. In this 
regard, a question can be raised, ‘Were the short term or medium term needs of the 
Delta fulfilled in the recovery process, so that it could sustain resilience and reduce 
vulnerability?’ If this is not the case, if natural hazard devastates the region again, the 
expected developmental benefit of the political transition could result in loss for village 
communities. As shown in an earlier chapter of this research, much of the 
responsibility for pre-existing vulnerability, early warning and emergency response to 
the disaster of Cyclone Nargis falls onto the military regime. At present and in the 
future, the political implications of resiliency and vulnerability to a community should 
be verified in advance so that it will be possible to avert the worst-case scenario.   
Analysis in this chapter about the recovery phase focuses on the political transition 
context. The community ‘assets’ and ‘process’ are accounted for in both short-term 
and long-term recovery processes and how they are influenced by the factors of 
political change.  
7.2 Process and outcomes framework for the recovery  
Dacy and Kunreuther (1969) claim, ‘it just seems reasonable to assume that the speed 
of recovery following a disaster will be determined primarily by the magnitude of the 
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physical damage’ (p.72). Disaster management is generally described as a cycle that 
includes preparedness, response, relief and recovery but the focus is normally on 
response although it is usually described in equal parts for all four phases (O’Brien et 
al. 2010). The situation in the Cyclone Nargis recovery reflects these two statements 
as while the scale of devastation was huge, most attention was on the initial phase of 
the disaster response. Also, poverty in the Delta needs to be highlighted as 32 per cent 
of the whole population from the Ayeyarwady Region has been living under poverty 
line while the national average ratio has only been 26 per cent (UNDP 2015). In this 
regard disaster recovery can be analyzed by looking at the ‘assets’ for capabilities in a 
community as these assets contribute the recovery outcome. The recovery ‘process’ 
also needs verification for its attribution of resiliency of community in the form of 
social cohesion, positive interaction and empowerment via participation.  
In this context, disaster recovery after Cyclone Nargis is explored from the recovery 
‘process’ and ‘outcome’ framework as shown in Figure 16. This framework is 
informed by physical and social dimensions.  
 
Figure 16 Dynamics of recovery: Outcomes of recovery corresponding to the 
community’s concern 
The physical dimension is referred to as community assets such as shelter and 
infrastructure while the social dimension is attributed to community processes such as 
participation and interaction. This study does not measure disaster recovery as a 
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success or failure; rather it looks for dynamics in processes with positive or negative 
outcomes. 
7.3 Descriptive account of recovery outcomes in Zones I, II and III 
In this part of the chapter, the recovery dynamics of the three research areas are 
presented with an emphasis on the profile of the smallest village in each research zone. 
These villages are purposefully selected to explore observable interactions, initiatives 
and conflicts of the recovery process. In each of the three villages, Cyclone Nargis 
destroyed all physical assets and there was a huge loss of life in terms of village scale. 
Basically, these villages were empty-handed in the aftermath of the Cyclone’s landfall. 
The first village, Aung Hlaing from Zone I, and the second, Western Yay Kyaw Gyi 
village from Zone II, are on the edge of the Delta in its southern part. The third village 
is in Zone III and is Thayet Thone Bin, which is in the Yangon Region and closer to 
the city. The contextual analysis of the three zones and a zoom-in picture of the three 
villages will highlight how pre-Nargis socio-economic factors contributed to the 
different dynamics and outcomes of recovery in line with the prevailing geographical 
marginality status of each region. The research areas and village cases are presented 
starting from Zone III, over which the cyclone path crossed last only after the other 
two zones had experienced it. Nevertheless, it was the place where the international 
and national aid agencies could reach the easiest as it is the closest place to Yangon 
where most of the relief and rehabilitation functions started. Taking the geographical 
advantage of Zone III in consideration, comparison for recovery phase started from 
Zone III.  
7.3.1 Research Zone III 
Among the three research zones, the villages from Zone III are economically stronger 
in general. Due to their proximity to towns and urban areas with easier transport to 
markets, relatively more livelihood opportunities were observed. Six of the selected 
villages from Zone III had access to the main grid of electricity right after Cyclone 
Nargis. In the other villages, household-scale solar power in the villages has been a 
recent development that indicates energy access has improved in the post-Nargis years. 
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The relative aid sufficiency in the post-Nargis period has helped many households 
rebuild and maintain good houses. Better transportation means frequent visits from top 
government officials and the ongoing presence of aid organizations in this area. 
Moreover, human resources are also more concentrated here than in the other two 
zones. Interviews and discussions conducted in this region reflected the impact of aid 
and the recovery process generally in positive terms. 
The village is much upgraded now. Even people who used to live in the hut got 
bigger houses. The aid from the organizations were helpful in this village. (Le’ 
Le’ Hlaing, 19 years old female student, Thayet Thone Bin village) 
Even so, inequality still exists within individual villages and among villages as this 
area has quite a high number of orphans and old people who survived while their 
working-aged children and parents died on farms during Cyclone Nargis. They are still 
struggling in the recovery phase. Many farmers are still debt ridden and fit in to the 
difficult situation of agricultural sector across the country (Cho et al. 2013). The 
embankment dykes in this area were constructed during the short-term recovery phase 
in several villages of Zone III but there are still reports of widespread sea water 
intrusion that causes low yields on rice farms. These complaints were more serious in 
Tawkhayan Gyi, Kyun Chaung, Taw Ku, Thayet Thone Bin, Pay Kone, Thone Gwa 
and Sar Gyin villages. Farming women in Seik Kyi village of this zone said the decline 
in yield in the post-Nargis year due to the high intrusion of salt water had compounded 
the debt burden to make their lives difficult in spite of the recovery aid that has 
improved their houses.   
The community resilience aspect of recovery is reflected in the improved structure of 
religious spaces such as monasteries and public buildings such as schools and clinics. 
This happens due to a large flow of resources from aid agencies and collective efforts 
made by local households with higher level of economic wellbeing. As a religious and 
cultural space, the monastery was extended to offer space for civil society and to 
development activities of the community as well. In the years after Cyclone Nargis, 
the monasteries in this area usually provided space for local civil society organizations 
(CSOs) to safely distribute aid and later encouraged their expansion to implement other 
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development activities. In general, space in the monastery could be utilized not only 
as an emergency refuge in Cyclone Nargis but also for assistance in the further 
development of CSOs.  
In general, better housing with improved strength met the safety concerns of the 
community and even less well-off families stated in interviews that they had 
confidence in the improvement of monasteries as shelter in future scenarios involving 
storms. Residents of any villages in this research zone can reach a stronger shelter such 
as monastery or school within 15 to 30 minutes. But safety is not fully guaranteed in 
communities, since many people work in the rice fields and stay at farm houses that 
are usually far from villages. Effective early warning was essential even in Zone III, 
which represents the most positively evaluated recovery out of all three areas. The 
recovery experience and outcomes in this zone highlight the fact that while material 
recovery can strengthen the community, a DRR system such as early warning and 
action for preparedness must be integrated into the daily lives of the villagers to build 
resiliency in the community.    
During the recovery process, what might be referred to as ‘linking social capital’ has 
certainly helped the villages in Zone III, with official connections and easier access 
from private donors. Many of the Yangon-based NGOs quickly tried to channel 
resources to this zone for a quick recovery. As a consequence, some villages like Seik 
Kyi and Thayet Thone Bin from this region even became showcases of recovery in the 
military regime’s television programs. Dynamics of recovery in Thayet Thone Bin 
village are shown in Box 4. This research zone is quite a contrast to the villages in 
Zone I and Zone II in terms of getting attention from the national authorities. The 
geographical configuration of aid inequality was evident when it was compared to the 
general wellbeing of other research zones in terms of basic infrastructure 
improvement. 
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Box 4 Case study from Zone III 
Thayet Thone Bin village of Zone III 
Village fact          Quantity/Type  
Current population      120 
Death toll in Cyclone Nargis    80 
Total houses/structures vanished in Cyclone Nargis 100 per cent 
Community organizations    1 
Library      1 
Emergency refuge     Cyclone shelter 
This village was newly reconstructed after Cyclone Nargis to accommodate the 
remaining survivors scattered across the rice fields and from other areas. As a 
showcase for reconstruction, this village was frequently visited by government 
officials. The respondents said they had received attention from foreign and local 
donors, business companies, and the diplomatic community because one of the 
Ministers at that time was known to be a native of the Thayet Thone Bin area. As he 
was serving as the Minister for Energy, the main donors who contributed aid to the 
village were companies from the energy sector. The government newspaper recorded 
a visit of the Prime Minister to the reconstructed village (Myanma Alin 2008c). 
Heavy machines from military units helped build a 3350 feet long access road 
between the new village and the Kungyangone-Dedaye highway road. The 
government newspaper also recorded the donation of books to the village library 
from the Ministry of Information (Myanma Alin 2008c). 
New houses donated to the village were better than those of other villages in 
surrounding areas. A school, a cyclone shelter and a library were also built under the 
supervision of the Minister. Other livelihood support such as fishing boats, fishing 
gear and tractors was given to farmers and fishermen. This village is composed of 
mainly three types of jobs: farmers, fisher men and manual workers. Most of the 
villagers are landless manual workers and they frequently become seasonal migrants 
in the nearest city, Yangon, when demand is low in farming and fishing jobs. The 
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community members stated that outside assistance reached the village three days 
after landfall and at one point of the discussion it was recalled that ‘Donors came 
from dawn till dusk later’ (U Hla Kyi, a farmer of 46, Thayet Thone Bin, Zone III).  
Because of high-profile interaction with military officials and the donors, the 
infrastructure of the village was improved to a status that the community had never 
experienced. The houses were built in a row with wood, corrugated roofs and a 
school-cum-shelter that is big enough for 300 people (Figure 17). Recalling the 
initial phase of relief and recovery, most memories were focused on receiving aid 
and visits of dignitaries. After housing, the most significant change was easier access 
to towns and cities thanks to the new road. Regardless of such physical 
improvements, livelihood options were identified as shrinking due to the decline in 
the crop yield of the area and lower productivity in fishing. A participant in 
discussion said ‘People in our village are poorer because most of the people here do 
not have regular income and regular job. We have fewer owners fishing boats which 
can employ local workers. After Nargis, some people quit fishing business’ (U Mya 
Aye, a fisherman of 65, a member of trustee board, Thayet Thone Bin, Zone III). 
In term of initiatives, community members registered their participation in DRR 
training and in organizing village preparedness committees. These activities were 
once initiated by NGOs. By the time of the field research in 2013 the disaster 
preparedness kits donated to the village were still well-maintained and ready for 
urgent utilization in case of disaster. They also attributed more awareness to hazards 
due to media accessibility to TV, radios and phones. The village library as mentioned 
in the interview, was not active.  
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Figure 17 School-cum-shelter in Thayet Thone Bin village 
7.3.2 Research Zone II 
An important feature of the recovery process of Zone II has been the completion of a 
new road in 2015 that is directly linked from Yangon to the biggest village of the whole 
peninsula, Kadon Kani village. All villages across the peninsula can now come to the 
terminus of the road by boat and can go to Yangon by car. Before the road’s 
construction, this was one of the least accessible areas in the whole Delta.  After 
Cyclone Nargis, aid delivery to this area was hampered due to the lack of a main road 
and a long commute by boat. Pre-existing geographical isolation was one of the factors 
that contributed to the recovery process, which has been characterized by the degraded 
state of housing and other reconstruction needs.  
This section makes a comparison between research Zone I and Zone II in terms of 
vulnerability. Although both exist at the edge of the Delta, and they are equally far 
from urban areas with long waterway transportation, Zone II has been more 
impoverished in general in terms of infrastructure, housing and livelihood options. One 
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of the main causes of deeper vulnerability in this area is the ‘lack of land entitlement’. 
Among 25 selected villages, except Aye Yar village and Eastern Yay Kyaw Gyi 
village, the rest of the list are living inside the reserved forest area or overlapping with 
reserved forest, according to a map which has not been updated for a long time. While 
equally marginal areas of Zone I enjoyed formal recognition and limited flows of 
resources from government and other organizations even before Cyclone Nargis, Zone 
II was more marginalized for both geographical and administrative reasons.     
Although agricultural expansion and other factors have contributed to the emergence 
of new villages in Zone II in reserved forest areas over the last 30 years, no policy 
initiatives were formulated under the military regime and many villages retained the 
status of informal entity. Regardless of their legality, administrative structures were 
put in place and the state extracted taxes and resources as in other places. Nevertheless, 
little public funding reached this area for services such as provision of schools and 
teachers. Construction of a school in Pauk Sein Kya village after Cyclone Nargis is an 
example. Although the school’s construction was completed with funding from 
UNDP, there were no teachers assigned to the school as the school lacked official 
status. While community members tried to reach the township administration to get 
permission for the school, they had not heard any answer at the time of the field visit 
in 2013. 
During the recovery process, land issues were raised by local communities through 
various channels to government officials. By the time of writing in 2016, official 
demarcation is ongoing and the land registration process has started granting the legal 
status of farmland to villages on Kadon Kani Peninsula. Most of the villages of this 
research have already had applied for land title for their farmland at the end of 
2015(Myawaddy 2016). The farmers may also benefit from new farm law promulgated 
in 2012 that allows farmers to use their land for mortgage collateral.  
While improvement in land titles will contribute to the livelihood of communities, 
mangrove conservation in remaining forest patches has weakened, as experienced in 
Zone III. Paradoxically, most of the villages showed high awareness of the value of 
mangroves due to their experience of Cyclone Nargis. The forests are vital for the 
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resilience of communities and excluding these villages from formal recognition does 
not help to improve the community’s participation in conservation efforts either. In 
this context, soil erosion and sea water intrusion have become a common pattern in 
Zone II and farmers have observed a dramatic decline in crop yield. Community 
narratives in this area indicate that recovery does not have impact in balancing 
conservation needs and livelihood needs of this area.  
Amid these changes, safety concerns remain high in Zone II as physical assets 
including homes and public buildings are not adequate. The most common answer in 
this area to the scenario of a future storm was, ‘No. We do not have a safe place to go.’ 
A similar opinion was expressed in the assessment of UN-Habitat for the whole Delta 
as follows: 
The geo-physical location of the delta, poor communication and evacuation 
protocols further worsen the risks for the Delta people and shelters without 
disaster resilient features may further increase these risks. (UN-Habitat 2011a, 
p.44). 
In this research zone, there are two designated cyclone shelters: one is in 
Kadon Kani village and the other is on the other side of Aye Yar village. 
Although each one can accommodate 500 people, the neighbouring villages 
cannot not reach them easily as they need to cross water ways. As shown in 
Figure 18, there is a small river between Aye Yar village and the cyclone 
shelter with no bridge so far. Other villages around this cyclone shelter will 
take at least 30 minutes to reach the shelter. A cyclone shelter was much 
anticipated by villagers during the recovery processes of all three zones of 
the Delta. In addition to the number of cyclone shelters, which is so far very 
limited, accessibility was also problematic, as all large and small villages are 
scattered across the whole peninsula and have different geographical 
vulnerabilities. 
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Figure 18 Shelter in Tauk Tar Kone village designated for people from the whole 
Aye Yar village track 
Another negative outcome from the recovery process in this research zone has to do 
with social cohesion. Of all villages of this research in the area, Kyein Chaung Gyi is 
the only village where a private company constructed more than 237 houses as well as 
a pagoda, a monastery, a school, a clinic and a sports ground. However, its smaller 
neighbouring villages were also severely impacted as Kyein Chaung Gyi village 
received relatively lower amounts of assistance. In this case, small villages such as 
Lay Gwa village, which does not have a school and has a deteriorating monastery, 
missed out. Based on perceived injustices in aid and recovery, negative attributes were 
mentioned frequently in discussions in this area.  
During the reconstruction process, a few large villages such as Kadon Kani and Aye 
Yar became logistical bases for aid distribution groups and other relief organizations. 
When the aid distribution was operated from these larger villages and did not 
frequently reach communities beyond the primary base, the organization needed to 
bring participation from smaller villages in surrounding areas to the base. But 
discussion in small villages such as Kywal Phyu, Zee Phyu, Pauk Sein Kya, Say Yoe 
Kwin, Lake Thaung Yay Kyaw, and Thaung Thar indicated that their chances to 
participate were limited and they assessed that resource distribution was unequal 
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between the base villages that accommodated aid organizations and their satellite 
smaller villages. Such negative opinions still existed in the communities although five 
years had already passed during the field visit of this research, and they highlight long-
term impacts of aid and recovery on local social cohesion.  
After the aid organizations or the donors left the aid beneficiary areas, local 
communities were left with positive and negative social outcomes. Participatory 
processes were the foundation of positive social outcomes. However, implementing a 
participatory approach might be challenging in the context of a difficult geographical 
location. In comparison, the above-mentioned issues ranging from aid disparity to 
impacts on social cohesion were not strongly present in Zone I, which is also located 
at the edge of the Delta at different end. The difference between the two zones is the 
geographical locations of the villages. In Zone I, as the villages are closer to one 
another and land routes support more connections, greater interaction already existed 
among the villages.  
In this research area, marginal existence has been caused by both geography and 
administrative exclusion for several decades. Formal recognition was regarded as the 
ability to improve several aspects of the community such as in health and education 
services. It can also enhance village identity and in many ways that leads to enhancing 
the village’s capabilities. A profile of recovery in Western Yay Kyaw Gyi village of 
Zone II is provided in Box 5.  
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Box 5 Case study from Zone II 
Western Yay Kyaw Gyi village of Zone II 
Village fact      Quantity 
Current population     165 
Death toll in Cyclone Nargis    119 
Total houses/structures vanished in Cyclone Nargis  100 per cent 
Community organizations    2 
Library       0 
Emergency refuge Primary school structure at 
ground level 
The original Western Yay Kyaw Gyi village, which was called Latter Chaung, never 
formally registered as a village in government records. It is the oldest community, 
having settled in the forest area some 80 years ago. It was relocated to its current 
position after Cyclone Nargis destroyed the old village. It is located inside the 
Reserved Forest Area in the map of the Forest Department. Nowadays, local people 
cannot even find enough firewood in their nearby forest which used to be a dense 
area of mangroves. After the cyclone, the old community members scattered to 
several places. Some of them never came back to the old community. In contrast to 
the experience of the villages from Zone III, no outside help rushed in to help these 
people. The very first organization that arrived in the village was the Myanmar Red 
Cross Society. The Red Cross arrived here one month after the cyclone’s landfall. A 
few other organizations and private donors also came with help after nearly two 
months.  
When its neighbor, Aye Yar village (a larger and more economically strong village) 
was coordinating with outside organizations to manage relief and recovery, Western 
Yay Kyaw Gyi people felt that they were neglected. Although they blamed their own 
leaders for inefficiency in acquiring resources, they also felt that other bigger villages 
in the same area such as Aye Yar village and Ywar Thar Yar village gained access to 
a higher quality and quantity of aid. Although it might have been a failure of outside 
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organizations to reach this marginal area, the blame in the eyes of the villagers goes 
to both their own leaders and higher-level management at the village tract level. In an 
interview the villagers also identified their communication skills as a short-coming in 
recovery interactions: ‘Here we cannot afford to drill a water well which will solve 
our water scarcity problem in every dry season. We lacked contacts with the donor 
who focused on water issue. The other villages around here were smarter than us and 
they knew how to approach to aid groups. While the village beside us got two drilled 
wells, we got nothing.’ (Western Yay Kyaw Gyi, Zone II)  
 
Figure 19 The difference in primary school structures between Western Yay 
Kyaw Gyi village and Ywar Thar Yar village 
A school-cum-shelter for emergency was built by a private company for this village 
as shown in Figure 19. Obviously fewer resources were utilized here, as indicated by 
the ground level floor of the school. At a school in its neighboring village, Yaw Thar 
Yar, which shares the same topography, the floor of the school was elevated from the 
ground. The villagers again expressed their dissatisfaction with low quality physical 
asset: ‘The construction company was sent by the government. The whole building is 
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gradually sinking into the sand. As the school is constructed on the same level with 
the ground, even in normal year the school area is flooded.’ (Focus group discussion, 
Western Yay Kyaw Gyi, Zone II) 
In their efforts in the reconstruction of the village, the villagers struggled to channel 
resources, but organizations that reached Western Yay Kyaw Gyi with a set agenda 
also did not offer much help to village as stated by the village leader: ‘When they 
approached us, we could not read the message and the kind of help they could offer. 
This was our weakness. Sometimes, we explained what we need in community but 
our needs did not match with what they could do. Then we did not get anything.’ 
(Focus group discussion, Western Yay Kyaw Gyi, Zone II) 
A negative impact of Cyclone Nargis was a deeper poverty that caused more 
mangrove depletion in remaining areas beyond the village. More trees were cut down 
for firewood after Cyclone Nargis to sell them to shrimp-drying businesses that need 
a lot of firewood for processing. While acknowledging the value of mangroves for 
safety and livelihood security, the village seems to be living in the trap of a vicious 
cycle of resource depletion and poverty. While livelihood conditions were quite 
weak in this village, people did not say much about help with livelihoods, either from 
organizations or government. While most of the survivors were involved in day-to-
day initiatives for family and communal recovery, a few left the villages to migrate 
to other places. For some people who have more financial capacity, when they fear 
stormy weather in rainy seasons of years following Cyclone Nargis, they ususally 
send women and children from households to Ywar Thar Yar village which has 
stronger houses of relatives.  
7.3.3 Research Zone I  
In contrary to the experience with Zone II and Zone III, a special characteristic of Zone 
I is that it already had connections with a humanitarian NGO even before Cyclone 
Nargis due to their experience in 2004 Tsunami. A few villages in this area were 
affected by the Tsunami and received aid from organizations. This is not the case for 
Zone II and Zone III villages although a few villages in Zone II were also survivors of 
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tsunami. Although the two lower areas (Zone I and Zone II) had experienced 2004 
Indian tsunami, experience of Zone I differed from Zone II which most of the local 
people have had little contact with outside organizations apart from encountering only 
occasional visits made by mangrove conservation organizations. 
In most villages in Zone I, the reconstruction and recovery experience was dynamic 
and interactive to some extent. In group discussions in Dee Du Kone, the local people’s 
facilitation in the recovery process was stated clearly. There, the role of Dee Du Kone 
monastery and its abbot in integrating local capacity and bringing outside assistance 
were recounted as follows: 
City-based organizations, Metta and Karuna (Pathein) which I get to know 
arrived here soon after the storm stopped. These early organizations wanted to 
start with the reconstruction of housing and our people assisted them to build 
efficiently. Here under Dee Du Kone village tract, my monastery host displaced 
people from four affected villages. So, in the first round, they thought it would 
be enough to give 50 houses for each village. Later they increased funding and 
expanded the humanitarian activities. They stayed here for 3 years. (Focus 
group discussion, Dee Du Kone village, Zone I)  
Similar stories were also stated by the church leadership of Kwin Yar and Nant Thar 
Kone villages in Zone I. In a vertical link to the higher level of the Christian church in 
urban areas and other places, resources were quickly mobilized and local communities 
were empowered to coordinate and facilitate this process.  
Sustainability in terms of local engagement to promote long term community 
wellbeing was noted in Zone I. In Dee Du Kone village tract, local civil society groups 
were actively involved in tree replantation projects for a coastal buffer. Here, outside 
resources were integrated into local involvement in most places. While reforestation 
efforts were initiated in several villages of all three zones, large scale efforts were 
observed in this area. Contrasting to other research areas, Zone III had more local 
initiatives in small numbers of villages, and Zone II struggled to maintain remaining 
mangroves and conservation or replanting efforts and faced difficulty due to poverty 
and limited livelihood opportunities.  
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However, the villages in Zone I have a track record of a more frequent hazard even 
before Cyclone Nargis. In addition to Tsunami 2004 which was noted as unusual event, 
these villages saw a more frequent type of hydrometerological hazards along the 
coastline such as storms and landslides. Seawater intrusion has been a yearly pattern 
since Cyclone Nargis. Its repeated occurrence in recent years has a direct impact on 
agriculture of the villages along the coastline. In comparison with Zone II and Zone 
III, this area reported a more serious level of seawater intrusion that contributes to the 
larger scale of landslide and water resource scarcity. Within five years from Nargis, 
Lay Yin Kwin village lost 20% of its soil because of bank erosion. Kone Gyi village 
which has existed in the same place for nearly a hundred years faced a serious problem 
of land erosion only in the last ten years. A Karen woman from Kone Gyi said, ‘In the 
past, the walking distance between the village and the sea took more than one hour. 
Now it took only half an hour as the bank has been approaching to the village.’ In 
comparison with Zone I and Zone II, Zone I suffered more than others.  
Besides a higher degree of seawater penetration, arsenic contamination in the water 
has been another public health issue in this area for a long time. In every Summer, 
these villages have to struggle for clean water because of a quick dry-up of fresh water 
sources and highest degree of salinization around the year. Salinization not only spoils 
drinking water sources but also undermine the revival of agricultural works in the 
villages of Zone I. Even though seawater intrusion made the long-term economic 
problems, water scarcity affects day to day survival of the local people.  
Being the very first area of the cyclone’s landfall throughout the whole Delta and 
experiencing repeated loss and damage due to floods and salination, safety was more 
seriously prioritized than other topics in the discussions. In focus group discussions 
safety outcomes were evaluated as weighing on the negative side. Even though house 
rebuilding was more systematic than in Zone II in incorporating resiliency and public 
buildings in relative strength, it seems to a villager from Aung Hlaing that repeated 
hazard experience does not provide complete faith in it. He said,   
We can only be secured only if we have strong building which was carefully 
constructed. We also should be  informed early enough about the coming 
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storm. In our experience in Nargis, buildings which we thought strong were not 
strong enough. (U Kyaw Soe, a farmer of 44, Aung Hlaing village, Zone I) 
An example of the heightened concern for safety was shown when participants of a 
focus group discussion calculated the capacity of cyclone shelters, and they added 
extra people to their consideration. In their experience, calculating based on village 
populations might not always work as in an emergency, people from outside of the 
village needed help too. Kone Gyi village (with a population of 1030) with a cyclone 
shelter was taken as an example. This building can accommodate around 200 to 300 
and Kone Gyi also has a school with a capacity of 500 to 700 people. While the village 
itself might find enough protection in these buildings in the case of a storm emergency, 
nearby poorer villages such as Aung Hlaing, Na That Kone (Nant Thar Kone) and 
Kwin Yar villages and others do not have any strong shelters within a radius of 45 
minutes of travel. So, they must also come to Kone Gyi for refuge. This discussion 
also revealed another aspect of recovery; while the completion of rebuilding and 
recovery accomplishments are usually displayed in ‘numbers’, the dynamics of 
recovery on the ground can be more complex than the numbers show. Village 
communities’ assessments and considerations could be different from those of outside 
organizations as shown in Box 6.    
Box 6 Case study from Zone I 
Aung Hlaing village of Zone I 
Background       Number 
Current population       230 
Death toll in Cyclone Nargis     320 
Total houses/structures that vanished in Cyclone Nargis 100 per cent 
Community organizations     2 
Library       1 
Emergency refuge      Primary school  
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This village was affected by the Asian Tsunami of 2004 with damage to 55 houses. 
After Cyclone Nargis, the village population halved from 523 to 210. After the 
Tsunami, a local NGO called Metta came to assist. After Cyclone Nargis, they came 
back again to provide relief and recovery support while other organizations also 
reached out to this area.  
Primary school construction in the village was supported by a local NGO, Metta 
while school running costs such as hiring teachers were covered by the community as 
formal government assistance was not enough. Compared to the case study from 
Zone II (Western Yay Kyaw Gyi), cyclone damage was at a similar level to all 
properties and vanished houses. Similarly, immediately after Cyclone Nargis most 
survivors of both of the villages had to leave for temporary camps in other places, 
returning after a few weeks.  
Being involved in the village’s capacity building, Metta was credited for its use of 
participation and genuine engagement with the local people. Moreover, community 
initiatives and interactions within and outside were frequently referred to in the focus 
group discussion. Community initiatives were reflected in the collective management 
of the forest near the village for fuel and the collective decision to protect barrier 
sand banks. When the villagers mentioned physical improvements, they were 
mentioned quite often in association with capabilities outcomes of material progress. 
One example referred to increased telephone availability in the village: ‘We now can 
call directly to meteorological department and ask about weather updates whenever 
storm news comes’. (Daw Aye Aye Mon, a female housewife of 49, Aung Hlaing, 
Zone I)  
DRR activities were also organized in the village. Villagers expressed their 
confidence in the school as a cyclone shelter. The building process and the location 
of the school were reportedly organized in participatory consultation with 
community members: ‘Our houses are not strong enough to resist even for strong 
wind; let alone the storm like Nargis. But we got school. The school is located at the 
center of the village and it can be reached from both ends of the village within 10 to 
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15 minutes. There is no bridge or creek on the way to the school shelter.’ (Focus 
group discussion, Aung Hlaing, Zone I)  
As in the villages of Zone II and III mentioned above, livelihood activities have been 
under pressure because of environmental change. Mangrove forests that served the 
community for protection against disaster and as breeding grounds for fishing had 
been depleted fast. In addition to that, water scarcity is a big issue in the whole 
region. Fresh water access was a big challenge for the village and rainwater 
harvesting was the main approach for household and community use. Economically 
viable households can maintain better storage such as bigger clay pots as shown in 
Figure 20, but for poor households, such options are unaffordable. The recovery 
process does not change existing patterns of water storage. In summer, they normally 
run out of water at higher temperatures. Then the community has to rely on outside 
water donations which involve newly-emerging civil society groups and religious 
organizations.  
 
Figure 20 Clay pots to store rain water 
In the profiles of the regions and the villages above, a general pattern of recovery in 
all three zones is discussed with an emphasis on the process of interaction between the 
community and the outside world, and the recovery outcome of community safety and 
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wellbeing concerns were presented. Recovery processes and outcomes were uneven 
within and among all three zones. Especially in the profile of all three small villages 
in the above section, the starting point of the recovery process was from total 
devastation. These three villages were empty-handed in the aftermath of the Cyclone’s 
landfall. But the recovery process was mostly influenced by pre-existing access to 
outside resources, both physical and social. Zone III was easiest for channeling 
resources as there was pre-existing road access and proximity to the city. Zone I was 
somewhat better due to pre-existing channels to outside NGOs/CBOs and in some 
places as to church hierarchy. In Zone II, limited physical and social networks 
prevented resource access.  
7.4 The process of recovery 
Berke et al. (1993) argued that the recovery period can bring opportunity for the long-
term development of an affected region via multi-layered interactions. Vertical 
integration involves the level of relations between social units and organizations of the 
community to outside social, economic and political institutions. Horizontal 
relationships occur among community members and between community members 
and organizations, not in egalitarian manner. External aid also helps the organizational 
capacity of the affected areas to usher in economic, physical and social development 
(Berke et al.1993). 
With the active participation of survivors, the goal of building a more disaster resilient 
community can be achieved (Berke et al.1993; Rubin et al. 1985). Holistic recovery 
(PERI 2001) can only be achieved when community members can participate 
inclusively and the decisions coming out of consensus must be compatible with long-
term community goals and take into account all the principles of sustainability (PERI 
2001, p.2). Community participation is crucial because recovery is not merely a 
technical process, such as building and renovating and building roads, but it is a social 
process that involves decision making for the future of a society (Nigg 1995). Nigg 
(1995) also states, 
In order for successful post-disaster decisions to be made, however, there must 
be an awareness of the pre-disaster conditions that create situations of social 
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and structural vulnerability, putting some segments of the society at greater risk 
…than others. From this perspective, what becomes important is how those 
decisions are made, who is involved in the decision making, what consequences 
those decisions have on the social groups within the disaster-stricken 
communities, and who benefits from these decisions and who does not. (Nigg 
1995, p. 1) 
With reference to the dynamics of networking and participation, recovery was 
analyzed here in each important category of process. The findings suggest that 
processes are a crucial dimension of recovery as the communities were left with a self-
organizing process that tended to have forward momentum for community resiliency.  
7.4.1 Initiatives in the process 
Resource availability was crucial to recovery but resource acquistion alone does not 
guarantee positive outcomes. The community’s commitment to take initiatives is the 
foundation for holistic recovery. FEMA (2005) defines holistic community recovery 
as follows:  
An attempt to incorporate all elements of the community as part of the recovery 
process, encourages consideration of the interrelationships of various sectors, 
such as commercial, environmental, etc., and forces community, federal and 
state partners to look at long-term implications of decisions. (p.6) 
From mangrove reforestation to the forming of a village disaster risk management 
committee, to maintaining a community clinic or a library in the long run, the 
community must take a central role in implementing activities that lead to holistic 
recovery. In case study villages, it is shown that when community members themselves 
were not strongly involved, the benefit to the community was likely to decline after 
donors left. 
An important example of a community’s initiative is in disaster risk reduction. Many 
organizations have been involved in the reconstruction of Cyclone Nargis-affected 
areas and have formulated approaches to integrate disaster risk reduction initiatives 
into the recovery process (UNICEF 2015). Most villages from all three zones in this 
research were involved in one kind of disaster risk preparedness activity or another. 
           
          
 
229 
 
Different organizations that engaged with the villagers used different formats of 
training in line with their priorities and allowable budgets, and the impact on each 
community was largely determined by the quality, content and design of educational 
programs (DRRWG 2013). For example, the village that was supported by Save the 
Children had a primary focus on the DRR skills of children while a local organization 
such as Metta was interested in integrating DRR into sustainable livelihoods in the 
sample villages. Zone I villages are beneficiaries of DRR training provided by an 
NGOs, and the communities identified the local resources, geographical features of 
the community and organization networks of the community as explained in the 
example of May Dar Ai village from Zone I. An example of this mapping exercise is 
shown in Figure 21.    
  
Figure 21 DRR training tools: Resource map and organization dynamics of May 
Dar Ai village, Zone I 
In all villages, the DRR education programs encouraged the villagers to set up a village 
disaster risk management committee (VDRMC). Most villages from all zones 
participated in this initiative of VDRMC, which were formed in the early recovery 
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phase of the post-Nargis period (2008˗2009). This involved a central body consisting 
of between 10 and 15 members selected by the community members, both male and 
female. The committee is composed of three to five task forces or sub-committees with 
specific assignments including early warning, first aid and sanitation, evacuation, 
search and rescue, temporary shelter and common food management, protection for 
vulnerable groups including children and elderly, and coordination, etc. When the field 
studies were conducted between 2013 and 2015, the action committees were 
sustainable only when the leaders were active in some villages, while most of them 
struggle to activate in the early monsoon. The poorer the village, the harder it is to 
prioritize DRR activities more regularly. In the poorer area of Zone II, most are not 
functional after five years while only bigger villages in Zone I and Zone III still have 
active committees.  
While the functioning of a village’s DRR committee and infrequent activation makes 
it harder to count as a positive outcome of the recovery, it gives space for interaction 
within villages, raises awareness and seeds ideas in many places. While Zone II still 
has transportation difficulties, larger villages in Zone I and III are active in inviting 
experts to talk on weather, climate and DRR. Marginality in terms of transportation 
infrastructure and in terms of resources seem to hamper initiatives with outside 
resources to enhance DRR and resiliency. While assets such as transportation help to 
foster initiatives as mentioned above, internal processes also need attention. Even in 
village-level DRR training, the illiterate found they were automatically left out by the 
selection process for training participants and often outside organizations failed to 
recognize this situation. In this way, the socially vulnerable are moving further from 
resilience initiatives.  
7.4.2 Interaction in process 
According to Comfort et al. (2000), the nonlinear process of recovery is largely 
influenced by interaction among public agencies, jurisdictions, private and non-profit 
organizations, and households for a collaborative effort to rebuild an affected 
community. Although the recovery phase brought development opportunities to the 
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post-Nargis Delta, process and space for interactions can define positive and negative 
outcomes.  
Interaction with organizations 
Although the main responsibility for emergency response rests with state agencies, the 
unique capacities of NGOs are also strategically important in the relief and 
reconstruction period (Osa 2013).  
Positive impact of NGO’s service in disaster response may include: (1) As service providers 
that deliver food, non-food items, and water, and that provide medical and psycho-social 
services, shelter, and protection, NGOs can save lives and livelihoods, limit the physical and 
psychological damage of catastrophic events, and make a sustainable recovery more likely. (2) 
NGOs can bring transparency and can propose constructive, alternative policies to the 
government. (3) NGOs can channel information from disaster zones to the rest of the world 
when governments are not doing this sufficiently. (4) In many cases, NGOs are the first to 
arrive in the affected communities, filling crucial gaps until the assistance from UN agencies 
and government arrives (Osa 2013, p.71).  
Local organizations are also identified as potential first responders in disaster response 
as they can take prompt action for search and rescue, provision of treatment to the 
injured and helping the homeless (Walker 2002; Benson et al. 2001). Interaction with 
NGOs including local civil social organizations and local people was significant in the 
post-impact phase of Cyclone Nargis as mentioned in several reports (CPCS 2011). It 
is also concluded that bridging and linking social capital in the context of local and 
external interactions after Cyclone Nargis had potential value for social community 
resiliency (Holliday 2012). Increased interaction with local and international 
organizations and village communities mean changes in power dynamics within a 
region. Villages in all three research zones indicate that information is no longer 
contained at the local level and local authorities are no longer immune from scrutiny 
both from outside actors and local people.  
During the recovery process, local capacity to accommodate people was also crucial 
in bringing much-needed resources and networking with the outside, as shown in the 
example of Dee Du Kone village of Zone I, where the chief abbot provided space for 
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aid organizations at a monastery and channels to local human resources. Poorer areas 
in Zone II had limited capacity for such accommodation. Currently, activities of 
development-oriented organizations have still been operating in all three zones 
together with local civil society organizations. But the number of NGOs that focused 
on service delivery, such as microfinance and healthcare services, to the case study 
villages in all three zones has shrunk dramatically since 2010. Regardless of NGOs 
changing priority, interactions during the recovery process were observed as one of 
the main factors in widening the local agenda with civil society organizations and local 
unions. Their focus now includes labour rights, land rights, farmers’ association rights 
and natural resource governance.  
Interaction, marginality and conflict 
The ‘Equality in Aid – Addressing Caste Discrimination in Humanitarian Response’ 
report by the International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) discussed the India 
experience of inequality in aid, saying ‘the so-called ‘untouchables’ at the bottom of 
the caste system – are frequently the worst affected. Nevertheless, they are often 
systematically excluded from relief and recovery efforts due to their inherent socio-
economic vulnerability’ (p.3). In the Ayeyarwady Delta, aid inequality mainly comes 
from geographical marginality and limited efforts by aid organizations to identify and 
reach these areas.  
Another vulnerability that was revealed in the context of interaction was in totally 
collapsed villages. These villages took some time to re-populate and few or no physical 
structures had been left to accommodate outside organizations in the early days of 
resource flows to areas. Normally for villages in need of total reconstruction, 
assistance and interaction should come in substantial ways, but this was not the case 
for several villages of Zone II. Although some organizations or government provided 
resources for re-establishing villages from scratch, mostly in Zone I and III, totally 
collapsed villages in Zone II struggled to assert their existence as village communities 
on the map. Thaung Thar, Lake Thaung Yay Kyaw, Western Yay Kyaw Gyi, Say Yoe 
Kwin, Gway Chaung Gyi, Dani Chaung, Khar Chin Kyun villages from Zone II and 
May Dar Ai, Kwin Yar, Lay Yin Kwin and Nant Thar Kone villages from Zone I could 
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not restore their existence within 20 days to one month. In this context, a lot of 
interaction happened in bigger villages with the relative infrastructure intact.  
From the organizations’ side, this disparity in interaction may be traced back to a lack 
of resources to reach further. Another reason was outside organizations’ tendency to 
stick to existing structures and not initiate structural change despite the reconstruction 
and recovery process offering this opportunity. Group discussion from Aung Hlaing 
village in Zone I, made a similar case of disparity in the government’s initiatives as 
well: 
Small village like us did not attract the attention of the authorities. The 
government people usually went to Kone Gyi because it offered more safety 
and convenience in term of infrastructure. (Aung Hlaing, Focus group 
discussion) 
In general, interaction as part of the recovery process after Cyclone Nargis provided 
the opportunity for empowerment, but interactions mostly followed existing physical 
and social structures and quite often failed to look to disadvantaged situations to 
engage and increase resilience.  
7.4.3 Conflict in process 
The overall recovery plan for the Ayeyarwady Delta after Cyclone Nargis was 
formulated in the PONREPP (Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan) by the 
TCG. Different organizations also had their own plans according to their interest and 
resources. When these plans were implemented locally, instructions on what to do 
often came with a top-down structure. In this regard, initiatives were sometimes 
perceived as being inflexible. An example is Zee Thaung village of Zone I, which was 
relocated from a water-front area to higher ground for long-term safety. But the needs 
of fisherman to have fishing boats in the vicinity to adjust to changing tidal situations 
make it almost impossible to live on high ground. The forced relocation was initiated 
by the local authority and the military unit without much consideration for livelihood 
aspects. Flexible strategy with collective problem-solving was not accounted for in 
this case.  
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Similar to the above-mentioned case of conflict between safety needs (higher ground) 
and livelihood needs (water-front), short-term livelihood needs and long-term safety 
and sustainablity needs of the environment are also in conflict. Moreover, fixed 
guidelines in aid organizations also seem to stifle possible creative problem-solving 
approaches suggested by the community. An experience in Zone I showed the result 
of such an approach. An aid organization came to Zone I with limited resources for 
housing. When the available resources did not match the whole village’s needs, 
villagers suggested drawing lots after allocating housing to essential beneficiaries such 
as old people and widows. For the local people, everyone who suffered from the storm 
should have an equal chance of getting a house. That is why drawing lots for a new 
house was a fair procedure. But the organization’s procedure was to select 
beneficiaries using criteria such as wealth ranking, which is an almost impossible task 
in the aftermath of a cyclone when all people have been affected. Also, the local people 
argued that the supposedly well-to-do family should not be left out from the 
beneficiary list because they also shared their remaining resources to others as soon as 
the storm stopped. The set criteria for aid distribution in the context of pre-impact 
wealth ranking could hamper solidarity of the village community. In this illustrative 
example, the outside contribution to local social dynamics is apparent and the outside 
actors needed to be mindful of potential conflicts. 
7.5 Changes in participation 
In most research areas, there was an obvious change regarding the space for 
engagement from local people and conditions to bring out assertive leaders from the 
community. In all focus group discussions, participants recounted varying degrees of 
engagement for community welfare within a community and to outside people even if 
the formal village leaders were not very supportive of interaction. This change in the 
recovery process was not common in the context of the authoritarian rule in Myanmar 
of that time, and citizens’ engagement was not encouraged over decades of military 
rule. This administrative mood of forced passivity changed in the context of Cyclone 
Nargis’s relief, rehabilitation and recovery process:  
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We afraid to stand out in the crowd in the past, but when outside people come 
and invite to talk our opinion after Nargis, we stand up for the sake of village 
and many other people do. Later sharing opinions change to debate and we all 
become active and somehow happy. (Naing Oo, Male fisherman of 31, Aye Yar 
village of Zone II)  
Big changes in political participation for local people came in 2012 with the new the 
Ward and Village-Tract Administration Law that allowed local people to elect their 
administrative leaders. This law was an extension of national political change and had 
an impact on the ongoing process of the community’s rights since Cyclone Nargis. 
Prior to the law, such local representation was not possible as the General 
Administration Department held the authority to appoint ward and village-tract 
administrators (Kyed et al. 2016; Kempel and Tun 2016). During the relief and disaster 
recovery phase, local people learned that leadership is very important in shaping a village’s 
wellbeing and engagement with the outside world. The following quote is from Pauk Sein 
Kya village with an emphasis on leadership:  
We need strong leadership. The leader must not abuse the power and must not focus on his 
own interest at the stake of community. The leader must be a respected person. People also 
need to know what we should do in selection of such leaders. (Focus group discussion, Pauk 
Sein Kya village, Zone II)  
Under the expanded space came both changes in civil society and national politics, 
local people changed to take more and more collective action. For example, the 
villagers from Pauk Sein Kya from Zone II formed a farmers and fishermen union by 
connecting township-level networks. Pauk Sein Kya had young people who were very 
politically active and their sensitivity to national political change was relatively high:  
After 2010, we have seen more space for local groups like us here. In the past, 
the authorities governed us by breeding fears inside us. Now we know how to 
connect with other civil society groups from town and it is time for us to remove 
the threat and fear imposed on us for a long time by the bad governance. The 
authorities appointed in the local levels are corruptive. They may do it better. 
If they are still being corruptive, we, as civic organizations must take action for 
check and balance. We cannot be quiet. (Pauk Sein Kya, Zone II)  
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7.5.1 Changes in communication 
During the early phase of emergency relief after Cyclone Nargis, communication 
infrastructure and capacity became critical issues for UN and non-governmental 
agencies. Hattotuwa (2008, p.3) reported that after Cyclone Nargis on 2 May, bringing 
telecommunication equipment to disaster areas was delayed until the beginning of 
June, as imported equipment was held in customs and effort was required to negotiate 
for its release with the line ministry. Moreover, visas were not issued for foreign IT 
experts for nearly a month and a half after the cyclone. On the community side, mobile 
phone availability was near zero in most villages of the three research zones as 
explained in Chapter 4 of this research.  
During the reconstruction and recovery process, the UN, NGOs and other 
organizations brought their urban based mobiles and what locals call ‘coastal phones’ 
to villages. In many areas organizations allowed the locals to use their mobile 
equipment and gradually in some larger populated villages, locals also started their 
own paid mobile services to villages. Then the government gradually relaxed its 
control on telecommunications and in 2016, it is estimated that nearly 90 per cent of 
the population are using telephones (Matsui 2016). In a follow-up fieldtrip to research 
areas in 2015, it was observed that mobile phones had become crucial for weather 
news, etc.   
During the major flood of the rainy season in 2015, relief activities gained more 
efficiency with the help of mobile phones. Awareness-raising and education activities 
have become more accessible via Facebook and mobile phones. The educational 
Facebook page of former Director General the Department of Meteorology and 
Hydrology has 500,000 followers. One aspect of mobile phone accessibility was its 
application in the process of getting more information and taking appropriate action in 
advance in regard to disaster risk reduction.   
7.6 Outcomes of the recovery 
Compared to the time before Cyclone Nargis, the capabilities aspect of the community 
is mostly positive due to increased interaction and engagement with outside actors to 
           
          
 
237 
 
channel resources or to have more options to enhance community capacity. FEMA 
(2011) emphasizes that, ‘each community defines successful recovery outcomes 
differently based on its circumstances, challenges, recovery vision and priorities’ 
(p.13). 
As exhibited in the outline of the recovery process in this chapter, the recovery process 
after Cyclone Nargis was mixed with changes in national politics. In this context, 
sources of recovery outcomes were hard to distinguish between political change and 
recovery process itself. Generally, the functional needs of every village to be disaster-
resilient communities were not adequately fulfilled because of resource availability. In 
this context recovery outcomes will be assessed from a perspective of community 
safety and human security to natural hazards.   
7.6.1 Physical and material outcome 
Housing and other types of shelter were the most visible physical and material 
outcomes of recovery or relief efforts after Cyclone Nargis. It is difficult to count how 
many of the houses or shelters are ‘safe dwellings’. Generally, Zones I and III owned 
safer shelters or houses in relative numbers but in Zone II most houses in the small 
villages could not be categorized as safe dwellings. Based on their experience of 
Cyclone Nargis, most houses in all three-research areas are evaluated by participants 
of the focus group discussions as having no way to withstand storm surge. 
Davis and Alexander (2016) explain the pattern of housing recovery in a two or three-
stage model as shown in Figure 22. In this model, two scenarios are stated. In scenario 
1, the condition of a living space after the disaster was only a temporary tent or living 
temporarily in other households. From there, the survivors could move to Stage 2, 
which is a better place than a tent and they no longer need to share the other’s space. 
After a certain period, the house condition improves or moves to Stage 3, which is a 
permanent house. In scenario 2, direct transition between Stage 1 (temporary tent) and 
Stage 3 (permanent house) occurs.  
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Figure 22 Two- or three-stage shelter and housing recovery (David and Alexander 
2016) 
In my study, most villages in Zone I and III had families who moved in three stages 
from a temporary shelter to a transitional shelter and then to a permanent house. 
However, most residents in the villages of Zone III still cannot afford to move from 
temporary shelter to permanent shelter due to a shortage of assistance in this area.  
According to UN-Habitat, a total of 752,299 affected families lost houses in the whole 
Delta. Among them, only 152,322 houses were supported with cash and in-kind 
assistance by the combined effort of shelter agencies. It was estimated that 421,525 
households were self-recovered, while it is estimated that the housing need of 178,452 
households was never met. For poorer residents of all research zones, who do not have 
any economic foundation for revival, it is not easy to build the houses in decent way. 
After 2010, some donors tried to solve the housing problem by approaching it from 
the livelihoods angle, believing funding for sustainable livelihoods will empower 
families and regular income generation will give them a chance to rebuild better 
houses. But it was observed as not feasible. According to the Chair of the Shelter 
Working Group, ‘it is a great mistake as families who earn perhaps US$1 or US$2 per 
day will never have sufficient funds to save hundreds of dollars for a new shelter’. 
(UN-Habitat 2011a, p.44). 
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In the context of limited resources for resilience-housing in Cyclone Nargis recovery, 
it was up to families to build stronger houses. Given the limited livelihood options in 
all three research areas, most families cannot afford to improve their houses. In a 2011 
report of ‘Lessons learned and way forward for resilience shelter interventions in rural 
Myanmar’, UN-Habitat and UNISDR found that 62 percent or more of surveyed 
households in the Delta are not disaster resilient. Resilient structures were assessed 
according to six features: anchor, bracing, fixed purlin/rafter, fixed roof cover, roof 
projection and roof pitch (UN-Habitat 2011a, p.44). 
This research looks at the physical and material outcomes of the recovery based on 
shelter or housing in two dimensions: short term and long term. In the short-term view, 
the outcome can be evaluated in a positive light as most families are in their own house 
regardless of the strength of the building, whether due to outside help or individual 
family initiatives. In terms of the long-term view and based on an evaluation of shelter 
based on resilience to future hazards, it can be evaluated as negative. It is observed 
that the majority in Zone II, many in Zone I, and several villages in Zone III are not 
disaster resilient.  
7.6.2 Safety outcome 
As stated in the previous section, individual housing is mostly not addressing safety 
concerns. Community members assessed their shelter as not safe for future hazards. 
Even designated disaster-resilient structures such as cyclone shelters do not guarantee 
safety without systematic aspects of early warning and disaster preparedness plans 
being initiated. Risk mapping, which includes the available assets for safety in an 
emergency, needs to be initiated urgently at the village level in the Delta.  
Since the inception of reconstruction in 2008, Myanmar has built a total of 358 
cyclone-resistant community buildings in the whole affected area of the Delta, which 
were listed as completed, under construction or planned by UN-Habitat by February 
2010 (UN-Habitat 2011b). Out of them only 54 were stand-alone shelters and the rest 
are supposed to be schools, hospitals and monasteries. Only half of the 54 shelters can 
accommodate 500 people while the rest can house around 200 to 300 people. Recently, 
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thirty-five stand-alone shelters were allowed to be transformed into primary schools 
and dispensaries (MOI 2015).  
Within the three research zones there are only three stand-alone shelters. Out of the 
three, two are located in Kone Gyi village and Lay Yin Kwin village of Zone I, which 
can accommodate 100 and 500 people respectively. Another one is in Toe village of 
Zone I, which is big enough for 200 people. Unfortunately, 25 villages of Zone II 
which had the biggest need for housing were not close to any stand-alone shelter, and 
the whole island on which these villages are located has only two cyclone shelters. 
Moreover, not all school buildings that can be used as emergency shelter are strong 
enough to be cyclone resilient, especially the wooden buildings that were constructed 
in 2008. The newer six villages that were established less than 35 years ago had no 
school until by the end of 2015. As they are still inside the reserved forest area, they 
do not have permission to build official schools.  
As the school is most likely to be the biggest building in the village when the 
monasteries are smaller and weaker, the following small villages are identified as the 
most vulnerable: Lay Gwa, Htan Bin Kwin, Dani Chaung, Lake Thaung Yay Kyaw, 
Thaung Thar and Pauk Sein Kya villages. These villages do not have primary schools 
that can serve as emergency shelters. Meanwhile other villages have renovated schools 
that can accommodate villagers. But not all of them are elevated from the ground to 
protect from flood and surge. In group discussions in the three research areas, a new 
push for safety was expected in national and international engagement of current 
political context in terms of risk reduction. ‘The disaster can happen again’ was the 
prevalent opinion in the research areas as the existing buildings are not well maintained 
and the area continues to face hazards in the post-Nargis period.  
7.6.3 Sustainability outcome 
Considering the role of the environment in livelihoods, safety and place identity in the 
Delta community, conservation and reforestation was stated as one of the major aims 
of communities in the group discussions. Nevertheless, the actual implementation 
differs depending on economic conditions, leadership of the village and outside 
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assistance in the form of recovery or disaster risk reduction programs. The ecosystem 
provides a natural means to enhance protection against natural hazards and reduce 
socio-economic vulnerability that can limit response capacity to disaster risk (Andrade 
et al. 2011). Local knowledge on the value of mangroves reflected what scientists had 
said about the value of mangroves as rich in biodiversity, providing different 
ecological and ecosystem services and enhancing community welfare.  
A small-scale replantation of mangroves in six villages (Kwin Yar, Kong Gyi, Lay Yin 
Kwin, Nant Tha Gone and Zee Thaung and May Dar Ai) of Zone I has been a great 
success. Kwin Yar’s community forest is referred to as a success story, which was 
initiated in the framework of disaster risk reduction, and involved village-led efforts 
with some resources provided from outside. Moreover, individual farmers are also 
maintaining mangroves on the frontiers of their own farms. Participants in the 
discussion from this village credited the mangroves for a decline in erosion of the bank 
and also as a wind shield:  
In the past, we were eager to cut trees to expand the farm land. Now we have deep 
concern in cutting trees recklessly. Restoration of mangrove contributed to a recent 
increase of the number of crabs. Due to the revived forest, we have easier access 
to firewood and protection against the strong wind. (Naw Say Lwal, a female 
vegetable grower of 51, Kwin Yar village, Zone I)  
In Zone II, 10 villages out of the total 25 had mangrove restoration projects in 2013. 
Some of them were supported by the forest department and some were initiated by 
NGOs. All of them are indicated as not expanding because of limited participation due 
to local people’s day-to-day struggle for living. Zone III does not have much space for 
community-led mangrove restoration activities as few vacant areas are left around the 
villages. Tawkhayan Gyi, Seik Kyi and Thayet Thone Bin have collective initiatives 
for mangrove restoration. In these villages, villagers built a consensus to use a parcel 
of the village land for mangroves. Overall, mangrove reforestation as a recovery 
outcome for sustainability shows limited success in Zones II and III, while Zone I is 
relatively better. In general, the environmental degradation in all three research zones 
precisely reflected what was stated in UNEP’s report on the Delta in the post-Nargis 
period: 
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Poverty is the root cause of environmental degradation in Nargis-affected areas. 
The limited ability of local people to appropriately manage their natural 
resources is motivated by their struggle for survival in what has become an 
increasingly over-exploited environment. This is a classic example of the 
poverty–environment nexus. The vicious circle of unsustainable natural 
resource management results in environmental degradation, forcing households 
to over-extract resources just to meet daily subsistence needs. This leads to a 
downward spiral of dwindling resources, jeopardising food security and 
livelihoods. This phenomenon reflects the current state of the environment in 
the Ayeyarwady Delta as well as in parts of Yangon Division. (UNEP 2009, 
p.10) 
7.7 Conclusion 
After nearly 10 years, Delta recovery can still be assumed to be an ongoing process 
for local communities. The dynamics of recovery challenge clear demarcation due to 
processes and outcomes spread over years. The complex interactions of local 
communities, local authorities, the national government, local and international 
organizations also make it difficult to outline a simple narrative. This chapter has 
attempted to explore much complexity in an expanded narrative to locate community 
security in the present time. Moving to various narratives and the identification of the 
recovery process and outcome in the three research areas, this research concludes that 
both positive and negative aspects of recovery were present in all communities. Assets 
for safety are yet to cover marginal communities while community processes are 
advancing in varying degrees. 
Community processes of participation and leadership gained momentum in the long-
term recovery phase while the national political transition is contributing further. 
Sustainability and expansion of the environment and physical assets (in the place 
domain) seem to be recovering slowly in most places with a high intensity of poverty 
while the areas with more active community processes and better economic situations 
increase and enhance the assets to some degree. Human capital and other social aspects 
of the community such as health and education (in the people domain) have also 
improved to some degree under the national framework. But localized deprivation, 
such as fresh water shortages and limited livelihood opportunities, inhibit most of a 
           
          
 
243 
 
marginal community’s ability to enhance its wellbeing. In a comparison of the three 
research zones, pre-existing inequality before Cyclone Nargis still has impacts in the 
reconstruction and recovery phases.    
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
This research has studied the disaster resilience and vulnerability aspects of village 
communities from a human security perspective in the context of a focusing event, 
Cyclone Nargis. Evidences show that the early warning system at the time of Cyclone 
Nargis was in operation but the effectiveness is in question. Evacuation planning was 
almost non-existent although the cyclone this time was forecasted to have a more 
severe devastation than Mala cyclone of 2006. In the global level, early warning 
systems (EWS) have been advancing with the help of technology in recent decades. 
Still, this phenomenal progress was not applied to the case of Cyclone Nargis.  
Observation in this study of Cyclone Nargis with the lens of human security 
framework is expected to be useful in the context of developing countries that share 
similar characteristics with the Ayeyarwaddy Delta. In the light of human security with 
early prevention approach, findings in this study highlight a crucial role of assets to 
provide and receive storm warnings (national weather service, community radio, radio 
at household) as well as a process to act on warning (community DRR, local warning 
volunteers) in pre-impact phase. In a vulnerable geographic area where poverty deeply 
prevails, assets to take refuge (cyclone shelter, school) and process to reach a refuge 
(safe evacuation, taking care of vulnerable population) in impact phase; assets to relief 
and recover (livelihoods supports, housing etc.) and process to enhance resilience 
(more participation, community ownership, bridging and linking communication) in 
post-impact phase are identified as crucial elements for enhancing human security. 
The chapters four, five and six present key findings regarding underlying conditions 
that hampered the disaster resilience of the community. Tracing back to the state of 
the Delta in the historical context of Myanmar, a profile of pre-impact vulnerability 
was explored in relation to direct and indirect legacies from different policy regimes. 
Moving from the pre-impact to the impact phase, problems with the early warning 
system were analyzed according to vertical linkages between national-level 
institutions and village-level communities. Then, in the storm emergency (impact 
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phase) of Cyclone Nargis, this study located the causes of vulnerability and resilience 
in the process of struggle and survival of the local communities. Long-existing 
structural and physical vulnerability at the time of Cyclone Nargis now can provide 
some explanatory answer to the basic question of ‘Why did so many people die?’  
The lessons learned from the community perspective as well as the national context 
illustrate what needs to be done to prevent another tragedy. Extending from the pre-
impact and impact phase discussion, the post-impact recovery process was explored in 
Chapter 7. Recovery outcomes in relation to safety aspects of the community were 
discussed as a process that builds varying degrees of resilience and capabilities. This 
chapter assumed recovery in the Delta to be ongoing. As a process of being 
conditioned to the scale of devastation and marginality in the three research areas, the 
recovery outcomes clarify the current state of the community in the Delta regarding 
human security.  
Overall, this study has argued that promoting human security in the disaster scenario 
in Myanmar’s Delta needs to link the community’s resilience capacity with the long-
term commitment to the national disaster management policy framework. While this 
is a geographically focused study with specific cases from Cyclone Nargis-affected 
areas, an assessment tool to measure the safety aspect of community in the forms of 
‘assets’ and ‘processes’ is expected to be useful in the context of rural communities in 
other areas, especially in coastal regions. Examples from several cases of the 
Ayeyarwady Delta show that access to basic life safety assets is often beyond local 
communities. As analyzed in the chapters concerned, the ‘assets’ can provide and 
receive hazard warnings in pre-impact phases. These assets include facilities that 
support functions of early warning systems and the effectiveness of warnings among 
the people such as the national weather service, media channels, community radio and 
TV, and disaster preparedness kits containing torches and so on.  
The ‘process’ of acting on a hazard warning can be related to the community DRR 
mechanism including the functions of volunteers to spread the warning systematically 
in the pre-impact phase and support of NGOs and community-based organizations in 
disaster preparedness. In areas where people cannot afford to own disaster-resilient 
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houses, physical ‘life safety assets’ such as cyclone shelters, monasteries, churches 
and schools, and natural assets from the environment can be a place to take refuge. In 
a process for safety, many actions and actors are involved. To move along with the 
community or individually to the refuge, the process here includes safe evacuation, 
taking care of vulnerable people, and carrying out search and rescue by community 
volunteer groups. Both in the impact phase and post-impact phase, assets for relief and 
recovery may take the form of livelihoods support, building reliable infrastructure for 
communication and transportation, providing basic public services such as health care 
and education and access to disaster-resilient housing.  
A process of enhancing resilience in the recovery phase needs more participation from 
the community, ownership by the community in taking initiatives, and bridging and 
linking social capital that sustains resource acquisition and knowledge transfer through 
social networks. A top-down recovery process with little involvement from the 
community was found to be ineffective, and sometimes even harmful to the social 
fabric. Also, weak and vulnerable communities alone cannot revive without linking to 
external support for sustainable development while their own deprivation is very deep. 
In communities where geophysical vulnerability is high and resilience is low due to 
the long presence of deprivation in a declining environment, the right configuration of 
assets and processes for human security can only be formed with resource and 
technological transfer from outside, which must be complemented by participatory 
initiatives.  
With regard to pre-impact vulnerability, Chapter 4 of this research traced back to the 
agricultural expansion policy and transformation of the Ayeyarwady Delta in colonial 
times. After Independence in 1948, many areas of the Delta were embroiled in civil 
war. When the civil war was scaled down and most of the fighting moved from the 
central area of the country to ethnic areas along the border, the Delta together with 
Myanmar entered a long period of military rule. The first military rule from 1962 to 
1988 was characterized by socio-economic decline of the whole country. In that 
period, the government’s rice procurement policy, which was designed to extract rice 
at fixed prices from farmers, weakened the Delta community as agriculture is the main 
source of livelihoods in the area. The extraction of resources from the rural population 
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continued under the second military rule of 1988 to 2010 and much of the Delta 
environment was devastated as revealed by Cyclone Nargis in 2008. It was argued in 
Chapter 4 that the socio-economic decline that made the whole country suffer was 
manifested in a brutal way in the Delta.  
If the Delta had been assumed to have situations such as better health, this might have 
improved personal strength to survive, better education might have empowered the 
people to be able to understand the risks and better nourishment might have helped the 
children’s development, better housing might have provided refuge in the storm, and 
it could have saved many more lives. In response to the question of why it is essential 
to state the obvious facts of socio-economic factors in disaster vulnerability and why 
I needed to devote one chapter to situate the vulnerability of the Delta in an historical 
context, the argument here is that the community’s insecurity and vulnerability cannot 
be separated from the political regime if we are going to build resiliency. These causal 
links need to be stressed in the understanding of the nexus of disaster and human 
security so that we can use a particular disaster (in this case, Cyclone Nargis) as a 
‘focusing event’ in reaching the overall goal of strengthening resiliency and promoting 
sustainable development. 
In the current political transition of Myanmar, the opportunity exists to move the 
country to a sustainable and resilient pathway. Varying degrees of vulnerability in 
different places should receive attention before these aspects of vulnerability transition 
to a disaster when hazards strike. Natural hazards unfortunately are not that rare in the 
current context of climate change especially in the coastal region of Myanmar in the 
Bay of Bengal. Myanmar has been consistently ranked as one of the world’s most 
vulnerable countries (Kreft et al. 2015).  
Another aspect of vulnerability shown in Chapter 4 was when an authoritarian state 
tried to control or dominate the space of the local community: social capital of the 
community was hard to expand to reach bridging and linking levels, which otherwise 
could have helped them to channel resources for reducing vulnerability. It took the 
whole experience of Cyclone Nargis to bridge and link with outside actors such as civil 
society, to channel the resources in desperation. Even in much-lauded initiatives of 
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Myanmar civil society in relief efforts after Cyclone Nargis, we should not forget that 
such interactions were restricted for years under military rule of Myanmar. As shown 
in the earlier efforts of the intervention of the authorities to prevent aid from reaching 
the affected area right after Cyclone Nargis, the space of civil society had been 
fluctuating under an authoritarian mood of ruling.  
What is revealed in the study of Cyclone Nargis is the importance of local leadership 
and social capital of the community that facilitates links with the outside. Without 
putting the community at the center of decisions in disaster recovery, resources 
transferred from the outside also might not effectively contribute to human security of 
the community. But without outside linkages to tangible and intangible resources, 
community capabilities were limited. The authoritarian nature of the ruling state 
resulted in shrinking civic spaces that led to community vulnerability and, in addition, 
many negative impacts on governance. After the political transition, the people can 
enjoy more freedom than they did before Cyclone Nargis. Still, the current government 
which has to manage a number of competing priorities from different regions and 
sectors within the country, is still struggling to channel resources for rural communities 
in the Delta. But expanded space for civic actions in a ‘freer atmosphere’ provides 
options to local communities to bridge and link up with resources and ideas to advance 
resilience-enhancing initiatives.  
Recognizing the crucial role of an early warning system in saving life, Chapter 5 of 
this research looked into the lack of sufficient warning to the Delta population at the 
time that Cyclone Nargis was approaching. While monitoring part of the early warning 
system fulfilled its role in providing an accurate forecast, proper risk analysis was 
weak, effective dissemination was limited at best and no plan existed on the ground to 
activate evacuation. The warning process was intended to provide safety for the public, 
but it did not happen in the end result.  
In the four phases of an effective early warning process, which include risk knowledge 
accumulation, monitoring and warning service, dissemination and communication 
warnings and response capability, much effort is needed to correct the system to gain 
positive results as shown in the discussion of Chapter 5. Details such as adapting the 
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warning system to meet local needs by using locally understandable names for issuing 
weather warnings, having policies that promote assets such as radios and mobile 
phones to receive the warning, providing formal or informal education, risk knowledge 
of storm surge and building public trust in the early warning system.  
Beyond this local process, the national policy regime needed to be examined in the 
context of early warning in Cyclone Nargis. ‘Did the government prioritize human 
security by using available resources to inform and alert the public?’ The answer is 
negative. ‘Did the government give attention to human resource development that can 
contribute capabilities such as understanding risk and acting on it?’ The answer is that 
little effort was put in place. ‘Did the government strengthen monitoring and warning 
capacity of state institutions such as the Department of Meteorology and Hydrology?’ 
The answer is no. ‘Did the government promote a false sense of security in the context 
of religion and culture to enhance their legitimacy?’ The answer is that regular features 
of the government media machine drove a false sense of security. It was obvious from 
the Cyclone Nargis experience and is still relevant today that more effort is needed to 
bridge a local disaster risk reduction process and there needs to be a national 
commitment to effective early warning systems that save lives.  
The horizontal move from the early warning to the harsh reality of struggle and 
survival at the cyclone landfall (the storm emergency/impact phase) was described in 
Chapter 6. So far, not many studies exist on this aspect of disaster in disaster research. 
Narratives of the community are shown in two strands of survival: Having refuge 
assets which could withstand storm and storm surge, such as strong houses, higher 
ground or protective trees; and individual or collective evacuation processes to safety. 
The process often involves looking for alternative assets when existing ones have 
collapsed and damage to seemingly safe refuges prompted people to move to another 
refuge. Again, it is revealed that strong structures (physical assets) could save many 
lives but management of these assets, a good lead time to start evacuation, and 
leadership in evacuation are all based in the community process.  
Hence, the national political regime implicates a weak link in supporting both physical 
assets and community process in context of Cyclone Nargis. The reasons why houses 
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were not storm-resilient to some degree are rooted in the failure of economic policy 
and reduction of poverty. Environmental assets were degraded due to the 
mismanagement of resource extraction, prevailing corruption and lack of sustainable 
development policy. A lack of a functioning DRR policy also linked to failure to 
encourage disaster preparedness among the people.   
At this point, a major issue in the context of human security is that of divergent views 
for helping the people of Myanmar. As explained in the initial part of this research, the 
state security (arguable regime security) was a focus of the military regime in 
Myanmar at the time of Cyclone Nargis. Human security in the aspect of safety in the 
community was not high on the national regime agenda. In this context, there are two 
opposing views to be noticed in the domestic arena. The first is to blame the military 
regime for everything that happened as much of the misery and the roots of poverty 
were caused by them. This view can be referred to as a political solution to 
vulnerability. The second view perceived that the military regime was responsible for 
many things but Cyclone Nargis was a natural disaster. That is why politicizing acts 
should not be involved here. This approach may be called a humanitarian solution to 
vulnerability. In the case of Cyclone Nargis, the coordination of the Myanmar 
government was its own adjustment in the political arena that allowed wider 
humanitarian space while some credit should go to the constructive engagement of 
ASEAN and UN. But a situation of intense pressure from humanitarian needs and from 
citizen mobilization to fulfill them with whatever was available, had pushed and 
expanded political boundaries.  
In terms of engagement with the outside world, this research has highlighted the vital 
roles of both approaches, ‘political and humanitarian’, with the centrality of 
community and outcomes of capability in any formulation of strategy. Some critical 
points were raised concerning the sweeping disengagement of the international and 
humanitarian community from Myanmar in the context of sanctions against the 
military regime. While this approach was intended to weaken the military regime (the 
effectiveness is widely debated), the outcome of sanctions for the rural community 
meant fewer resources to reduce vulnerability. While resilience and vulnerability of 
community are directly related to the national political regime, the state has primary 
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responsibility for the disaster risk management. However, the lesson learned here is 
that there were missed opportunities for the humanitarian and development community 
to find ways to engage with the community to ease vulnerability and to promote risk 
sensitivity. The community’s coping and resiliency can be better approached by the 
participation of all stakeholders who can contribute to effective DRR with 
development and capabilities of communities.  
The dynamics of interactions among community members, authorities and the aid 
community was outlined in the recovery aspect of Chapter 7. Again, the centrality of 
community was highlighted in this chapter as the findings suggest that many initiatives 
that overrode community’s participation and community’s ownership ended up in 
overall negative outcomes in the recovery. While many resources are still needed to 
build safety structures such as cyclone shelters and better housing, it was community 
leadership that aid organizations should have put first.  
This research finds that one of the best ways aid organizations can contribute is by 
empowering community and facilitating positive social capital in bridging and 
bonding to larger structures of institutions, organization and governance. This linking 
and bridging should not only target channeling resources and ideas to the community 
but also learning from the community and changing accordingly to meet local needs 
within the flexibility of a larger disaster risk reduction framework. Learning and 
understanding from the recovery phase insist that a vertical link of engagement among 
stakeholders including community, institutions, organizations and national governance 
should extend from short-term initiatives to long-term commitments.  
Before Cyclone Nargis, the state of underdevelopment in Myanmar’s disaster 
management system was little known. Cyclone Nargis called much attention from the 
policymakers to put necessary effort for preventing future risk. Institutions for long-
term disaster risk reduction have been strengthened significantly in the aftermath of 
Cyclone Nargis. The Government of Myanmar modified the government structure and 
established new institutions and plans to improve the effectiveness of disaster 
management at all levels. However, (CFE-DM 2017) expressed ‘the resources to 
implement the policy changes have been slower to develop’ despite the enthusiasm of 
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Myanmar government to make new adjustments for progress. Regardless of level of 
capacity, integrating disaster risk reduction in the country’s development agenda is 
increasingly in demand due to the following factors: (1) political transition in the 
country paved the way for a growing momentum of civic advocacy for mainstreaming 
disaster risk reduction and more citizens’ participation in disaster relief effort, (2) the 
need for stronger disaster management and response institutions are highlighted by 
subsequent disasters in the Post-Nargis years including a major flood of 2015 and 2016 
respectively, (3) needs to comply international DRR mechanisms such as the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the ASEAN Agreement on 
Disaster Management and Emergency Response.  
Myanmar have taken steps to update Myanmar Action Plan for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (MAPDRR) 2009-2015 and the Standing Order on Natural Disaster 
Management which was adopted in January 2009 based on the experience in years 
after Cyclone Nargis. In the previous MAPDRR, national-level monitoring and 
evaluation of the DRR activities were not included and the new one must have 
institution and arrangement for monitoring and evaluation for future efficiency. 
Among the institutional improvement, the government also established a disaster 
Management fund at the national level (Mizzima 2015). Myanmar also planned to 
build a new roadmap for disaster risk reduction in 2016 in a collaboration with the UN 
and the existing Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group which is composed of a 
diverse network of 49 organizations (UNDP 2016). As there were critics from civil 
society against 2013 Disaster Management Law for not filling the gap of inclusiveness 
for the most vulnerable groups and leaving the aspect of mitigation out of the law, new 
strategy making under NLD government is expected to adjust the Disaster 
management rules and regulation to minimize disaster risk and improve resiliency in 
a better way. In eight years after Cyclone Nargis, time for the sheer advocacy disaster 
risk reduction has passed. Now the adovates says, it is time to shift from planning for 
ensuring human security in the context of disaster to effective implementation (UNDP 
2016).  
This legacy of institutional and financial weakness must be carried away by the 
incumbent government of 2016 led by NLD. As natural and man-made hazards are 
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demanding a huge cost in nearly every year, NLD government winning the election in 
2015 with landslide victory also need to give attention to the disaster risk reduction 
within existing weak structure. The previous government’s vision to go ‘a people-
centered resilient growth by building back better’ is now transferred to the shoulders 
of NLD government. This study conveys narratives of different communities from 
three separate areas in the Ayeyarwaddy Delta. The findings in previous chapters give 
a vivid illustration of the gap between the state policies and existing needs of human 
security on the ground. Setting up national institutions from the above is not 
automatically translated as uplifting the lives of most vulnerable people especially 
those from the margin. The changes in national policy have had influence in improving 
the overall situation of people from the Delta. But the long-term recovery process has 
had mixed results so far as storm recovery assistance has dramatically declined since 
2011 while expected sustainable economic development and better infrastructure have 
yet to reach the Delta in the current state of political change.  
Disaster preparedness is more effective when it is locally relevant preparation and 
adaptation that can provide safety for communities, especially for marginal area of the 
Delta. As the safety aspect in the recovery in Chapter 7 shows, sparsely populated but 
scattered small villages areas need to be strategic in selecing the location of cyclone 
shelters as they need to consider the complexity of evacuation processes in cases where 
people have to travel from distant locations with difficult mobility through several 
waterways. Another lesson from Cyclone Nargis for that aspect is that the community 
needs good lead time and a community-based disaster preparedness plan to evacuate 
in difficult terrain especially if a stronger shelter is not located nearby.  
To fight against the government’s complacency was another expectation of this 
research. Since the 2011 political transition of Myanmar, more optimism has been 
spread nationally and internationally by semi-civilian governments. The military still 
has control of a good part of the government but the recent changes pivot on human 
security at least in the national policy discourse. The vulnerability of the Delta was 
still evident as stated in the number of cyclone shelters, rates of poverty, rising sea 
levels, and continuing degradation of the coastal environment. On the other hand, the 
resiliency aspect of community is also noted in the expanded space for local people to 
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engage in policy making. A growing civil society makes villages better connected with 
organizations and ideas from outside. Still there is a lot to be done for the community’s 
safety and for the human security of the Delta by the government, by village 
communities themselves and by internal and external organizations. The most 
alarming questions are, ‘Is the Ayeyarwady Delta ready for another Cyclone? Is the 
community better prepared for it? Is human security acceptably enhanced in the 
marginal area of the Delta so it could resist such a storm?’ 
Cyclone Nargis was the biggest disaster in Myanmar’s history. More than 150,000 
people died and there was huge loss and damage to the Ayeyarwady Delta. The lessons 
from Cyclone Nargis have been extracted from two aspects of this research: One, in 
an exploration of the temporal phases of Cyclone Nargis in looking at a community’s 
resiliency and vulnerability, and second, in an analysis of the causes of vulnerability 
and resiliency within a village community and beyond. The lessons are applicable to 
many marginal areas with human security concerns. Roots of vulnerability and 
resilience can be located not only in the present but also in the implications of past 
policies. Holistic views linking the past and the present have revealed ways in which 
a society can be healed and built as a safer community. As stated in the introduction, 
it is believed that the lessons need to be spread. This research is an endeavor to drive 
the lessons from the village to the leaders of society and the policy community. In this 
way, there is hope that the tragedy of Cyclone Nargis conveys the message of how to 
avert future tragedy in the Delta and many other places.  
8.1 Recommendations 
The following recommendations are based on the findings of this research concerning 
the safety of the Delta community as regards exposure to cyclone hazards.  
8.1.1 Early warning system 
1. The early warning system process in Myanmar needs to review overall 
efficiency in communication with the masses and should be strengthened with 
an emphasis on each part of monitoring and forecasting, risk analysis, issuing 
warnings, and activating evacuation processes.  
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2. The institutional capacity of the Department of Meteorology and Hydrology 
needs to be strengthened with more technical capacity for monitoring and 
forecasting. 
3. Systematic structures and standard procedures in dissemination of hazard 
warnings should be developed in coordination with government agencies, 
media, local authorities and community members. 
4. Local geographical names and language that is understandable to all citizens 
of the country regardless of their literacy levels, should be adopted. News and 
warnings for areas that are likely to be affected and that need prompt action 
must be sensitive to local names to enhance community comprehension. 
5. Public places such as schools, village clinics or communal spaces such as 
monasteries or churches should install a user-friendly risk map of the 
surrounding region. In the case of the Cyclone Nargis-affected areas, a map of 
the whole Delta could be helpful to avoid the direct impact of storm surge or 
Tsunami. 
6. Village communities should have designated volunteers or community-based 
disaster committee members to be alert to updates of cyclone situations and to 
distribute timely emergency warnings to make sure they reach every 
household.   
7. Schools in the Delta and in the coastal parts of Myanmar should include 
disaster preparedness education especially informing students about cyclone 
risk, and schools should maintain school-based disaster preparedness plans 
which are already tested. 
8. Cyclone, storm surge and tsunami awareness should be raised in the Delta and 
coastal communities of Myanmar with different media outreach efforts.  
9. Along with rising mobile phone penetration into rural society, a system should 
be installed for dissemination of alerts through telephone applications.   
 
8.1.2 Emergency management 
1. Disaster risk reduction activities need to be initiated at the community level 
and active disaster preparedness committees should be established in each 
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village or incorporated into the function of existing, strong organizations of a 
village.  
2. Disaster preparedness activities or evacuation drills should be initiated in 
village communities at the onset of the monsoon, with emphasis on vulnerable 
groups in each community. 
3. The need for and availability of cyclone shelters or other potential refuges 
should be assessed every year by the local authorities. These disaster-resilient 
buildings should be accessible to everyone in the community without 
discriminating against any marginal groups. These facilities should have 
enough strength and maintenance to accommodate a changing population. 
4. Access roads to cyclone shelters or refuges should be assessed every year and 
adjusted according to the changing human settlement patterns of the 
community.  
5. In villages without cyclone shelters or concrete schools or public structures, 
religious spaces such as monasteries or churches should be strengthened for 
storm emergency needs.  
 
8.1.3 Community assets and processes 
1. Communities should maintain and expand their natural barriers to prevent 
harm from hazards such as vegetation cover, barrier islands or mangrove 
forests. 
2. Communities should constantly check and maintain emergency assets such as 
stronger public buildings, and natural or man-made surroundings such as high 
ground or embankments. 
3. In the case of access to cyclone shelters or safer places, communities should 
plan for means of transportation in advance.  
4. Senior people from the village should have the chance to facilitate and share 
experience about storms from the past, including Cyclone Nargis.  
5. Villages that suffered in Cyclone Nargis should have memorials to remind the 
community about the storm experience and provide the lessons with the 
purpose of social learning.  
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6. In villages with sizable death tolls during Cyclone Nargis, an annual religious 
memorial for the deceased on the second or third of May could facilitate a 
social learning process.  
 
8.1.4 Governmental process 
1. The date of the second of May each year should be designated as a storm 
awareness day with educational and awareness-raising activities.  
2. A risk map of the Delta and coastal region should be produced, widely 
disseminated and communicated in various formats to communities. 
3. Local learning processes should be facilitated and supported by the State in 
various venues such as schools, cultural activities. 
4. The government should provide improved infrastructure for safety such as 
shelter, roads and embankments.  
5. Infrastructure development such as telecommunications should incorporate 
DRR services for communities.  
6. Local development initiatives should be approached from the perspectives of 
human security and the capabilities of local people.  
7. Environmental conservation should be integrated into the formulation and 
implementation of risk reduction and livelihood strategies.  
8. Environmental changes and other climate change-related risk for the country 
should be constantly assessed with a human security and community wellbeing 
focus. 
9. Local rights, local ownership and empowerment should be a focus in any 
development plans and disaster risk reduction activities.  
 
 8.1.5 International humanitarian and development communities 
1. The recovery process and the current vulnerability of the Delta should be 
assessed in the year of the tenth anniversary of Cyclone Nargis (i.e. 2018). 
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2. Developmental and safety needs of the Delta should be highlighted and 
resource mobilization should continue occasionally.  
3. Potential impacts of sea-level rise and climate on the human security of the 
Delta population should assess and provide help to the national government 
and local communities for adaptation.   
4. Eco-DRR and other resilience-enhancing activities should be promoted and 
feasible assistance should be mobilized. 
5. In the changing political landscape and expanding humanitarian and 
developmental space, the international community should seize the opportunity 
to support long-term sustainability of the community.  
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Appendix 1  
List of the villages that participated in this research  
 
N
o 
Village 
name 
Village 
code 
&Gmtrnf Village tract Town-ship 
Longi-
tude Latitude 
Death 
toll 
Popula
-tion 
in 
2013 
Zone I 
1 Kone Gyi 154488 ukef;BuD; 
Kone Gyi 
(Pyinsalu Sub-
township) 
Labutt
a 94.76142 15.8215 167 1030 
2 Aung Hlaing 154491 
atmifvIdif 
Kone Gyi 
(Pyinsalu Sub-
township) 
Labutt
a 94.77185 15.7987 320 230 
3 Na That 154493 eowf 
Kone Gyi 
(Pyinsalu Sub-
township) 
Labutt
a 94.77645 15.81801 211 311 
4 Lay Yin Kwin 154494 
av,mOfuGif; 
Kone Gyi 
(Pyinsalu Sub-
township) 
Labutt
a 94.81249 15.79643 500 1884 
5 Kwin Yar 154495 uGif;,m; 
Kone Gyi 
(Pyinsalu Sub-
township) 
Labutt
a 94.74446 15.8301 30 714 
6 Dee Du Kone 151513 
'D;'l;ukef; 
Dee Du Kone 
(Hainggyikyun 
Sub-township) 
Labutt
a 94.41754 15.87928 0 1050 
7 Kyauk Ka Lat 151514 
ausmufuv
yf 
Dee Du Kone 
(Hainggyikyun 
Sub-township) 
Labutt
a 94.43308 15.8841 0 3600 
8 
May Dar 
Ai 
 
151517 ar'gtdkif 
Dee Du Kone 
(Hainggyikyun 
Sub-township) 
Labutt
a 94.41314 15.86831 7 680 
9 Zee Thaung 151518 
ZD;aomif 
Dee Du Kone 
(Hainggyikyun 
Sub-township) 
Labutt
a 94.41109 15.87558 6 400 
10 Bone Taw Pyayt 158889 
bkef;awmfjy
nfh 
Oke Twin 
(Hainggyikyun 
Sub-township) 
Labutt
a 94.45863 15.92806 
Over 
1000 1050 
Zone II 
1 Aye Yar Ward II 150602 
at&mtydkif; 
(2) Aye Yar Bogale 95.1127 15.80894 5 3695 
2 
Western 
Yay Kyaw 
Gyi 
150608 
aandausmfMuD
; Aye Yar Bogale 95.10934 15.84594 37 428 
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3 Ywar Tha Yar 150609 
&Gmom,m Aye Yar Bogale 95.11791 15.83643 41 433 
4 Tha Ma Seik Ta 150610 
orpdwÅ Aye Yar Bogale 95.14837 15.79868 2 335 
5 War Taw Kone 150611 
0g;awmukef; Aye Yar Bogale 95.13971 15.78869 5 300 
6 Tha Pyay Yoe 150604 
oajy&dk; Aye Yar Bogale 95.16472 15.79585 2 595 
7 Thaung Thar 
No 
code 
aomifom Aye Yar Bogale 95.16485 15.77838 0 210 
8 Say Yoe Kwin 150612 
aq;&dk;uGif; Aye Yar Bogale 95.14829 15.78481 0 597 
9 Gway Chaung 153196 
a*G;acsmif; Ka Don Ka Ni Bogale 95.21425 15.82808 550 860 
10 Shwe Sar Yan 153198 
a&Tpm&H Ka Don Ka Ni Bogale 95.21934 15.80542 14 630 
11 
Leik 
Thaung 
Yay Kyaw 
153205 
vdyfaomifa&
ausmf Ka Don Ka Ni Bogale 95.19923 15.81042 15 567 
12 
Kyein 
Chaung 
Hpyar 
153206 
Mudrfacsmif;zsm
; Ka Don Ka Ni Bogale 95.20087 15.82568 25 675 
13 
Eastern 
Yay Kyaw 
Gyi 
153207 
aandausmfMuD
;(ta&SU) Ka Don Ka Ni Bogale 95.19806 15.86102 119 214 
14 Da Ni Chaung 153208 
 "edacsmif; Ka Don Ka Ni Bogale 95.20907 15.84864 1 370 
15 Kywe Hpyu 153209 
uRJjzL Ka Don Ka Ni Bogale 95.15476 15.78105 0 398 
16 Htan Pin Kwin 
No 
code 
xef;yifuGif; Ka Don Ka Ni Bogale 95.1795297 
15.79896
1 2 680 
17 Zee Hpyu Ywar Ma 155504 
ZD;jzL&Gmr Kyein Chaung 
Gyi Bogale 95.18591 15.87479 51 565 
18 Pauk Sein Kya 155507 
aygufqdefus Kyein Chaung 
Gyi Bogale 95.1991 15.87241 58 951 
19 Chaung Byea Gyi 155508 
acsmif;jAJMuD; Kyein Chaung 
Gyi Bogale 95.20987 15.89043 300 1511 
20 
Kyein 
Chaung 
Gyi 
155493 
Mudrfacsmif;MuD
; 
Kyein Chaung 
Gyi Bogae 95.19040 16.04791 1342 1392 
21 Hnar Gyi 155538 ESmBuD; Kyein Chaung Gyi Bogale 95.17653 15.85083 14 350 
22 Lay Gwa No code 
av;*G Kyein Chaung 
Gyi Bogale 95.20959 15.89194 200 719 
           
          
 
 261 
23 Khar Chin Kyun 156298 
cgcsOfuRef; Kyun Thar Yar Bogale 95.12110 16.01189 70 170 
24 Mon Taing Lay 156301 
rkefwdkif;av; Kyun Thar Yar Bogale 95.12334 15.90548 335 190 
25 Ma Pway Tan 164121 
rayG;wef; Kyein Chaung 
Gyi Bogale 95.23816 15.94307 141 172 
Zone III 
1 Taw Kha Yan (East) 161343 
awmfc&rf; 
(ta&SU) 
Taw Kha Yan 
(East) 
Kungy
angone 96.05215 16.41045 309 2800 
2 Seik Gyi 161345 qdyfBuD; Taw Kha Yan (West) 
Kungy
angone 96.01879 16.40425 67 1318 
3 Kyun Chaung 161346 
uRef;acsmif; Taw Kha Yan 
(West) 
Kungy
angone 96.02817 16.39523 40 1900 
4 Taw Ku (West) 161353 
awmful; 
(taemuf) Taw Ku (West) 
Kungy
angone 96.10759 16.43159 16 1453 
5 Thone Gwa 162705 
oHk;cG Thone Gwa Kungyangone 95.99424 16.4196 210 2000 
6 Pay Kone 159233 ayukef; Pay Kone Kungyangone 95.99936 16.4215 9 1100 
7 Auk Seik 153411 atmufqdyf Ka Nyin Kone Kungyangone 96.09692 16.34238 0 805 
8 Thayet Thonebin 219290 
o&ufoHk;yif Thone Gwa Kungyangone 96.10192 16.42737 50 1200 
9 Sar Kyin 215383 qm;usif; Toe Dedaye 96.07627 16.32858 20 1290 
10 Toe 162818 wdk; Toe Dedaye 96.06742 16.30759 17 4000 
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Appendix 2 
Semi-Structured questions for Focus Group 
Discussions 
 (A) 24 Hours before Nargis  
1. How did you receive information about the storm? 
2.What was your immediate decision in the next hours? 
3. What did you do for preparation? 
(B) Would you mind sharing me about your experience during the cyclone? 
(C) Please specify about your experience within 24 hours right after the cyclone 
1. What made you survive? 
2. What was your first action? 
3. What you needed most by that time? 
4. What was dominating in your thought and action? 
(D) Recalling after the storm 
1. Did people die here? If yes, what were the causes? 
2. How can you relate the environmental changes (such as losing of mangrove) and 
high death toll?  
3. Did you think the warning you receive made a difference to your experience? 
4. What else could you have done to evacuate yourself and loved ones? What could 
you not do? 
(E) Disaster response of different stakeholders 
1. How do you think about the response of authorities to post-Nargis period? 
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2. After the storm, how long did it take for community members to start helping each 
other? 
3. How long did it take to receive the first relief aid of civilian? 
4. How long did it take to receive the first relief aid of NGOs? 
How long did it take to receive the first relief aid from government institutions? 
In emergency phase, how did the community leaders (formal, informal and religious 
leaders) reacts to the situation? 
Who were the most vulnerable to disaster during the storm and after the storm? 
What enhanced the resiliency of the survivors in post-disaster period? 
What were the priorities for the community in immediate days after Cyclone Nargis? 
What were the challenges in resettlement and rehabilitation phases?  
 (F) Assessment for change after five Years 
In five years after the storm hit the community, what are the changes you have seen 
in your society?  
What are the impacts of relief and reconstruction aid to the community? 
What are the changes in your family? 
What are the changes in your surrounding natural environment within these five 
years? 
What is irreplaceable loss for the community? 
(H) Disaster preparedness 
What are the most essential elements for safety in case you happen to face a storm 
again? 
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Are there uses of traditional knowledge for understanding the weather? Could you 
elaborate more on traditional knowledge applied in the community? 
What would you need to prepare to reduce disaster risk if something bad like 
Cyclone Nargis is likely to happen? 
What would be a refuge for you to evacuate at the time of disaster? If you have any, 
please explain how you can access and the current condition of these assets?  
How would you assess the vulnerability of the community if a strong cyclone like 
Nargis occurs? 
How do you evaluate the capacity and adequacy of disaster preparedness mechanism 
currently established in the community and their function linking to the institutions 
above? 
What are the progress and the biggest shortcomings in community-based disaster risk 
reduction institutions? 
How do the community members get weather news now? 
J.  Question to understand the viability of eco-DRR 
What are the biggest threats to the environment and sustainable livelihoods in your 
community? 
How does livelihoods condition link to disaster risk reduction? 
What are the changes you notice in weather/climate around you and at sea around 
your community? 
In which situation, the community can apply best eco-system based disaster risk 
reduction?   
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